


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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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Central Asia

Nazarbayev Speeches at Kazakh Supreme Soviet

On Union Treaty Draft

91US0119A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 18 Oct 90 pp 1-2

[Report by N. A. Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR, at the second session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, on the draft of the new Union Treaty]

[Text] Esteemed deputies and comrades!

I would not be sinning against the truth if I said that the question which we are examining today is the pivotal one for all of perestroyka as a whole. Moreover, in many respects it is determining the fate of the present and future generations of Soviet people, since it deals with a most important sphere of social life—the structure of our multinational state.

Eras are changing right before our eyes. On the one hand, this two-part process is characterized by the break-up and elimination of the command-administrative system from the political arena; on the other, by the birth of a new civil society where the person is becoming the highest value and protecting the interests of each citizen and each individual person is the main goal. Of course, the set of problems which we are living with is unusually diverse. However, throughout time people's strongest desire has been the desire for freedom. It has never atrophied, even when under the yoke of the most rigid unitarism for decades. Today we are feeling the full power of the civil will of the people of Kazakhstan, which focuses on affirming republic sovereignty. And no one will question the obvious truth that the republic's economic and social progress is inconceivable without its obtaining real freedom and without overcoming the diktat of the central departments.

But the question arises of how to realize the undoubtedly healthy ideas of sovereignty and national renewal of peoples and their independence and self-management, given the specifics of the country's life. How can the two seemingly mutually exclusive and opposing currents be combined onto one channel? And it is no accident that more and more often we hear voices of alarm warning against a fatal severance of the economic, cultural, demographic, and other ties which have become established among Soviet people of various nationalities during the years of their life together. What can we say about that?

Yes, we want to break the center's strong "hold" and put an end to the republic's humiliating subjugation. But that does not at all mean that Kazakhstan intends to "slam the door" and at the same time rid itself of those blood and fraternal bonds which helped us survive difficult experiences and became the cementing foundation of our Union.

We believe that sovereignty may be achieved through fundamental reform of the existing state order, at the same time preserving permanent values—unity and cohesion. Ultimately, the progress of any people or any state is inconceivable if they have isolated themselves. That is one of the few rules of world history which operate without any exceptions. That is why we have been and continue to be staunch supporters of a union of the republics. We have already expressed this principled position in a number of documents and statements. Among other things, the draft of the Declaration on State Sovereignty which we are discussing emphasizes that on the basis of the free self-determination of its people, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic "unites with other republics in a renewed union of sovereign republics." In other words, Kazakhstan has been and continues to be a member of the federation, but a qualitatively renewed one based on a Union Treaty in full accord with contemporary realities.

On the basis of this position, a special Kazakh SSR commission authorized by the republic's president and consisting of leading legal scholars, republic people's deputies, and practical specialists prepared the Kazakhstan version of the draft of the Union Treaty. Allow me to briefly present its main provisions.

We believe that the Soviet sovereign states called Union republics, as well as all national-state formations, including autonomous ones, are participants in the Union Treaty. There are no such formations in the Kazakh SSR, so it difficult and even perhaps unethical for us to give any advice regarding how to insure the equal participation of all national-state formations in the Union Treaty. However, for us it is altogether certain that the principle of equality of all nations and peoples should be observed, regardless of their size or form of statehood.

In the past, closely tied with the formation and affirmation of the command-administrative system of government and the departure from the Leninist understanding and implementation of the democratic and humanitarian nature of socialism, unnecessarily rigid and in many respects bureaucratic centralization which restricted the sovereignty of the Union republics and constrained their initiative and activism became established in our country. The wrong idea that the way to strengthen the Union state lay for the most part through ever-greater centralization and expanded powers of the Union organs began to take root more and more in theory and practice. As a result, by the mid-1980s a severe disparity and a sharp contradiction had developed between the immeasurably increased economic, cultural, and cadre potential of the republics and their real ability to independently resolve their own problems, on the one hand, and excessive centralization on the other.

Consequently, we should not be speaking only of the significantly increased role and expanded rights of the republics in all areas of social life. It is important to

overcome the opinion which has taken shape over many decades that the Union can be strengthened only by legally guaranteeing the right of the Union organs to review "any question" which they consider to have "important" or "all-Union" significance. A different principle should operate in a real functioning federal state: "The republic has the right to do anything which is not in the jurisdiction of the Union of SSR."

From the legal standpoint, the Union Treaty should be a unique legal act in the law-making system, and its principles should be the basis of the Union Constitution and the constitutions of the Union republics. Unification will take place on the principles of equality, voluntary agreement, and free withdrawal from the Union, based on precise delineation of the powers of the Union, of the Union republics, and of each particular republic.

Moreover, the renewed Union is obliged to guarantee profound democratization of state institutions and society as a whole; the economic, political, and legal sovereignty of the Treaty participants; human rights and freedoms in accordance with constitutional norms and international legal norms; new conditions of economic integration in the interests of increasing the well-being of all peoples living in the Soviet Union; and development and enrichment of national cultures and common human values.

What do we see as the main underlying principles which define the content of the Union Treaty?

First, all nations and peoples should be equal in interrelations and before the law and authority; their freedom and free development, interests and language, and culture and traditions should be preserved by law and protected and guaranteed by the state and all its organs and social organizations, both within the framework of the Union of republics and within the framework of each Union republic.

Secondly, power must come from the people and belong to the people, who realize this power directly and through their representative organs.

Thirdly, a Union republic should be sovereign in the full sense of the word and have full power on its territory.

Fourthly, the unification of the Union republics into a Union of sovereign states should be based on principles of voluntary agreement, and the jurisdiction of both the Union republics and the Union as a whole in resolving questions of state construction is determined on this same principle. In light of that, we should bear in mind that any limitation of a republic's sovereign rights is improper and must be stopped, followed by review of the questions of harm done in accordance with the norms of the Union Treaty and international law.

The person, the measure of all social values, is the focus of the preamble to the Treaty. He is guaranteed economic and political freedoms and a dignified existence. It is here that the devotion of the Union of sovereign

states being created to common human values and the universally recognized principles of international law and its readiness to live with all countries and peoples in peace and harmony and take all measures necessary to prevent confrontations in international, interrepublic, and interethnic relations are especially emphasized.

Articles 7 and 17 of the draft we are proposing specifically list those rights which the Union of sovereign states is granted. There are 14 in all. Most likely you are already familiar with them through the text presented for your examination. I would just like to focus your attention on a few rights of the Union.

They are the formulation of the country's economic and social development on the basis of the proposals of the Union republics, the formulation and realization together with the Union republics of all-Union programs, and the establishment of the principles of organization and operation of the all-Union market;

the formulation, ratification, and execution of the Union budget, management of the country's defense and space research, as well as objects belonging to all-Union state property or join management of them by contract;

determination of the country's foreign policy and conclusion of international treaties;

granting of loans and economic aid to foreign states from the capital of the Union budget with the consent of the Union republics, conclusion of agreements on state loans and credits received by the Union, protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union, organization of the country's defense, leadership of the Armed Forces of the Union, and others.

In this way, the Union of sovereign states is granted the powers necessary to perform state-wide tasks. The totality of these rights and their effective use gives the Union the status of sovereign state which is supreme within the country and independent in relations with foreign states. The Union remains a federal state with complete state authority within the limits of the rights and powers mentioned.

We begin from the assertion that the Union republics are the primary bearers of all rights. They voluntarily delegate some of their powers to the Union state in order to effectively perform tasks which are of interest to the entire Union. Consequently, we must reject the, in our opinion, faulty approach to determining the powers of the Union republics where the republics' rights seem to be composed of what is left of the rights of the Union state which are not in the jurisdiction of the USSR.

We approve of the idea of political and legal diversity of the republics' ties with one another and with the Union as a whole fixed in the Program Statement of the 28th CPSU Congress, "On Humane, Democratic Socialism." Proceeding from that, we consider the version for determining the objects within the jurisdiction of the Union being proposed as our own Kazakh version. If the other

Union republics agree with it, we will sign the treaty as a whole; but if certain features of our version do not find general understanding, we are prepared to record them in special protocols to the Union Treaty.

The rights which we delegate to the Union state are vitally important to our republic. Consequently, the republic's participation in the mechanism for realizing these rights is one of the guarantees which insure a harmonious combination of all-Union and republic interests. In the broad sense this is achieved through the system of higher organs of state power in which the Union republics are represented by their deputies.

Thus, for example, we believe that management of defense objects, space research, and objects of all-Union state property should be carried out with the participation of our representatives, while the production, storage, or use of fissionable materials cannot be sanctioned without the consent of the Union republics. Their consent is also needed to grant state loans or economic aid to foreign states from the state budget capital and when the same are received from foreign states.

I think that the questions of customs service, supervision of transport, power engineering systems, and communication equipment and systems which are important to several Union republics or the Union as a whole, as well as the management of internal and railway troops should be carried out by the Union jointly and with the consent of the Union republic. The procedure for citizens of a particular Union republic to serve in the military should also be determined in the same way, by agreement. Questions of state statistics and standardization must be resolved by the same procedure to insure a state-wide approach.

All these provisions of our draft require a definite mechanism of realization. In our opinion, the Union government should be formed of representatives of the Union republics who could bring particularly pressing local economic or sociocultural problems to the attention of the central organs and propose optimal ways to resolve them.

The participation of the Union republics in realizing the rights given to the Union state is a new principle which must not become a formal appendage to the process of democratization of national-state construction. It is very important to utilize it as a real, effective lever of coordination of the interests of all participants in the Union Treaty.

In the draft presented we gave a closed list of the particular rights handed over to the Union state; and we consider it unacceptable to use the open list fixed in Article 73 of the USSR Constitution, where after listing 11 rights in the Union's jurisdiction, it talks of the "resolution of other questions of all-Union significance," which can mean whatever one wants. In practice this has led to general diktat by the Center. At the same time, however, a precise closed list of rights does not mean it cannot be changed, since life can make its own

corrections. It is altogether possible that it will be expanded, on the basis of an agreement by a particular group or all of the republics with the Union state.

I want to mention that the draft of the Treaty also includes the opposite possibility that certain powers of the Union may be handed over to the Union republic. In this way, we provide not only for the precise fixing of the Union's powers, but also for the possibility of flexible changes which objective reality may dictate.

The draft of the Treaty focuses exceptional attention on the activities of the Union organs of management. It is no secret that it was precisely these departments which arbitrarily usurped the sovereign rights of the Union republics. They were the ones who aspired to all-encompassing centralization and management "from above."

The draft of the Treaty does not define the types of all sectorial and central organs of management of the Union. They are established by the country's higher organs of power, in particular, the Law on the USSR Council of Ministers. However, the Union Treaty has defined the principles and limits of the creation and functioning of the Union ministries and departments, including those on the territory of the Union republics.

Thus, the Union state can create only those ministries and departments which are needed to realize its powers and has no right to interfere in the management of sectors which the Treaty has not placed in the Union's jurisdiction. Here we also take into account that the need for organs of economic management such as sectorial ministries and departments disappears altogether with the transition to a market economy. Consequently, following abolition of the Union ministries and departments which carry out economic regulation in Union republics, at some point in the future the corresponding republic ministries and departments will also be abolished.

Of the ministries which will be preserved in the Union system, only the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry will carry out their functions on the territory of the Union republics.

Now I would like to talk about the types and status of the Union's higher organs of state power and management. We believe that in the new system there is no need to preserve the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. In our opinion, it has not proven its effectiveness in legislative activity. The Union's Supreme Soviet, which has one chamber and is not large, can be the state's supreme legislative organ and its parliament. I think that in the future we will certainly have to change to a professional, small parliament which is permanently in session. We believe that the system of representation of people's deputies in the Supreme Soviet which now exists should be changed. There should be equal representation from all Union republics.

The draft of the Treaty defines the procedure for electing the president of the Union of sovereign states and outlines his main tasks. We believe that the main concern of the president, other than foreign policy concerns, is insuring compliance with the Union Treaty and taking the measures necessary to preserve the rights and interests of the Union republics.

As you most likely noticed, we have singled out the question of monitoring compliance to the provisions of the Union Treaty. I think that a special independent organ which is not part of the Union state system is needed for this function. The council of representatives of the Union republics, in the person of their president, the representatives of the councils of ministers, or the representatives of the supreme soviets, can be this organ.

We believe that the right of exclusive ownership of land, mineral resources, and other natural wealth by Union republics should be fixed in the Treaty and then in the constitutions and Union and republic laws. Obviously, this should not be seen as a specifically regional or narrowly local approach; no other interpretation of ownership will be accepted by the republic's people. Everywhere the right to land, mineral resources, and other natural wealth is always the underlying right of a people which cannot be separated from them, nor, incidentally, delegated. At the same time, however, establishing this right envisions delegating it to the local soviets which dispose of the natural wealth on their territories. And that does not preclude all-Union departments and organizations from using this wealth in the general interests, but on a contract basis, of course.

Our draft emphasizes that a republic's territory cannot be changed without its consent. We believe that such agreements do not have to be ratified by the Union state, since no one can understand the efficacy of changing borders between republics better than the republics themselves. Moreover, their right in this area cannot be restricted and their decisions cannot be made dependent on the discretion of other republics or the Union.

Resolving territorial disputes between republics on which they have not reached agreement is a different matter. These questions may be handed over to the Supreme Soviet of the Union for study, but not on a mandatory basis.

The main principle which insures normal interrelations of Union and republic legislation is their issuing laws within the framework of their own jurisdiction and with the consideration and observance of mutual sovereign rights.

The Union republics are given the right to suspend operation of the acts of the Union Council of Ministers and its departments if they violate the laws of the Union or a Union republic, but they must inform the appropriate Union organs that they are doing so. That puts up a legal barrier against attempts at departmental diktat and guarantees the constitutional rights and legal interests of the Union republics.

We are putting great hopes on the effective operation of the mechanism for resolving disputes between Union and Union republic organs over questions of the legality of their acts.

The expanded rights and independence of the Union republics proposed should result in intensified relations with foreign states, including through the conclusion of international agreements and joining in agreements already concluded.

If we turn to the present USSR Constitution (Section 10, Article 73), it says that establishing a general procedure for and coordinating relations of Union republics with foreign states and international organizations is the jurisdiction of the Union. In our opinion, this formula sharply limits the powers of Union republics in the foreign policy activity sphere. Within the framework of the renewed Union, as sovereign states the Union republics should act as independent objects of international relations and have broad diplomatic and consular ties with foreign states, conclude agreements with them which do not conflict with the Union's international obligations, exchange diplomatic and consular representations, carry out foreign economic activity, and have the right to representation in the UN, specialized institutions, and other international organizations.

We propose including the following powers in foreign policy activity within the Union's jurisdiction: determination of Union foreign policy, conclusion of international agreements of the Union, and Union representation in international relations. At the same time, the international agreements and obligations concluded by the Union which affect the interests of the Union republics should be ratified by them.

Undoubtedly, precise and constant compliance with the provisions of the Union Treaty by the parties participating in the Treaty is a most important condition of the existence of a renewed Union of sovereign states and the main guarantee of respect for mutual interests. Consequently, the draft emphasizes specially that as founders of the Union of Soviet sovereign states, the Union republics are obliged to bear responsibility for the normal functioning of the Union state, while the Union, in the person of the central organs, bears responsibility for strict compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

These are the main provisions of the draft of the Union Treaty presented for your examination. I want to emphasize once again that its main goal is the decisive renewal of our multinational state on the paths of contemporary integration and the preservation of the unity and political, socioeconomic, and spiritual consolidation of Soviet peoples. I assume that the people's deputies will express their opinions on the document presented and do useful work with it, and take it as the basis to determine the general prospects of further development of both the republic and the country.

I ask you to take into account that we are now studying only a draft which will be discussed jointly with other

republics and at the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is possible that we will have to return to it more than once, if disagreements arise among us on any key features. So we must examine the draft in principle.

On Declaration of Sovereignty

91US0119B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Oct 90 p 1

["Declaration of Sovereignty: The President's Reflections"]

[Text] As was already reported, at the regular session of the republic's Supreme Soviet, on 16 October, N. A. Nazarbayev, the president of the Kazakh SSR, gave a report on the draft of the new Union Treaty. Then he expressed a number of ideas on Kazakhstan's Declaration of State Sovereignty. Among other things, he said that the appearance of an alternative version of it must be considered a positive fact. If one did not exist, we would have to discuss one draft, as always. I am certain, he emphasized, that the deputies of various nationalities who participated in preparing this version were above all concerned with preserving the stability and consolidation of our multinational society. We all must become accustomed to pluralism in parliamentary work—it only enriches us.

You know my position on equal treatment of the rights of all peoples of multinational Kazakhstan. I consider it a matter of principle for me. We must always remember the need to strengthen the friendship of peoples. And in general, are we not substituting the pale words "interethnic relations" for this concept which is sacred to us?

Our country was built and is now to be built as a real socialist community of national-state formations. For that matter, that is how the USSR is unique as compared with other states of the world. And the processes which are occurring in all of its republics certainly prove this truth.

The president then emphasized that the task of creating a generally civil society without mentioning nationalities can be posed as a task of the future, when we achieve a higher level of culture and well-being of the people than now. Any political action should rely not on wishful thinking, but on concrete reality. And in this connection we must disagree with those who want to remove not only the question of national statehood in the republic from the Declaration, but words about the Kazakh people in general.

We risk being misunderstood by the Kazakh people, who in this case would be put in an unequal position with other nations of the USSR. Take any of the similar declarations of the Union republics—there is always a provision on national statehood. It is politically wrong to remove this thesis from our document just because the Kazakh population in the republic's territory is not a majority. The Kazakh people, who throughout their

entire history have shown loyalty to the ideas of internationalism, did not deserve such treatment. Just like any other people, for that matter.

We must not surrender to unwarranted emotions. Some of those speaking from this tribunal listen only to themselves without trying to understand the opponent's position at all. But there are always two sides to the coin. If we do not want to make a mistake in policy but give a complete guarantee to equal rights for all peoples of the republic, we should always remember that.

I will not hide it; I like, for example, Point No 4 of the alternative Declaration, which says that the Kazakh SSR guarantees all citizens and noncitizens living on the republic's territory all the rights and freedoms envisioned by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR, and the Constitution of the USSR, regardless of their ethnic, national, or party affiliation, social or material position, sex, religious beliefs, type of work, or place of residence. Violations of civil or national equality are punishable by law. If the commission to finish work on the draft of the Declaration leaves this point, I think the people will view it positively.

I consider the revision of the Law on Languages which has already been adopted and is in operation unacceptable, the president noted, but corrections must be made in accordance with Union laws. All the suspicions among the Russian-speaking population regarding the supposed violation of their right to use their native language must be eliminated. Let us find a consensus and reach the right understanding of the question.

Now regarding the idea that there should be one state language in the country. That is not our prerogative. Let this problem be studied at the Union level. I was at the corresponding discussion at the USSR Supreme Soviet. After many days of debate, the decision was made to recognize Russian as the official language. And in this way, it is higher than the state language.

Let us always use law as the basis in everything. Once again I want to appeal to you to remove the element of suspicion of one another from your statements and always remember that the republic's people are outside this hall. They attentively follow every word said from this tribunal and every speaker. You know what the atmosphere is like, so we must not electrify it even more.

Then the president directed the deputies' attention to Article 16 of the Law on Public Associations, published in PRAVDA, which says, among other things, that military men and persons who have a position in the law enforcement organs are to be guided by the demands of the law in their official activity and are not to be involved with the decisions of political parties or mass social movements pursuing political goals. It appears that this problem has been solved; we must also act in accordance with the law. Are we going to discuss this question here and talk about using the law to prevent

some people from being members of political organizations? But that is undemocratic. Incidentally, there is never a vacuum in politics, and this must be examined here as a desire to oust some people so that other forces can come in.

I also want to mention that it is written in this law that the creation and activity of public associations having overthrow, forceful change of the constitutional order, or forceful violation of the unity of the territory of the USSR, the Union or autonomous republics, or autonomous formations; propaganda of war, violence, or brutality; fanning of social dissension, including class dissension as well as racial, national, or religious dissension; or commitment of other criminally punishable acts as the goal or method of action is prohibited. The creation of public militarized formations is prohibited. The creation and activity of public associations which infringe upon the health or morals of the population or the rights or interests of citizens protected by law is also prosecuted according to the law. I would ask you to adopt such a law in Kazakhstan as soon as possible.

There is a point on the procurator's office in the draft of our Declaration. The appropriate commission must study it once more. When we say army, customs, the Committee for State Security, or the procurator's office, let us announce honestly and frankly that we are for preserving the federation, but a renewed one. We support full sovereignty in economics and politics. But we voluntarily give the right to the country's defense to the Center. We have enough to do with economic and other affairs. Let us be involved in them above all.

The question of customs also arose here. If we are going to change to a market, we will need an all-Union customs territory, otherwise Western businessmen will not come to work here. And just what is internal customs? Under that system should we, let us say, set up customs control on the border with Uzbekistan, collect customs duties, and introduce quotas and import licenses? If Kazakhstan has a negative balance in the ratios of imports and exports, then who will lose?

Now let us examine the foreign economic aspect. Before we can enter the international market, we have to pay many millions of dollars to be allowed into the currency fund and the International Banking Association. Each republic cannot do that separately. And each republic and each enterprise which enters the foreign market without centralized assistance will itself create its own competition. So do we need customs with these conditions?

In conclusion N. A. Nazarbayev said: When we talk of sovereignty and democracy, we must always understand that there is no absolute sovereignty or absolute freedom and democracy. All states of the world depend upon one another, borrow money, and trade; and therefore use regulatory levers. So let us not fall into euphoria. Everything is interdependent. I must remind you of that in

order once again to appeal to you to think seriously and act as comrades in all matters. In the Supreme Soviet we cannot get by without this.

Kazakh Communist Party Draft Rules Published

91US0158A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Nov 90 pp 1, 2

["Draft Rules of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan" published under the heading: "Communist Party of the Soviet Union"]

[Text] The Communist Party of Kazakhstan is a political organization uniting on a voluntary basis citizens of the Kazakh SSR operating within the CPSU on the principles of self-government in accordance with the USSR Constitution and the constitution of the Kazakh SSR.

The party proceeds in its activity from communist ideals, the creative development of the heritage of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the achievements of progressive social thought and the particularities of the national-state, socioeconomic, and cultural development of the republic and sets as its goal the creation of a socialist society in which social justice, the supremacy of all-people values and those common to all mankind and the principles of internationalism are secured in practice.

The republic Communist Party organizes its internal life and activity on the basis of its own program and prescriptive documents drawn up on the basis of the fundamental program and statutory principles of the CPSU. It expresses and defends the interests of the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia and other social strata devoted to the socialist choice, upholds the interests of the multinational people of Kazakhstan and is open to cooperation with all social and political movements to which the ideals of socialism are close.

I. Principles of Organizational Composition and Activity

1. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan proceeds in intraparty relations and in its activity from a recognition of the priority of the power of the party masses and the unity of democracy and party discipline and initiative and responsibility.

The basic propositions of the organization and activity of the party are:

- ideological community, party comradeship, benevolence, and the respectful attitude of party members toward one another;
- equality of the rights and duties of all communists and a harmonious combination of the interests of the party and the individual communist;
- the right of all party organizations to participate in the elaboration of party policy and their independence and self-management in the solution of questions of their internal life and activity;
- debates and referendums on the most fundamental issues of party and public activity, whose sponsors

- may be the directive and executive bodies or communists constituting no less than one-third of the members of the corresponding organization;
- complete freedom of expression of opinions and comparison of views and the right of communists to unite by platform in the course of debate, the creation of factions with their own internal organization and discipline and ideological principles conflicting with the party's program aims not being allowed here;
- the right of the minority to freedom of intraparty debate, criticism, propaganda, and defense of its viewpoint and the demand for a political evaluation of wrongful decisions. A minority constituting over one-third of the participants in a meeting, conference or congress has the right to have a particular opinion minuted and to demand a repeat examination of contentious issues in its organization or to put them to superior authorities. Upon a repeat examination, a decision is adopted by a majority of the participants in the forum, after which it becomes binding on all;
- the electivity, periodic changeability and the accountability of the party authorities and their leaders to the communists who elected or nominated them;
- collectiveness in the work of all party organizations and collegiality in the work of their elective bodies;
- the binding nature of compliance with a decision of superior elective authorities for the party organizations and the communists and the right of the latter to participate in their formulation, independently determine the forms and methods of work on the implementation of these decisions and to appeal in the event of disagreement with them to the highest party authorities, while not suspending their fulfillment;
- glasnost and openness in the work of all party organizations and authorities.

2. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan is built on the foundation of the principle of democratic centralism on a territorial and production basis and has the following structure: primary, rayon, city, and oblast party organizations. An organization uniting the communists of a given territory is superior in relation to those which constitute it.

3. The directive bodies in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan are the general assembly, conference, and congress. They are competent if they are attended by more than one-half, and at the time of reports and elections, by no less than two-thirds, of the members of the party organization or elected delegates. The directive party authorities elect the executive bodies (bureau, committee) and auditing commissions.

The executive and control bodies in the party are elected by ballot. The ballot paper includes any number of candidacies. The candidates who have obtained more than one-half of the vote of the party members who took part in the balloting at a meeting, conference, congress, party committee plenum, and auditing commission session are considered elected.

Delegates to rayon, city, and oblast conferences, a republic conference, and a congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan are elected by a direct ballot of the communists by party district, as a rule.

Party committees and auditing commissions are formed by way of direct delegation of the representatives of lower party organizations elected by ballot. The conference or congress reserves the right of final decision on the question of their election.

Party members may not be members of more than two committees or auditing commissions of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

Secretaries of party committees of all levels and chairmen of auditing commissions are elected at the corresponding meetings, conferences, and congresses or, at the delegates' discretion, at plenums of party committees and sessions of the auditing commissions. They may be registered in any primary party organization.

Members of elective bodies in the party at raykom level or higher are elected to the same office for no more than two terms in succession.

The composition of the executive and control bodies of the party may be renewed or changed completely prior to the expiration of the term of office on the initiative of the delegating organizations or as a consequence of resignation. The authority of the new members is confirmed at plenums of the pertinent party committees or auditing commission sessions.

With their own resources the party organizations and committees may independently or with other organizations establish the necessary mass media.

The elective party bodies have the right to create permanent or temporary commissions for various matters of party work and a working apparatus, which is formed from the communists with regard for the recommendations of the primary party organizations. Labor legislation extends to the employees of the apparatus.

4. When questions of the organizational composition of the party organizations and their work in the USSR Armed Forces, the KGB forces, and the internal and railroad forces are being decided, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is guided by section 23 of the CPSU Rules.

5. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan organizes its relations with the Communist Parties of the Union republics on the basis of the CPSU Program, practical cooperation, mutual understanding, and party comradeship.

In the shape of its Central Committee it maintains direct relations with the parties of foreign countries.

6. The activity of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan may be terminated on the basis of a referendum if no fewer than two-thirds of the republic's communists have voted for this.

II. Membership in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan

7. A citizen of the Kazakh SSR who has reached 18 years of age, recognizes the program aims and rules of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, works in a primary party organization, and supports the party materially may be a member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is simultaneously a member of the CPSU. Each member of the CPSU who has come to the republic for work, study, or residence becomes, having registered with a primary party organization, a member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

8. A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan has the right to participate in the formulation and realization of party policy, to elect and be elected, to criticize any party body and any communist, to address inquiries, complaints, and proposals to any party authority, and to demand a straight answer to his appeal, and take part personally at the time of discussion of questions of his activity or behavior. A communist has the right to expect protection on the part of the party against unsubstantiated charges and persecution in connection with his party activity and to enjoy the services of institutions and enterprises of the party.

A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan has the right to take part in the work of public organizations and associations whose goals and activity are not in conflict with the program aims of the party.

9. A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is required to comply with a decision of the party authorities, propagandize and defend the ideas of the party, struggle for the achievement of its goals and assurance of its vanguard positions in society, consistently pursue the party line in the work force, among the population, and in state and public organizations, observe party discipline and legality, strengthen the friendship of the peoples, and struggle for the establishment of the principle of internationalism. The communist is required to protect the honor and dignity of the party, contribute to a strengthening of its ideological and organizational unity and enhanced authority, pay his membership dues on time, and preserve party property.

Membership in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is incompatible with membership in other political parties and participation in antisocialist, nationalist, and chauvinist organizations and actions.

10. Members of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan are admitted individually upon application. A decision on admittance is made by a meeting of the primary party organization and is final if more than half of the meeting

of the primary party organization has voted for it. A decision on the admittance of a shop organization with primary organization status is confirmed by the party committee. A probationary period and also the surety of two party members may be determined for a new member. Persons who were previously members of other political parties are admitted in the normal way. A party card is issued and members are registered in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in the usual procedure for the CPSU.

The communist is on the party register at his place of work or residence as he wishes and with the consent of the primary party organization.

If a party member cannot, because of his state of health or age, participate fully in party life, the primary party organization has the right on the basis of his personal application to exempt him from regular work and the payment of membership dues.

Persons voluntarily supporting the party materially or helping it at the time of the organization of activities, but not members of it, may be party sympathizers.

11. For a breach of the statutory requirements of party discipline and the standards of party morals a primary party organization or superior party committee may rebuke or reprimand a communist or expel him from the party.

Party membership may be terminated also upon an application from a communist for voluntary withdrawal from the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, which is examined by the primary party organization.

A decision of a superior party authority on the institution of party proceedings against a communist or on his expulsion is conveyed to the primary party organization in which he is registered.

The question of party membership of a person found guilty by a court of law of having committed a crime is decided by the primary party organization after the sentence takes legal effect.

Termination of the membership in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan of a member of an elective party body is decided at a plenum with regard for the opinion of the primary party organization which recommended him to this body and where he is on the party register.

The question of a party member who has not paid his membership dues for more than three months without valid reason is subject to examination in the primary party organization. A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan who has not registered with the party within three months is deemed to have left the party.

A decision on expulsion from the party is considered adopted if more than one-half of the primary party organization or party body has voted for this.

A person who has been expelled from the Communist Party of Kazakhstan or who has had party proceedings instituted against him has the right within three months to appeal to the party control commission of the superior party committee. The appeal is examined within two months from the time it is received.

III. Primary Party Organizations

12. Primary party organizations are formed according to production and territorial principles with no less than three party members each by a decision of a meeting thereof and are registered by the pertinent raykom and gorkom ((rayon committee and city committee)). They may also be formed on any basis if this contributes to the strengthening and development of the party organization and its increased influence. Joint territorial-production party collectives may be formed for a period of important public and political campaigns (elections, referendums, and so forth).

The primary party organization may form within it party groups and shop organizations. The latter may, with the permission of the raykom or gorkom, be accorded the rights of primary organizations on matters connected with membership in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

With regard to the specific tasks and conditions of their activity the primary party organizations hold their meetings as necessary, but not less than once every three months, decide independently questions of admittance and termination of party membership, determination of their structure and directions and methods of work, the mounting of political actions and financial and economic management activity, and build relations with organizations of other parties and soviet and public organizations.

The primary party organizations conduct ideological, political, and organizing work in the work force and on the territory, implement party decisions, defend the interests of the working people, uphold social justice, and influence the accomplishment of economic and social tasks. They have the right to draw up draft documents at the time of the preparation of party congresses and conferences and party committee plenums, express their attitude toward a decision of any party body and submit proposals concerning the recall from party bodies of all levels of communists who are registered with them or whom they have recommended to these bodies.

The activity of the primary party organizations may be terminated at the decision of the raykom or gorkom for actions contrary to the party rules. In this case the primary party organization has the right to appeal to the higher authorities of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

13. For the performance of current business the meeting (conference) of the primary party organization elects for two or three years a party bureau (committee)

and its secretary and also, at the discretion of the communists, an auditing commission. Party organizations with less than 15 communists elect for the term and in the procedure established by the meeting a secretary of the party organization and his deputy, and party groups, a party group organizer. The work of the secretary of the primary party organization is regulated by the Regulations Governing the Status of Secretary.

IV. Rayon, City, and Oblast Party Organizations

14. Rayon, city, and oblast party organizations perform within the limits of a rayon, city, and oblast work on implementing party policy and provide for the realization of the decisions of superior party authorities and their own decisions.

The rayon, city, and oblast party conference confirms the authority of members of the rayon, city, and oblast party committee and auditing commission elected in lower party organizations for a term of not more than five years and elects members of the superior elective party bodies. Conferences are convened at the decision of the rayon, city, and oblast party committee or at the demand of a group of party organizations representing no less than one-third of the total number of communists of the rayon, city, and oblast.

Conferences and also party committee plenums, which are convened as necessary, examine urgent questions of party life and relations with bodies of the soviets and other parties and public movements, and with regard for the opinions of the party organizations draw up and propose to the organs of state power, public associations, the work force, and the population program solutions for political, national, social, economic, ecological, cultural and moral, and other problems in the region.

The raykoms and gorkoms maintain a register of communists and coordinate and direct the activity of the primary party organizations. The obkoms ((oblast committees)) may accord the largest primary party organizations raykom status on questions of the registration of members of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

The rayon, city, and oblast party committees monitor fulfillment of the program and prescriptive documents of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the decisions of party congresses and conferences, and have the right to reverse the decision of a primary party organization, and the obkoms, of the raykoms and gorkoms, unless it conforms to program and statutory propositions.

The raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms may, with regard for the opinions of the lower organizations, form at their plenum a raykom, gorkom, and obkom bureau.

15. The auditing commissions of rayon, city, and oblast party organizations inspect the soundness of execution of the party budget, including the accounting and payment of party membership dues and the financial and economic management activity of the enterprises

and establishments of the corresponding party committees and primary party organizations.

16. To exercise supervision of compliance with the decisions of the directive party authorities, observance of statutory requirements and the standards of party morals, and the solution of questions connected with defense of the interests of the primary party organization and the honor and dignity of the communists, and an examination of their appeals the appropriate party committees in the rayon, city, and oblast party organizations form party control commissions. They work in accordance with regulations confirmed at a plenum of the party committee.

V. The Highest and Central Authorities of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan

17. The highest authority of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is the congress. Congresses are convened by the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee not less than once every five years. A decision of the Central Committee to convene a congress and the agenda and representation quota is announced not later than three months prior to the congress. The Central Committee publishes draft documents on the main issues to be put to the congress.

A special (extraordinary) congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative or in accordance with the demand of party organizations uniting not less than one-third of the total number of communists. The congress is convened within a period of two months and is deemed competent if a majority of oblast party organizations is represented at it.

In the event that the Central Committee fails to convene a special (extraordinary) congress, the organizations which demanded it may form an organizing committee enjoying the status of party Central Committee to convene a special (extraordinary) congress.

18. The congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan:

- hears the accounts and reports of the Central Committee, Auditing Commission, and other bodies, adopts decisions and evaluates their work;
- adopts program documents and the rules of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and examines and revises them;
- determines the party's political course and its election platform;
- confirms the composition of the Central Committee and Auditing Commission elected in the oblast party organizations and at conferences of army units and formations;
- elects the first secretary of the Central Committee, simultaneously electing him a member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee Politburo;

- delegates representatives of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan to the central authorities of the CPSU.

19. In the period between congresses of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan the Central Committee convenes as necessary a republic party conference for the discussion of urgent questions and the policy and practical activity of the party.

The conference has the right to hear accounts of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee and Auditing Commission concerning their work, to adopt within the framework of the program documents of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan other decisions binding on the party and to make revisions to the party rules.

20. In the period between congresses the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee:

- elects secretaries, simultaneously electing them members of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee Politburo;
- confirms the editors of the press organs of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee;
- organizes fulfillment of the decisions of congresses and conferences of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan;
- taking as a basis the opinions of the party organizations and the work force, draws up proposals pertaining to questions of the domestic and foreign policy of the republic and submits them by way of legislative initiative to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet;
- draws up and confirms prescriptive documents pertaining to application of the rules and realization of the program;
- directs the activity of party groups (factions) in the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and other republic bodies;
- implements the party's personnel policy;
- directs the activity of the oblast, city, and rayon party committees and the primary party organizations;
- represents the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in interaction with other social and political organizations;
- examines and determines the main directions of the formation and utilization of the party budget, keeping the republic's communists regularly informed on these matters.

A plenum is convened by a decision of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee Politburo or in accordance with the demand of no fewer than one-third of the members of the Central Committee.

21. For the solution of political and organizational questions in the period between plenums the Central Committee elects the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee Politburo.

The Politburo renders account of its activity annually at a plenum of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee, and members of the Central Committee, in the party organizations which elected them.

22. Standing commissions are formed in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee pertaining to the main areas of its activity. They are confirmed at a plenum from the ranks of members of the Central Committee and also other communists as advisers.

23. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan Auditing Commission is guided in its activity by the rules of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and regulations approved by a congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. It monitors execution of the party budget, the state of the payment of party dues, and the work on examination of the citizens' appeals. At its meeting it elects a presidium and chairman of the Auditing Commission.

24. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee and Auditing Commission meet as necessary, but not less than twice a year, and if necessary, in joint session.

Members of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee may take part in the work of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Auditing Commission, and members of the Auditing Commission, in the work of plenums of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee on a nonvoting basis.

25. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee forms a party control commission. It participates in exercising supervision of the fulfillment of program and prescriptive documents of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, promotes a strengthening of the party ranks and party comradeship, defends the interests of the primary party organizations determined by the party rules and the honor and dignity of the communists, and hears their appeals.

The Central Committee Party Control Commission is endowed with the right of independence in the adoption of decisions on communists' appeals and the presentation of proposals to the appropriate party organizations and committees in respect of party proceedings being instituted against communists who are in breach of the requirements of the party rules and the standards of public morals. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee Party Control Commission is formed at a plenum of the Central Committee from the ranks of members of the Central Committee, the permanent staff of the commission, and other communists. It is guided in its activity by regulations approved by a plenum of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee.

26. The address of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee is 4, Republic Square, Alma-Ata.

VI. Communists in the Soviets, State Authorities, and Public Associations

27. In the soviets, economic management authorities, and public associations the Communist Party of Kazakhstan pursues its policy through the communists working in them.

28. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan struggles for political leadership at elections to the soviets of people's deputies through other forms of the citizens' desire. The party organizations draw up and publish their election platforms in the usual way, recommend communists for nomination as candidates for people's deputy, and help them in the organization of the election campaign and other political activity.

Party organizations may enter into election agreements with other social and political organizations and formations and support the candidates for deputy whom they nominate who are not members of the CPSU.

29. For the term in office of the soviets of people's deputies communists may unite in party groups (communist factions) for coordination of their activity and the practical implementation of the wishes and instructions of the electorate. The party groups (communist factions) interact with the appropriate party committees and obtain assistance and support from them. A bureau or chairman is elected for the current business of the group (faction).

The formation by the communists in the soviets of groups and factions independent of party authorities, but acting on behalf of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, is not allowed.

30. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan cooperates with the public forces adhering to the positions of democracy and social justice. It builds its relations with trade union and other public organizations and mass movements on the basis of political interaction and cooperation and respect for a different viewpoint.

Party groups (factions) may be formed at congresses and conferences convened by the public organizations by analogy with the same groups (factions) in the soviets.

31. In work with the youth the party bodies and primary party organizations rely in work on the LKSM ((Leninist Communist Youth League)) of Kazakhstan, cooperate with other youth organizations of a socialist orientation, render the utmost assistance in their activity, and enlist them in the elaboration and realization of the youth policy of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. The relations of the party and Komsomol organizations are built on the principles of political partnership and ideological affinity, recognition of the ideological independence of the Communist Youth League and mutual respect and trust. The party regards the LKSM of Kazakhstan as the immediate reserve for replenishment of its ranks.

Members of elective bodies of the youth organizations have the right to participate in the examination of questions of youth policy in the corresponding party committees.

32. The primary party organizations and party committees may recommend communists and nonparty people for specific areas of state, economic, and public activity. Operating by political methods, they promote their election or appointment to the appropriate office, render them support, receive the communists' accounts of their work, and publicize the conclusions and recommendations made here.

VII. Monetary Resources and Property of the Party

33. The activity of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and its organizations is backed by financial and material resources from their own revenue.

The party's monetary resources are formed from the communists' membership dues, income from publishing, production-economic and commercial activity, the voluntary contributions of individual citizens, enterprises, organizations and societies, and other receipts not in conflict with current legislation.

Monthly membership dues for party members are determined in the following amounts from their total monthly income:

70 rubles [R] and under—10 kopeks

R71-R100—20 kopeks

R101-R150—30 kopeks

R151-R250—1 percent

R250 and above—not less than 2 percent.

Working communist retirees pay party membership dues separately from their pension and wage.

34. The budget of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and its structure and the amounts of the payments into it from the income of the local party organizations and of subsidies to them and the party budget implementation report are approved by a plenum of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee and conveyed to the communists.

The party organizations are independent in the development of sources for the formation and disposal of their budget and have the right to decide structural, staff, and production and economic questions, and to create, reorganize, and liquidate periodical publications. The budgets and their implementation reports are approved at plenums of the corresponding party committees, with notification of the party members.

35. To support its activity the Communist Party of Kazakhstan utilizes buildings, structures, equipment, implements, cultural-educational and health-improvement property, monetary resources, party publishing houses with the periodical publications and printing plants which are a part of them, and other

property belonging to the CPSU, and also owns monetary resources, subsidiary, joint and small businesses, transport facilities, and other property.

The party committees exercise operational control (possession, enjoyment, and disposal) of the property of the party organizations. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee, local party committees, and establishments and organizations of the Communist Party enjoy the rights of bodies corporate and may delegate these rights to their structural subdivisions and primary party organizations.

In the event of the disbandment of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan or the prohibition of its activity, the property of the republic party organization is transferred to the CPSU.

Up to 50 percent of the sum total of membership dues received is channeled into the financing of the activity of the primary party organizations, including to support full-time employees.

Financial commissions with the participation of the primary party organization secretaries are formed under the auspices of the raykoms, gorkoms, and party committees of raykom status for the solution of questions of financing the activity of the party organizations and the distribution and redistribution of monetary resources.

Kazakh Sovereignty, Ethnic, Border Issues Viewed

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[Article by Zhapsarbay Qwanyshev, scientist-secretary of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Sh. Walikhanov imeni History, Archaeology and Ethnography Institute, candidate in historical science: "Thoughts on the Declaration"]

[Excerpts] Today the future of a multiethnic state is directly connected with relations between the republics forming it and the center. For that reason the question of sovereignty is being actively discussed at all levels, and various points of view are being expressed. However, one thing is now absolutely clear: there is no longer the possibility at all of an utterly centralized system based upon a uniform administration, as once was the case, and there is no doubt whatever that there was real aberration from the principles proclaimed in the 1922 Treaty Establishing the USSR. For that reason, the course of events, changes taking place in the republics, and democratic processes in our society have made revision of this agreement the order of the day.

Simultaneous with the Union Agreement now in preparation, declarations on their state sovereignty are being ratified in the republics. (Such declarations have been ratified in Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia and other

republics.) Recently the draft of a Kazakh SSR Declaration of State Sovereignty was published in the pages of the press. This is a major event in the social and political life of our republic.

Let us compare the published draft with declarations ratified by fraternal republics such as the Ukraine and Belorussia. (We will say nothing of Russia, since the situation there is altogether different. Russia is a Federal Republic.) At first glance the Kazakh SSR Declaration is little different than the others. It appears no better and no worse than the others. But this is a first impression only. If one looks more closely, everything is there in the Kazakh SSR Declaration but, unfortunately, it seems as if the Kazakh people have been forgotten. To be sure, the words "people" and "people of Kazakhstan" are not absent from the draft. They are there. However, the word "people" can be interpreted in two ways. Does the word refer to the Kazakh people, the Kazakh nationality, or does it refer to representatives of some other peoples living in the republic? This is unclear. In our view the word is not specific enough. Everything must be referred to specifically. (See Sections 1, 2 and 6.) The declarations of our Ukrainian and Belorussian elder brothers began with the principle of nationality self-government by the Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalities. This does not run counter to Leninist rights of nationalities to self-government. On the contrary, every people has a natural right to such self-government. No, how could it? But is Kazakhstan not a republic like the Ukraine or Belorussia? Is it not historical fact that the name of the republic is formed with the name of the Kazakh people? Why it is we cannot say, perhaps due to certain peculiarities of Kazakhstan, or as an expression of the multi-ethnicity of the republic, but the national peculiarities and interests of the Kazakh people are always being forgotten. The Ukraine and Belorussia are, to be sure, multi-ethnic. Why does a people which has given its name to a republic, which has its own history stretching over many centuries, its own culture, customs and practices not have the privilege, moral and legal right to say, "I am Kazakh." In one way this is understandable. This is because, as a result of more than 70 years of famine and harsh repression in our history, we are nearly in danger of being destroyed as a nationality. For that reason, our people hesitates to speak its mind openly, and there has manifested itself in the psychology of the people as an incomprehensible timidity, a feeling, as it were, of alienation in one's own land, of inferiority. It has even gone so far that these days certain "internationalists" and nihilists cannot refrain from assigning the categories "nationalism" and "extremism" to our citizens who feel that they must be concerned for their nation, their nationality. But the times go on changing, and with them people. Today's Kazakh is no longer the Kazakh of the past. The Kazakh people of today is a people which has developed national sensitivities. We think that the Declaration must take this change into account.

In order that what I say might not be considered only criticism, let me also make some suggestions. For

example, why cannot the simple word "people" in Sections 1 and 2 of the Declaration not be expanded as "Kazakh People," or "the Kazakh people and the nationalities living in the republic," or "nationalities." In order to be even-handed and not be accused of one-sidedness by the reader, let me say that the words "Kazakh People" do occur in Section 8. However, there is nothing there about the self-government of the Kazakh people. It is stated that the Kazakh people is guaranteed the right to rebuild and protect its national culture, own peculiarities, language, history and natural environment. Sad to say, no special right of self-government is granted the people. And if the republic named after the Kazakh people becomes sovereign, how will this protect the still nonexistent right to the Kazakh people to self-government? There is nothing about this at all.

If we think about the real sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR, that is to say, the sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR as a land where only the Kazakh people live and breathe, we must first and foremost specify the status of the Kazakh people. International norms and principles do not, to be sure, allow extermination of any given species in the animal world. Is not a complete people one such organism? However, this must not be taken to diminish other peoples, or to press under foot their own national rights. One cannot benefit at the cost of other peoples. We must recognize and remember the truth of the present. However, it is necessary that every question have its beginning, and there must be reliable foundations for every issue based on international law and universal principles. For nationality questions these foundations are the right of a nationality to self-government, its language, history, culture and national territory. The national independence of the Kazakhs, their national character, language, history and culture can only develop in Kazakhstan. Only in Kazakhstan, not in Russia, China, Afghanistan or somewhere else. We cannot call the Kazakhs living in those countries the true Kazakh people; they are Kazakhs living in areas located outside the republic.

Something else which we must touch on is the question of language in the draft of the Declaration. An official language unintended in the Kazakh SSR Law on Language, a year old on 23 September, has emerged. Is this due to our giving way to avoid the pressure being exerted with the emergence of "yedinstvo," or perhaps is this due to an indifferent attitude towards the law? If we are to gain legal statehood, we cannot allow such legal nihilism. An official language is an official language by virtue of the amount of credibility we give it. What is meant by official language in some Western countries is a language of state. A language of state is a language of state if its use is compulsory in all institutions. At present we do not issue passports, controlling all the land in Kazakhstan. We cannot introduce justice into the assignment of people to land. We cannot even discuss the question of sale of land. In addition, who can guarantee that forces desiring to "add northern or western oblasts to Russia" will not take charge, after they have gained as

much land as they are able? If some parliament or some soviet does not help us in this, we can do nothing to prevent it. No one is against the Russian language. However, under conditions of mismatch, of a lack of parity at present between the Russian language and the Kazakh language, our making Russian an official language in Kazakhstan is to counter the reputation barely achieved by Kazakh as an official language, and to lower its status. What kind of equality is it for Kazakh to be utilized in only ten of the fifty sectors within which it should be used? **To make the Kazakh language equal to the Russian language, the Kazakh language alone must enjoy official status. The Russian language, on the other hand, as set forth in the Language Law, must be the language for international relations.**

It is well known to everyone that Kazakhstan was once a colony of Russia. Does that mean that Kazakhstan must use as its official language the language of the metropolitan country? At the very least, let us look at the definition of "official language" on page 238 of the dictionary "Yuridicheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar" published in 1984: [in Russian] **"An official language is the basic language of state, utilized in law-making, in official record keeping, legal proceedings, in education etc. In countries where the population is multi-ethnic (e.g. India, Switzerland, Spain, Canada), it is specified in the constitution which language (or languages) is official."**

Making Russian the official (or state) language in place of Kazakh will in my view, first of all, communicate the fact that those Kazakhs who do not know how to speak Kazakh are making no effort to improve themselves. (Among them, we single out in particular persons holding official office. If Russian becomes the official language they will speak in Russian at meetings and elsewhere). Secondly, it will be interpreted as a sign of disrespect for Kazakh, and will not increase but rather lower the reputation of the Kazakh language (and likewise of the Kazakh people). If we accept the ideas of those promoting "yedinstvo," and accept Russian as our official language, then we thereby do nothing more than change the name of the republic and exchange the passports of the Kazakhs. Or perhaps we will be asking for the autonomy of what is little more than the meager remnant of our broad Kazakhstan.

The conclusion that the ideas of V.I. Lenin on a soviet federalism were not carried out completely, and that a policy of unity came to the fore with a shift to the Stalinist idea of "granting autonomy," has recently been observed frequently in the historical literature. But that is a superficial, one-sided judgment. That is to say, the juxtaposition is made that supposedly everything was good under Lenin, but then everything became bad with the appearance of Stalin. (In so saying we have no desire to whitewash Stalin). The root of the problem lies somewhat deeper. We see our history as the history of unusual circumstances. The reason is that our people has had to struggle to preserve itself even during the decade or so of socialism. As a consequence of this, in most cases, federative principles have been sacrificed with the

goal of central administration in mind. Thus as our society has developed, many humanitarian principles have been trampled under foot. Even at present, there is no guarantee whatever that things will go back to the way they were before if pressure is exerted.

This being the case, what is in question is the political system itself. Up until the present, we have sought to blend together into one dish things which cannot be blended together. And we have deceived one another by attempting to eliminate the poison which exists in the body social through half-measures. For example, we have up until the present forgotten the contradiction between federative principles of state formation and organization upon a basis of CPSU unitarianism. As a result, we have become subject to confusion of the whole, and to ethnic confusion as one part of the whole. It is clear that real sovereignty is impossible if the sole rule of the party is maintained, under conditions whereby its separation from the state apparatus and the independence of republic party organizations is in question.

Law Establishes Kirghiz Presidency, Amends Constitution

91US0152A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 11 Nov 90 p 3*

[Law of the KiSSR: "On Establishing the Post of President of the KiSSR and Introducing Amendments and Additions to the KiSSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)"]

[Text] In order to develop political and socioeconomic changes within the republic, provide guarantees for the activity and the necessary interaction among the legislative, executive, and juridical authorities or powers, increase the responsibility and effectiveness of the work being done by the state organs, and proceeding on the basis of the social requirement for strengthening the constitutional system, as well as civil rights, liberties, and security, the KiSSR [Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet **hereby decrees the following:**

I. The post of President of the KiSSR shall be established.

II. The following amendments and additions shall be introduced to the KiSSR Constitution (Fundamental Law):

1. A new Section 12¹ [Superscript figure is not a footnote number, but rather a breakdown of the main number.] shall be added to the KiSSR Constitution with the following contents:

"Section 12¹. The President of the KiSSR

Article 114. The head of the KiSSR shall be the President of the KiSSR.

Article 114¹. A citizen of the KiSSR who is at least 30 and not more than 65 years old and who is fluent in the state language may be elected President of the KiSSR.

One and the same person may not be President of the KiSSR for more than two consecutive terms.

The President of the KiSSR shall be elected by the citizens of the KiSSR on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret balloting for a term of five years. The number of candidates for the post of President of the KiSSR shall not be limited, and elections shall be conducted on an alternative principle. The election of a President of the KiSSR shall be deemed valid if at least 50 percent of the electorate have taken part in it. That candidate shall be deemed elected who has received more than half the votes of the electors participating in the balloting.

The procedure for electing the President of the KiSSR shall be specified by the Law of the KiSSR.

The President of the KiSSR may not be a people's deputy of the KiSSR or of this republic's local soviets of people's deputies.

The President of the KiSSR shall have the right to participate in the work of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet as well as that of the Presidium of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet.

The financial remuneration or emolument of the President of the KiSSR shall be specified by the KiSSR Supreme Soviet.

A person who is President of the KiSSR may receive a salary solely for this position.

Article 114². When entering upon his duties, a President of the KiSSR shall take the oath of office at a session of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 114³. The President of the KiSSR shall have the following duties:

- 1) to act as guarantor of the civil rights and liberties of the KiSSR, the observance of the KiSSR Constitution, and the laws of the KiSSR;
- 2) to ensure the safeguarding and protection of the sovereignty of the KiSSR, as well as the security and territorial integrity of this republic;
- 3) to represent the KiSSR in the Federation Council of the USSR, in relations with other entities of the Federation, as well as in international relations;
- 4) to ensure interaction among the highest organs of state power and administration of the KiSSR;
- 5) to facilitate the carrying out of their plenipotentiary powers by the soviets of people's deputies;
- 6) to send Messages to the KiSSR Supreme Soviet and submit annual reports to it concerning the state of affairs in this republic and other important matters of state life;
- 7) to submit candidates to the KiSSR Supreme Soviet for appointment or election to the positions and duties of

chairman of the KiSSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the KiSSR Committee on Constitutional Oversight, chairman of the KiSSR People's Control Committee, chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Court, the KiSSR chief state arbiter; to join in consulting with the KiSSR Supreme Soviet regarding the dismissal of the above-indicated officials from their posts with the exception of the chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Oversight and the chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Court;

8) to place before the KiSSR Supreme Soviet the matter of the resignation or the acceptance of a resignation from the KiSSR Council of Ministers; in coordination and with the consent of the chairman of the KiSSR Council of Ministers, he shall also relieve from their duties or appoint members of the KiSSR government with their subsequent submission for approval to the KiSSR Supreme Soviet;

9) to sign laws of the KiSSR; he shall have the right, no later than within a two-week time period, to return a law, along with his own ideas about it, to the KiSSR Supreme Soviet for a repeat discussion and vote. If the KiSSR Supreme Soviet by a majority of two-thirds of the votes of the total number of people's deputies upholds and reaffirms the decision which they had previously adopted, the President of the KiSSR shall sign the law;

10) to provide or furnish an interpretation of a law of the KiSSR;

11) to have the right to halt an action of decrees and abrogate an instruction or an order issued by the KiSSR Council of Ministers;

12) to introduce proposals to the USSR Committee on Constitutional Oversight concerning the appropriateness of USSR laws which infringe upon the interests of the KiSSR, and concerning the congruence between the USSR Constitution and the KiSSR Constitution;

13) to join in a delegation to the USSR President with regard to halting the activation of decrees, instructions, or orders by the USSR Council of Ministers which infringe upon the interests of the KiSSR, putting a stop to acts by administrative organs subordinate to the USSR Council of Ministers which infringe upon the interests of the KiSSR, and to protest them to the USSR Council of Ministers;

14) to carry on negotiations and sign international treaties for the KiSSR, to accept letters of accreditation and recall from accredited diplomatic representatives of foreign states; to appoint and recall diplomatic representatives of the KiSSR to foreign states and international organizations;

15) to accept honorary titles for the KiSSR and to award other state awards of the KiSSR;

16) to decide matters regarding the granting of citizenship in the KiSSR and granting asylum; to exercise the pardoning of persons who have been convicted by courts of the KiSSR;

17) to decide other matters relegated to his competence by legislative acts of the USSR and the KiSSR;

18) in the interests of the citizens of the KiSSR he shall warn about the possibility of introducing a state of emergency in certain localities or throughout the entire territory of the republic. And, in case of necessity, he shall introduce it without any preliminary explanation. A decree of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet concerning its approval of the President's decision on introducing a state of emergency shall be adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of the total number of KiSSR people's deputies.

The system and schedule of a state of emergency shall be established by law.

The mutual relations between the President of the KiSSR and the President of the USSR, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the government of the USSR shall be specified by the laws of the USSR and those of the KiSSR.

Article 114⁴. A KiSSR Presidential Council shall operate under the President of the KiSSR. Its task shall be to work out measures for implementing the basic directions of this republic's domestic and foreign policies, as well as to provide for its security.

The members of the KiSSR Presidential Council shall be appointed by the President of the KiSSR. The chairman of the KiSSR Council of Ministers shall be a member of the KiSSR Presidential Council ex officio.

The chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right to take part in the sessions of the KiSSR Presidential Council.

Article 114⁵. The President of the KiSSR, on the basis of and in order to execute the KiSSR Constitution and the laws of the KiSSR, shall promulgate ukases having mandatory force throughout the entire republic. Such ukases may be examined and considered by the KiSSR Supreme Soviet upon the proposals of at least one-third of the KiSSR people's deputies; and they may be abrogated if they are opposed by at least two-thirds of the votes out of the total number of KiSSR people's deputies.

Article 114⁶. The President of the KiSSR shall possess the right of immunity and may be removed in case he violates the KiSSR Constitution and the laws of the KiSSR only by the KiSSR Supreme Soviet. Such a decision shall be made, taking into account the conclusion drawn by the KiSSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight, by at least two-thirds of the votes of the total number of the KiSSR people's deputies.

Article 114⁷. The President of the KiSSR may hand over the execution of his own duties as provided for by Paragraph 14 of Article 114³ to the chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet and the chairman of the KiSSR Council of Ministers, whereas he may hand over those

obligations provided for by Paragraphs 15 and 16 of Article 114³ to the chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 114⁸. If the President of the KiSSR, for one reason or another, can no longer perform his duties, prior to the election of a new President of the KiSSR, his plenipotentiary powers shall be transferred to the chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, and, if this is impossible—to the chairman of the KiSSR Council of Ministers. Moreover, the election of a new President of the KiSSR must be conducted within a three-month time period.

Article 114⁹. The honor and dignity of the President of the KiSSR shall be safeguarded by law."

2. In connection with amending the KiSSR Constitution, Article 12¹ "The President of the KiSSR," changes and additions shall be introduced to the following articles of the KiSSR Constitution:

1) Article 98:

in Paragraph 9 the words "First deputy and" shall be deleted;

after Paragraph 9 the article shall have the addition of Paragraph 10 with the following contents:

"10) election of the chairman of the KiSSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight upon the submission of candidates by the President of the KiSSR, and the election of the deputy chairman and the members of the KiSSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight—upon the submission of candidates by the chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet";

Paragraph 14 shall be deleted;

Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 shall be considered as Paragraphs 11, 12, 13, and 14, having set forth Paragraph 11 in the following version:

"11) the appointment upon the submission by the President of the KiSSR of the chairman of the KiSSR Council of Ministers";

in Paragraph 12 the word "appointment" shall be replaced by the word "approval";

Paragraph 14 shall be set forth in the following version:

"14) the appointment of the KiSSR Chief State Arbiter and, upon his submission—the state arbiters of the KiSSR State Board of Arbitration, the approval of the collegium of the KiSSR State Board of Arbitration";

Paragraph 16 shall add the words "determination or specification of the legal status of public organizations";

in Paragraph 25 the words "ukases and" and "instructions or orders of the chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet" shall be deleted;

Paragraph 27 shall be added to the article with the following contents:

"27) approval of the decision by the President of the KiSSR concerning the introduction of a state of emergency";

Part 3 after the words "laws and decrees" shall add the words "shall provide an interpretation of the laws of the KiSSR";

2) Part 2 of Article 101 shall be set forth in the following version:

"Extraordinary sessions shall be convoked by the chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet upon his initiative or upon the proposal by the President of the KiSSR, or by at least one-third of the KiSSR people's deputies".

3) In Part 1 of Article 103 the words "to the Presidium of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet" shall be replaced by the words "to the President of the KiSSR," and after the word "oblast" the words "and the Frunze city" shall be added.

4) Article 105 shall be set forth in the following version:

"Article 105. In order to organize the work of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, a Presidium of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet shall be created, to be headed by the chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet. The Presidium of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet shall include the deputy chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet and the chairmen of the permanent or standing commissions of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet.

The Presidium of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet shall adopt decrees.

The Presidium of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet shall carry out the preparations for the sessions of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, coordinate the activities of the permanent commissions of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, jointly with them exercise monitoring controls over the observance of the KiSSR Constitution and the laws of the KiSSR. It shall also organize the holding of people's discussions of draft laws, i.e., bills, of the KiSSR and other extremely important issues of state life.

The Presidium shall provide for the publication in the state language and in Russian of the texts of laws of the KiSSR and other acts adopted by the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, the President of the KiSSR, the Presidium of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, and the KiSSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight."

5) Article 106 shall be deleted.

6) Article 107 shall be considered as Article 106.

7) In Article 106:

Part 1 shall be deleted;

Parts 2 and 3 shall be considered as Parts 1 and 2 respectively.

Article 108 shall be considered Article 107, having setting it forth in the following version:

"Article 107. The chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet shall have the following duties:

1) To convoke sessions of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet;

2) to exercise overall leadership and direction in preparing issues for examination and consideration by the KiSSR Supreme Soviet;

3) to submit to the KiSSR Supreme Soviet the names of candidates for election to the position of deputy chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, as well as proposals concerning the personnel make-up of the KiSSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight, with the exception of its chairman;

4) to join in submitting to the KiSSR Supreme Soviet ideas concerning relieving a member of the KiSSR Supreme Court of his duties.

The chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet shall issue or promulgate decrees with regard to convoking sessions of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, and on other matters shall issue instructions and orders. He shall also sign the decrees adopted by the KiSSR Supreme Soviet.

The deputy chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, as empowered by the chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, shall perform certain of the chairman's functions and shall replace the latter in case of his absence or his incapacity to carry out his own duties".

9. Articles 109, 110, and 111 shall be considered Articles 108, 109, and 110 respectively.

10) Article 110:

Part 1 after the words "or to be elected by the KiSSR Supreme Soviet" shall add the words "to the President of the KiSSR";

in the first sentence of Part 2 the word "shall be relieved" shall be replaced by the words "shall have the right to be relived";

in Part 3 the words "and during the period between its sessions—without the consent of the Presidium of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet" shall be deleted.

11) Articles 112, 113, and 114 shall be considered Articles 111, 112, and 113 respectively.

12) In Article 111:

in Paragraph 2, Paragraph 3, Part 4 the words "Chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet" shall be replaced by the words "President of the KiSSR";

Paragraph 2 shall add a new part with the following contents:

"At the behest of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, conclusions shall be drawn and provided concerning the congruence of the ukases issued by the President of the KiSSR with the KiSSR Constitution and the laws of the KiSSR".

Paragraph 3 of Part 4 after the words "shall submit to the KiSSR Supreme Soviet" shall add the words "or to the President of the KiSSR";

Paragraph 4, Part 4 after the words "upon the proposal" shall add the words "of the President of the KiSSR".

13) In Article 112 Part 2 shall be set forth in the following version:

"The KiSSR Supreme Soviet and the President of the KiSSR shall direct the activity of the KiSSR Committee of People's Control".

14) In Article 117:

Part 3 shall add the words "and shall regularly inform the President of the KiSSR concerning its activity".

Part 4 after the words "upon its own initiative" shall add the words "or upon the proposal of the President of the KiSSR".

15) In Part 1 of Article 118 the words "its Presidium. The chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet" shall be replaced by the words "President of the KiSSR".

16) Article 120, after the words "other decisions of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet" shall add the words "ukases of the President of the KiSSR".

17) In Part 4 of Article 122, after the words "KiSSR Supreme Soviet" the words "ukases issued by the President of the KiSSR" shall be added.

18) Article 170 shall add Part 2 in the following version:

"The city of Frunze shall be the site of the residence of the President of the KiSSR and the Presidential Council of the KiSSR".

III. It shall be established that the first President of the KiSSR shall be elected by the KiSSR Supreme Soviet by secret ballot for a term of five years.

Candidates for the post of President of the KiSSR during the first election shall be nominated by KiSSR people's deputies. Only those candidates shall be allowed to run whose nomination has been supported by at least 50 KiSSR people's deputies; and the election shall be conducted on the basis of an alternative choice or choices. The candidate who has received more than half of the votes out of the total number of KiSSR people's deputies shall be deemed elected. If, as a result of the balloting, no one of the candidates has garnered more than half of the votes, a run-off is held between the two candidates who have garnered the greatest number of votes. If, even in this case, neither candidate receives more than half of

the votes out of the total number of the KiSSR people's deputies, a nomination of new candidates shall be conducted.

2. The person who has been elected as President of the KiSSR shall take office from the moment he takes the oath.

The following text of the oath of the President of the KiSSR shall be approved:

"I do solemnly swear to faithfully serve the people of our republic, to strictly follow the KiSSR Constitution, to guarantee the rights and liberties of all the citizens of our republic, no matter what their nationality, to conscientiously perform the lofty duties entrusted to me as President of the KiSSR".

V. The present law shall take effect from the moment when it has been adopted.

A. MASALIYEV, Chairman of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet

city of Frunze, 24 October 1990.

Uzbek Advisor Discusses Interethnic Relations, Language Issue

91US0139A Tashkent KOMSOMOLET
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 7 Nov 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Shakhobiddin Sradzhevich Ziyamov, by B. Khasanov: "Interethnic Relations in the Center of Attention"]

[Text] Today there is no one who is indifferent to the problems of interethnic relations. And this is understandable, since those problems are closely intertwined with all aspects of our life. Therefore, importance is attached to the paths for resolving them, for forming interethnic self-awareness, and for cultivating interethnic communication. UzTAG correspondent B. Khasanov discusses these problems with UzSSR presidential advisor Sh. S. Ziyamov.

[Khasanov] Shakhobiddin Sradzhevich, quite recently there was mention of complete harmony in the sphere of interethnic relations, but today life shows us that even in this sphere there are sometimes sharp contradictions. What can you say in this regard?

[Ziyamov] Actually, in the recent past cheerful tones were used to paint the monolithic solidarity and unity of the peoples of our country, and the problems, of which there were many in our life, were downplayed or avoided.

Perestroyka and glasnost revealed the "diseases" that existed in that sphere also. Moreover, the fact that they had been neglected had a negative effect on people's awareness and on the fates of the national groups.

Take, for example, our republic, which had been turned into a raw-materials appendage of the center and the

union ministries. Until recently, half of Uzbekistan's industrial output and more than 80 percent of its agricultural output was shipped out of Uzbekistan as raw materials. In this process, the republic's interests and its national problems were ignored, and the proper attention was not paid to the development of the nation's traditions or culture.

At the present time it has become obvious that the resolution of the problems of interethnic relations and the reinforcement of the friendship of nations are the determining factors for carrying out the perestroika itself.

[Khasanov] The tragic Fergana events are still fresh in people's memory and they cause pain in people's hearts. What do you think were the reasons for them and, most important, would it have been possible to prevent the tragedy?

[Ziyamov] There were many reasons, including economic and social problems that had not been resolved for years, unemployment, corruption, and the increase in crime, bribery, and thefts. In addition, there was the inaction on the part of the local party, soviet, and law-enforcement agencies and their estrangement from the people.

The events certainly could have been prevented if there had not been a political shortsightedness in evaluating the events at their very beginning—the conflict in Kuvasay. But, for a definite period of time, objective information concerning the events in Kuvasay was not provided. All kinds of rumors spread throughout the oblast, the republic, and then the country. I was a member of the group that was sent to Kuvasay to take steps to stabilize the situation. After a careful study of the situation, we prepared for the previous leadership of the republic a memorandum concerning what had happened. That memorandum mentioned the reasons and the nature of the conflict and contained recommendations for specific steps to prevent any possible consequences. However, that document was not taken into consideration. And everyone knows what the underestimation of what had occurred led to.

[Khasanov] For our republic, the questions of national policy and interethnic relations are of special importance: we are living in a multiethnic house. What is the republic leadership doing today to resolve the problems that arise in this sphere?

[Sh. Ziyamov] According to the results of the most recent population census, representatives of more than a hundred nations and nationalities live in Uzbekistan. These include more than 14 million Uzbeks, 1,650,000 Russians, 900,000 Tajiks, more than 800,000 Kazakhs, etc.

Naturally, the multiethnic factor is taken into consideration when developing and implementing policy in the economic, social, and cultural spheres of life. In addition, this is stipulated in the basic trends for stabilizing Uzbekistan's national economy and in the principles for

entering a market economy that were approved by the 3rd Session of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet.

We have taken a number of specific steps that were aimed at the social protection of the standard of living of the multiethnic population and primarily those who are poorly provided for. And this work is being continued, because, when preparing for the new management conditions, we must not forget the more than 9 million persons who are living below the poverty level and who need assistance. For the most part, these are rural inhabitants.

The personal plots have been expanded, new jobs are being created, and steps are being taken to provide the personal farms with fodder and feeds for livestock and poultry.

Consistent work is being carried out in the republic to implement the Alma-Ata agreement on the friendship and cooperation of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan; work is being done to sign agreements dealing with economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation with other union republics; and questions related to the conclusion of a union treaty with a consideration of the principles that were defined in the Declaration on the Sovereignty of Uzbek SSR are being considered.

Steps to restore national traditions and customs have been aimed at improving the interethnic relations. "Navruz," for example, has once more become a nationwide holiday, and there has been a change in the attitude toward believers.

I would like to emphasize that the national problems have not been invented, and those who are attempting to indicate that these problems are of an artificial nature are incorrect. The present-day period is characterized by an increase in national self-awareness. This is a positive phenomenon. And so it is important today to give a creative, constructive nature to it, and to prevent anyone from using it for purposes of destruction.

The Uzbek nation that is international in its nature, one might say, is reinterpreting its history today, is attempting to understand more deeply the causes of the negative phenomena in the recent decades, and to find the paths for its development. Thus one can understand the tremendous interest in the cultural and historical heritage, from which it had been estranged, as a result, among other things, of the changes in the writing system for the Uzbek language. Today it is important for our heritage to have an effect on the process of improving society, and on educating the upcoming generation. Incidentally, the republic's "Meros" (Heritage) program is aimed at this.

I think that we must master the Uzbek language, we must know the old Uzbek writing system, in order to go back to the original documents and extract from them, as though from pure springs, the enriching knowledge provided by our great ancestors. But in this process we must

not limit ourselves only to that which pertains to our nationality. Our nation must be open. It must become an organic part of the world community. It must strive to master the achievements of the economy, science, and culture of all nations. And for this purpose it is necessary to have a mastery of the Russian language, the language of interethnic communication in our country, and of foreign languages. Incidentally, that was emphasized by UzSSR President I. A. Karimov in his statement at the 3rd Session of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet.

[Khasanov] Shakobiddin Sradzhevich, as everyone knows, the central press has been raising with increasing frequency the questions of the migration of the population from Uzbek SSR. How reliable are these statements concerning the extent of the migration?

[Ziyamov] Today, for the country as a whole, as a result of the sociopolitical and economic instability, a great migration from some regions to others can be observed.

In our republic, the tragic events in Fergana also had an effect on these processes. But it would not be correct to say that this has been promoted primarily by the Law Governing the Republic's State Language, as the authors of certain articles have been saying. That law is aimed at guaranteeing the development of the Uzbek language and expanding the sphere of its use. Moreover, it stipulates the necessary conditions for developing the languages of the other nations that are populating the republic. I shall not conceal the fact that there are a large number of problems in implementing this law. Certain individuals are attempting to accelerate the process, and this, in its turn, has been causing a definite amount of alarm. But I feel that each specific instance must be analyzed individually and that this law must be thoroughly explained to people. It is obvious that, when implementing it, we do not have the right to allow any biases, emotions, or subjective interpretations.

There are different reasons for migration, including the economic and social problems. For example, a sociological study was recently conducted in Kaskha-Darya Oblast among those persons desiring to leave the confines of the republic. The results of that study showed that only six-seven percent of the respondents gave "language" as the reason for wanting to leave. The others mentioned economic and everyday-social difficulties and other reasons.

Let us look now at the figures: in 1989, more than 170,000 persons left the republic, of whom only 17,500 were Russians. As you can see, a large percentage among those leaving is made up not of Russians, as the authors of certain articles assert, but Crimean Tatars, Jews, Germans, and representatives of other nationalities who are attempting to return to their historic homeland.

When speaking of the migratory processes, it is also necessary to keep in mind the fact that it is not only the representatives of the Russian-speaking population who are migrating. In 1989, more than 24,000 Uzbeks left the republic, and 23,000 arrived here. The reasons for this

were departures to undergo training, to carry out probationary work, and to get jobs.

In completing my answer to this question I want to say that our republic does not have the migratory boom that is mentioned by certain journalists. Their assertions and conclusions attest to the fact that they either lack the objective information or they are indulging in wishful thinking. This is also noted in the appeal from the people's deputies of Uzbekistan to the republic's population and to the USSR Supreme Soviet. It contains the following lines: "...We are seriously concerned about the fact that there has been an increase in the activity rate of the forces that are attempting to sow panic, to destabilize the situation, and to engender enmity among the representatives of various nationalities. ...Therefore we decisively assert that any attempts to incite nationalism and chauvinism, that led to the aggravation of the interethnic relations, will be stopped with all the severity provided by the laws."

In certain articles appearing in the central press and in statements made by individual informal organizations, it has been asserted that the Uzbek CP Central Committee and the republic's leadership have not been paying the proper attention to satisfying the cultural needs of the national groups living in the republic or to defending their rights. I feel that this does not conform to reality. Today more than 30 national-cultural centers have been created and are operating in our republic. You might note that this is more than in any other republic. At the present time there has been an increase in the amount of time devoted to radio and television broadcasts in the languages of the nations residing in the republic. A new program has appeared on television—Friendship, which, among others, throws light upon the activities of the national-cultural centers. There has been an increase in the number of schools providing instruction in the Kazakh, Tajik, Karakalpak, and other languages. More than 657,000 children attend the republic's more than 1200 schools with Russian as the language of instruction. All the republic's higher educational institutions have departments where Russian is the language of instruction. For example, there are 185 departments in the higher pedagogical institutions alone. Twenty-seven newspapers in Russian are published in Uzbekistan, as well as books and magazines. For example, in 1989 alone the Publishing House imeni Gafur Gulyam published 27 different titles of belletristic literature in Russian, in a volume of 462 printed sheets. And it is planned to publish 30 titles in 1990. Editorial offices for literature in Russian exist at the "Uzbekistan," "Ukituzchi," and other publishing houses.

The previously mentioned authors of articles also assert that the republic does not have any sociopolitical stability. Is that really so? Our republic does have stability today, and people can see this by comparing it with the situation in Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine, and Moldavia. The fruits of this stability have been the successful

cotton-harvesting campaign that was completed within short periods of time, and the fulfillment of the state plan.

The implementation of the planned reforms in our society is impossible without the friendship and unity of the nations living in Uzbekistan. And so, in this area also, the leadership of Uzbekistan has been carrying out work on various levels, including the work of reinforcing legality and law and order.

[Khasanov] Today the republic is creating councils for coordination the activity in the sphere of interethnic relations and international education. What will their activities consist of?

[Ziyamov] They are being organized on public principles and they must not replace the commissions for interethnic relations that have been created under the party and soviet agencies. They are being created in the rayons, cities, and oblasts on the basis of decisions made by the soviets of people's deputies. They will be headed by soviet chairmen, and they will include representatives of party agencies and public organizations who are the most authoritative and most honored individuals.

The councils will coordinate the work in this sphere. By developing long-term and current measures, they have been called upon to promote the improvement of interethnic relations. They will isolate problems and take steps to resolve them. Provision has been made for a study of the activities of the state and public agencies and institutions in implementing the Law Governing the State Language of Uzbek SSR and for taking specific steps to form the international self-awareness and to cultivate interethnic communication.

The agencies that will become the primary links in this structure are the councils for international education and for forming the cultivation of interethnic communication within the labor collectives and at educational institutions and people's places of residence.

A republic council will also be created to coordinate the activities in the sphere of international education and interethnic relations.

The creation of this structure, in my opinion, will make it possible to study in greater depth the processes that are occurring and to engage concretely in the resolution of the problems in this sphere, to make competent decisions, and thus to promote the reinforcement of the friendship among nations.

Native Languages Among Ethnic Groupings

91UN0429A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 48, Nov 90 p 12-13

[Article by M. Guboglo: "Language—The Soul and Pride of a Nation: Results of the Census"]

[Text] Peals of perestroika's first thunder, resulting from the accumulated problems in the linguistic life of the

peoples of our country, including problems connected with bilingualism, are rumbling through the pages of newspapers and journals. At the same time it is becoming apparent that the criticism that has been leveled at bilingualism was in fact not directed so much at the proper knowledge of two languages as at forcible methods of implanting the second language, especially when we are speaking of the active "help" of the Center in the dissemination of Russian among non-Russian peoples of the country.

Laws on language, which were adopted in 1989 and which declared the languages of the indigenous populations of the Union republics to be state languages, have created the constitutional basis for the development of the native languages of these peoples.

Thanks to extensive governmental programs that followed the laws legitimizing these languages, the accent has gradually begun to shift from the second language to the first language, the native one. The year 1990 has demonstrated signs of a new tendency. The essence of this is that the texts of the Declarations of Sovereignty of a number of autonomous republics, especially those autonomous republics that in summer and autumn of 1990 "elevated" their status by affirming their wish to be subjects of a federation, included provisions simultaneously recognizing two languages as official: The language of the nationality that has given its name to the republic, and Russian (see the Declaration on Sovereignty of the North Ossetia Republic on 20 July 1990, of the Tatar Republic on 30 July 1990, of the Komi Republic on 5 September 1990, of the Udmurt Republic on 20 September 1990, and of the Yakut-Sakha Republic on 27 September 1990). There are grounds to suppose that the motives underlying legislative establishment of bilingualism (on the basis of two state languages), are fully justified inasmuch as they proceed from an ethnolinguistic situation that is real and already exists in the republic.

The only question is whether a balanced understanding of the concerns and problems of developing each of the languages included in the bilingualism will take the place of the preferred status of the language of interethnic communication that has existed so long.

As history shows, there have been tremendous differences in the way bilingualism was developed and disseminated. In the second half of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's, during the course of building the state, priority, of course, was given to the creation of conditions for the development of ethnic languages. But later there was an abrupt change of course and primary attention was focused on the interests of Russian as the sole language of interethnic communication. Recently the course has been changed again, and the interests of the native language has again moved to the foreground in the republics.

But, despite the sharp turns in language policy, bilingualism has nonetheless been consistently expanding.

For example, during two decades, the 1970's and the 1980's, the quantity of non-Russians fluently using Russian (as a second language) grew from 113 to 141 million people (164.5 percent), and the total number of bilingual Russians during this period increased from 3.9 million to 5.7 million people (148.0 percent). As a result, the proportion of the bilingual population among non-Russian peoples as a whole grew from 37.1 percent in 1970 to 48.9 percent in 1989, and the proportion of bilingual Russians increased correspondingly from 3.0 percent to 4.0 percent; the proportion of bilingual Russians in the 14 Union republics (besides the RSFSR) increased from 15.4 percent in 1970 to 18.0 percent in 1970.

The spread of bilingualism as a whole has not impaired ethnic consciousness and the linguistic orientations of the country's population. The proof of this is the fact that the proportion of people who consider the language of their nationality to be their native language remained at approximately the same level over the course of three decades: 94.3 percent in 1959, 93.9 percent in 1970, 93.1 percent in 1979, and finally 92.7 percent in 1989. Simultaneously, the proportion of people of non-Russian nationality who consider Russian their native language increased somewhat as part of the process of the national dissemination of Russian bilingualism: 4.9 percent in 1959, 5.5 percent in 1970, 6.2 percent in 1979, and 6.6 percent in 1989.

The coordinated data of the four consecutively conducted population censuses speak for themselves. We are looking at a stable picture in the psychology of the linguistic life of the peoples, one with enduring tendencies that can be fully trusted. It seems all the more necessary to familiarize the reader as quickly as possible with the concrete data of the last census on the linguistic life of the peoples in various republics, oblasts, and rayons, in the cities and villages, and among people of various sexes, ages, levels of education, and occupations in particular spheres of the national economy. To wait another 2-3 years for this data means to lose time in the analysis and understanding of today's ethnolinguistic situation and modern ethnolinguistic processes. Even if some computer corrections are made to this data, that will not have an influence on the interpretation of basic ethnodemographic and ethnolinguistic trends.

Today it is no secret to anyone that many laws on state languages in the Union republics were adopted "on the run," without any kind of serious look at the real linguistic situation, without knowledge and understanding of the sociolinguistic tendencies, and without taking into consideration that very bilingualism that arose not as a result of ministerial directives, but naturally and at the free will of people living jointly and under a common roof.

How often has it happened in our history that the good intentions of various political leaders, framed without taking into consideration the real situation, have led to

unforeseeable results? And so now, in a period of transition, one should not be surprised that in the Union republics the fear has grown among citizens of nonindigenous nationalities that hasty implementation of rash laws on a single state language will lead to infringement of the political and civil rights of those who speak "nonofficial" languages. And so it has happened. A session of people's deputies of cities and rayons with predominantly non-Moldovan populations took place, for example, on 2 September 1990, in Tiraspol, and it passed a ruling to form a republic independent of Moldova. Two weeks earlier, on 19 August 1990, the first congress of rural and city soviets of South Moldova adopted a declaration "On the Freedom and Independence of the Gagauz People From the Republic of Moldova." The cornerstone of the demands of each of the newly formed republics was to declare two state languages in multiethnic Moldova: In addition to Moldovan, the Russian language, which has become for many, including a portion of the Moldovans, the language of social and professional mobility, as well as the language of cultural and political activity.

Once more expressing our deep gratitude to the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] for the raw materials (information on the results of the USSR population census in 1989) that it has given us, and using the opportunities presented by computer equipment, we will dare to present the reader of SOYUZ with a new series of tables containing data on the linguistic life of the permanent population of our country, in statistics, as well as in its dynamic aspect. It is believed that the absolute and relative indicators of the tables spare us the need for detailed commentaries and at the same time allow the interested reader to make an independent judgment on the most important facets and relationships in the linguistic life of the country's peoples.

We will only note that the 1989 census permitted us to reveal the general, stable trend of the peoples to preserve their distinctive aspects and the stable maintenance of ethnicity in the USSR, as opposed to many of the world's multiethnic countries. However, within the framework of this general picture there are substantial deviations and, at times, exceptions. Both the general rules and the exceptions to them are important and interesting for understanding the picture.

Uneven rates of growth of the population among peoples of the USSR belonging to different linguistic groups (see SOYUZ No 44) has led to noticeable movement in terms of proportions of peoples on the ethnic map of the country, as well as in the shades of the ethnolinguistic palette. One of the most significant of these was the reduction (by 6.8 percent) in the proportion of the Slavic population, from 77.1 percent in 1959 to 70.3 percent in 1989, and the increase in the proportion (by 6.2 percent) in the population speaking Turkic languages: From 11.1 percent in 1959 to 17.3 percent in 1989. It is understood that the trend in the development of the linguistic life of the Slavic and Turkic peoples, together making up approximately 88 percent of the population of the

country (see the table of the linguistic affiliation of the peoples of the USSR), is of significant interest.

For example, of the peoples belonging to the Turkic group of languages, only 5.9 percent of the people indicated any non-Turkic language as their native language. However, there were significant variations among the individual peoples within the framework of this composite indicator. The highest percentage—97.9—of correspondence between nationality and native language was among the numerous peoples who have their own Union republic. Among Turkic-language peoples who make up autonomous republics, this indicator is 82.2 percent. Among those who did not have their own autonomy, it is 85.7 percent. And although the experience of the linguistic life of three of the Turkic-language peoples (the Altai, Karachai, and Khakass) who have the status of an ethnic-territorial formation lower than an autonomous republic does not "fit" this general trend, one can still draw a general conclusion that the more numerous a people are, the broader and more stable the position of the native language is and the more stably ethnicity is maintained and preserved as regards the native language—the language of their nationality.

The variations in the linguistic life of Turkic peoples within groups are greater as the status they occupy in the presently existing hierarchy of national-state formations becomes lower. For example, there is only a 1.5 percent difference between the Turkmens who consider their own language to be their native language (98.5 percent) and the Kazakhs who believe the same (97.0 percent); but in the group of Turkic peoples who have an autonomous republic, this same indicator is 26.2 percent between the Tuva (98.5 percent) and the Bashkirs (72.3 percent).

And, finally, among the Turkic peoples who do not have any kind of statehood, the "dispersal" in the stability of maintenance of ethnicity is extremely great—74.9 percent—between the Crimean Tatars (91.9 percent) and the Karaim (17 percent).

Among the urban population of all Turkic-language peoples (with the exception of the Karakalpaks), the correspondence between nationality and native language was somewhat smaller than in rural localities. It is understandable that in cities, with their multiethnic makeup, it is more often necessary to communicate not only among one's own group but with representatives of many other peoples of non-Turkic nationality than it is in villages.

The male portion of the majority (15 of 26) of Turkic-language peoples preserved the native language of their nationality somewhat less than the female portion. Ethnosociological pools conducted in the 1970's in a number of republics showed that this process was helped along primarily by such factors as service in the military, a relatively higher social and professional status among

the men by comparison with the women, and a wider participation in the migrational processes than among the Turkic women.

The maintenance of ethnicity in the form of one's native language or, on the contrary, the loss of it, is a result of daily practice, the use of a particular language in various daily situations. In other words, the roots of the ethnopsychology of a language are nurtured by the sociolinguistic foliage of its use in practical spoken activities.

The data of the 1989 population census testify to an apparent connection running from parameters of the correspondence of "nationality" and "native ethnic language" to frameworks of the "bilingualization" of a particular people.

It is among those six relatively numerous Turkic-language peoples who have their own Union republics that the highest percentage of preservation of one's nationality in the form of the native language corresponds with a relatively low percentage of people who fluently speak a second language. For example, in the case of two of them (Uzbeks and Turkmen) bilingualism in Russian and a non-Russian language is practiced by about one-fourth of the entire population, and in the case of another two peoples (Azeris and Kirghiz) bilingualism occurs among one-third of the entire population. The higher proportion of Kazakhs who speak Russian fluently (60.4 percent) is explained by the fact that in their republic they represent an arithmetic minority. And a significant portion of the Kazakhs live in a relatively dispersed fashion in the northern Kazakhstan oblasts and in areas that are densely settled by other nationalities.

With a "decrease" in the status and a "decline" in the numbers, there appears an inversely proportional ratio. Among five (Balkars, Bashkirs, Kumyks, Tatars, and Nogai) of the nine Turkic peoples who have autonomous republics, the proportion of bilingual people exceeds 70.0 percent and encompasses, with insignificant deviations for individual peoples, almost three-fourths of each people. Among the Chuvash and Yakuts, about 65 percent are bilingual.

We must not ignore the curious fact that the Gagauz and the Crimean Tatars—out of eight peoples speaking Turkic languages (who do not have ethnic territorial formations)—are quite similar to the representatives of the autonomies with regard to the scale of their bilingualism in Russian and a non-Russian language. In our view this testifies that the further development of their linguistic life should contribute to the process of their obtaining ethnic statehood in one form or another.

Among the other Turkic peoples (Altai, Dolgans, Karachai, Khakass), the scale of bilingualism in Russian and a non-Russian language on the whole varies between that of the aforementioned groups.

The reader should not be led astray by very low indicators of bilingualism in Russian and a non-Russian language among several Turkic-language peoples who do not have their own ethnic territorial autonomy, inasmuch as the small proportion of people fluently using a second (Russian) language is explained by the fact that they have a high proportion of people who have made the transition to the Russian language and have, in consequence, indicated it as their native language. This is precisely the case, in particular, among the Karaim, among whom 14.4 percent fluently speak Russian while 75.4 percent consider it their native language, among the Krymchaki (30.2 percent and 62.2 percent respectively), and among the Tofalars (39.1 percent and 55.3 percent).

The low level of bilingualism in Russian and a non-Russian language (40.3 percent) in the linguistic life of the Soviet Turks is supplemented by other forms of bilingualism: About 30 percent of the Turks fluently speak the language of the native nationality of the Union republic in which they settled after deportation.

In the case of 15 of 26 Turkic-language peoples, bilingualism in Russian and a non-Russian language is more prevalent in the cities than in rural areas; among Karakalpak—by a factor of three, Uzbeks—by a factor of 2.9, Turkmens—by a factor of 2.7, Kirghiz—by a factor of 2.4, Azeris—by a factor of 2.2. Among three peoples—Gagauz, Nogai, and Crimean Tatars—the proportions of the population's urban and rural bilingualism were approximately equal. Among the remaining eight of the peoples, the predominance of the proportion of rural bilingual residents over the proportions of bilingual city dwellers is explained by the difference in the pace of linguistic assimilation. During the transitional stage of bilingualism in Russian and a non-Russian language, a portion of the urban population of the Karaim, Krymchaki, Dolgans, Shorians, Chuvash, Khakass, Tofalars, and Altai went over to Russian monolingualism.

In the case of peoples of the Iranian linguistic group, bilingualism in Russian and a non-Russian language, as well as all forms of bilingualism, occurs more widely among the males than among the females: Tajiks—35.9 and 19.2 percent, Ossetians—70.4 and 67.5 percent, Afghans—36.9 and 17.9 percent, Beludzhi—7.2 and 1.9 percent, Kurds—30.8 and 26.7 percent, Persians—49.2 and 42.4 percent, and Talyshy—7.7 and 3.5 percent. It is characteristic that in the case of the Iranian-language peoples it is only among mountain and Central Asian Jews that men and women fluently speak a second language like Russian or any other language of the peoples of the USSR in approximately equal numbers.

Predominance of bilingualism in Russian and a non-Russian language among men by comparison with women is characteristic of Turkic-language peoples to a greater degree than of peoples of any other linguistic family. Among 21 Turkic peoples, the percent of men fluently speaking Russian is higher than for women.

Among the remaining four peoples (Tuva, Dolgans, Karaim, and Krymchaki) this proportion is almost equal.

The general developmental rules of the linguistic life of the Turkic-language peoples revealed by the population census also "appear" for the most part among the peoples within the framework of other linguistic groups. Some exceptions in one direction or another do not change the main trends of linguistic development: They consist of a combination of maintenance of the stability of native languages with simultaneous development of linguistic contacts and the appearance and functioning of manifestations of bilingualism, on both small and large scales.

Notes to the following table: Percentages refer to the proportion of peoples of a given linguistic group to the overall population of the USSR according to data of the 1989 census. One asterisk designates peoples have ethnic territorial formations. Two asterisks designate peoples who have more than one ethnic territorial formation. All others are peoples who have no ethnic territorial formations.

Table of Linguistic Affiliations According to Linguistic Families and Groups

Altaic Family

Turkic Group—17.3 percent

- 1) Azeris*; 2) Kazakhs*; 3) Kirghiz*; 4) Turkmens*; 5) Uzbeks*; 6) Balkars*; 7) Bashkirs*; 8) Karakalpak*; 9) Kumyks*; 10) Nogai*; 11) Tatars*; 12) Tuva*; 13) Chuvash*; 14) Yakuts*; 15) Altai*; 16) Karachai*; 17) Khakass*; 18) Dolgans*; 19) Gagauz; 20) Karaim; 21) Krymchaki; 22) Crimean Tatars; 23) Tofalars; 24) Turks; 25) Uighur; 26) Shorians

Mongol Group—0.2 percent

- 1) Buryats**; 2) Kalmyks*; 3) Khalkha Mongols

Tungus-Manchurian Group

- 1) Evenki*; 2) Nanais; 3) Negidalt; 4) Orochi; 5) Orochi; 6) Udege; 7) Ulchi; 8) Evens

North Caucasian Family

Abkhazian-Adyge Group—0.2 percent

- 1) Abkhazians*; 2) Kabarda*; 3) Adyge*; 4) Circassians*; 5) Abaza

Nakh-Dagestani Group—1.0 percent

- 1) Avars*; 2) Aguly*; 3) Dargins*; 4) Ingush*; 5) Laks*; 6) Legians*; 7) Rutul*; 8) Tabasarans*; 9) Tsakhury*; 10) Chechens*; 11) Udi

Indo-European Family

Slavic Group—70.3 percent

1) Belorussians*; 2) Ukrainians*; 3) Russians*; 4) Bulgarians; 5) Poles; 6) Serbs; 7) Slovaks; 8) Croats; 9) Czechs

Iranian Group—1.8 percent

1) Tajiks*; 2) Ossetians**; 3) Afghans; 4) Beludzhi; 5) Mountain Jews; 6) Central Asian Jews; 7) Kurds; 8) Persians; 9) Talyshy; 10) Tats

Albanian Group

1) Albanians

Armenian Group

1) Armenians*

Baltic Group—1.6 percent

1) Latvians*; 2) Lithuanians*

Romance Group—1.2 percent

1) Moldovans; 2) Spanish; 3) Italians; 4) Cubans; 5) Rumanians; 6) French

Greek Group

1) Greeks

German Group—1.2 percent

1) Austrians; 2) Americans; 3) British; 4) Dutch; 5) European Jews*; 6) Germans

Indo-Aryan Group

1) Gypsies; 2) The peoples of India

Uralic Family

Finno-Ugric Group—1.6 percent

1) Estonians*; 2) Karelians*; 3) Komi*; 4) Mari*; 5) Mordvins*; 6) Udmurts*; 7) Perm Komi*; 8) Mansi*; 9) Khanty*; 10) Hungarians; 11) Vepsians; 12) Izhortsy; 13) Liv; 14) Saami; 15) Finns

Samoyed Groups

1) Nenets*; 2) Nganasany; 3) Selkupy; 4) Entsy

Chukot-Kamchatka Family

Chukot-Kamchatka Group

1) Koryaks*; 2) Chukchi*; 3) Itelmeny; 4) Chuvantsy

Chinese-Tibetan Family

1) Chinese; 2) Dungans; 3) Vietnamese

Semitic Family

Arabic Group

1) Arabs

Eskimo-Aleutian Family

Eskimo-Aleutian Group

1) Aleutians; 2) Eskimos

Kartvel Family

Georgian Group

1) Georgians**; 2) Georgian Jews

Isolated Languages

1) Assyrians; 2) Kety; 3) Koreans; 4) Nivkhi; 5) Yukagiry; 6) Japanese

Editor's Note. Previous materials and tables from the "SOYUZ Encyclopedia," devised by Mikhail Guboglo and the late Valeriy Kondratyev, have aroused great interest on the part of our readers. Today we begin a conversation on languages. In future issues of SOYUZ our readers will be able to acquaint themselves with tables reflecting the linguistic life of the country.

Computer processing of the 1989 population census was prepared by Yelena Guboglo.

Market's Effect on Northern Ethnic Groups

91UN0280A Moscow SOVetskaya Rossiya
in Russian 10 Nov 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Andrey Krivoschapkin, writer of Evenk nationality and RSFSR People's Deputy: "Live on, My North! What Will be the Fate of the Small Nations of this Region Under Market Conditions"]

[Text] My North is great and unique. For the 300,000 persons who represent more than 30 ethnic groups of indigenous peoples, the North is an age-old habitat, without which life is inconceivable. These peoples have a centuries-old history and an ancient culture. They are a tiny fraction of world civilization. The North also became a native land for millions of people of various nationalities who came here at different times from all ends of the country.

I believe in my North, and in its tomorrow. At the same time, I must and am obliged to declare frankly that today it is in critical need of the help and support of the large nations. The situation that is evolving, I will put it bluntly, is tragic. An intensive and barbaric development of the North, calculated only for immediate gain by forces of all-consuming Union ministries and departments, is destroying it.

The industrial "development" affects the problem of interethnic relations, inasmuch as it invades the holy of

holies of the small nations of the North—the foundations of a traditional way of life. Tens of millions of hectares of reindeer pastures and of hunting and fishing lands are disappearing. The reindeer disappear from where deer moss is trampled. Once there is no reindeer, the traditional way of life of the Northerner, which was carefully protected for centuries, is wrecked. The same can be said about hunting. This is the life, food, and clothing of the Northerners. Without the traditional way of life, they lose national traditions, their personality and virtues, and they are transformed into nothing. And this is then a tragedy for entire nations. But this is a fact of today's reality.

August was rainy in the north of Yakutia this year. The grasslands were under water. Although the plans for the procurement of hay were not big, their fulfillment came into question. And fresh milk here, especially as a product for children's nourishment, is in the shortage category. Therefore, I understood the anxiety of local leaders. But, as they say, every cloud has a silver lining. The cloudy, cold August days, interspersed with heavy rains, were favorable for the reindeer.

I met on those days with my own constituents—the reindeer breeders of Allaikhovskiy Rayon. Things went well for me then: Together with members of the cultural agitation team, I had occasion to fly over several reindeer-breeding herds.

The reindeer nomad camps are deployed, as I noticed during the flight, along the shore of the Indigirka River, which is truly a bread-winner for workers of the Allaikhovskaya tundra. Because the ration of the reindeer breeder includes fresh and smoked fish—the yukola. Then I thought, mentally addressing the industrialists, how important it is to keep the Indigirka ecologically pure! For its slightest contamination will damage the fish, and through it, the health of the people, most of all that of the reindeer breeders. This northern pearl of a river flows through the territory of four rayons: Oymyakonskiy, Abyyskiy, Allaikhovskiy, and Momskiy. Do not forget this, extractors of the "Indigirzoloto" combine!"

My kinsmen-Evens [formerly called Lamuts] are scattered in groups over the entire North. They live in the oblasts of Yakutia, Magadan, Kamchatka, and Sakhalin, and in Khabarovsk Kray. The national-state structure of groups, as among many peoples of the North, has not been established everywhere. For example, the groups do not have even one national okrug. Last year, in the meantime, the first Evenskiy Evenko-Bytantay National Rayon was organized in Yakutia. Our society should see to it that every Northern people, regardless of its numerical size, has its own national territorial organization: okrug, rayon, or ordinary Soviet. But the initiative must come from us alone.

My constituents wrote to me from the Allaikhovskiy Rayon of Yakutia about the pressing need to restore the

Even village of Oyetung, which was abandoned. I cannot calmly read the lines of the letter that was written to me with a bleeding heart:

"We, the Evens, indigenous inhabitants of the former village of Oyetung of the Allaikhovskiy Rayon of the Yakutsk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, because of a 'lack of prospects,' were expelled in 1970 from a native settlement that had been inhabited for centuries. Less than half of the inhabitants of Oyetung were moved against their will to the city of Olenegorsk, and a good half, to the rayon center of Chokurdakh.... Not all Oyetung groups were provided work and housing in the new settlements. This question has not been fully settled to this day. The Oyetung hunting grounds, the reindeer pasture lands, and fishing sectors that the Evens used to live on are now deserted.... Our fellow tribesmen did not find a place to live permanently for 20 years of this terrible existence. Also, there was no resolution of the problem of providing the former reindeer breeders, fishermen, and hunters with housing and permanent work.

"The Evens began to forget their mother tongue, culture, centuries-old traditions, and good customs.

"Not accusing anyone for our past sufferings, not stirring up the past, but to correct the aforementioned mistakes, in April of 1990, after overcoming great obstacles on the part of the command administrative apparatus, the Evens groups themselves organized an economically accountable cooperative 'Oyetung' in the Allaikhovskiy state farm [sovkhoz]. The organization of the cooperative was greeted by the Evens population with great approval and with the hope of restoring the native village of Oyetung and its historical past."

I consider it my duty fully and in every way possible to support the Oyetung groups. Under conditions of a transition to a market, Oyetung must acquire a legal right to an independent existence, with a revival of the traditional way of life of the people.

A similar situation has also developed with groups of the Uyandi village in the Ust-Yanskiy Rayon of Yakutia. The association "Yakutzoloto" is undertaking to restore its ancient village. But this has to be done very quickly, reliably, and with a sincere desire to help.

Here is another example. In Yakutia, the northern Anabarskiy Rayon is one of the most remote and socially backward rayons. In order to meet here with constituents, I had to fly all the way to the shores of the Laptev Sea.

The village Yuryung-Khaya, which translates as White Mountain, is scattered along the shores of the Anabar River. Here representatives of a small ethnic group of northern nationalities settled down, the Dolgans, and in Yakutia the Dolgans live only in this village, on the central farmstead of "Severnnyy" sovkhoz. They call the village, probably correctly, the ocean gateway not only of the Anabarskiy, but also of the neighboring Mirninskiy

Rayon. Ocean-going vessels deliver various kinds of national economic cargoes here. In the winter, cargoes are moved on winter roads by motor vehicles to the rayon center—the village of Saskylakh, the diamond city of Mirnyy, etc. This fact maintains a good work attitude in the village, and it brings a noticeable vitality to life. However, serious inconveniences also crop up. An oil installation and tank facilities are situated close to the village and in its environs. Any negligence can lead to a lot of trouble. The situation is dangerously explosive. The Dolgans have repeatedly asked that they be protected against this danger, but, as before, the question remains open.

There was serious discussion here about what was to be moved—the village or the oil installation—but the difficulty is that there is marshy tundra and permafrost everywhere, and there is no place to move the village. This is to start with. Second, as it was explained to me by the indigenous inhabitants, the village is situated in a place that was most convenient and favorable to living, and it is the age-old native land. In addition, to move the village will cost a lot, and, given our poverty, it is practically impossible. Then the variant of moving the oil installation comes up. But, they say, this also has its difficulties. Only one thing remains: Take immediate steps to guarantee the safety of the village. First, it is necessary to build a reliable rampart of sand around the oil installation, and, with the help of a reinforced concrete barrier, to make the Anabar River safe from petroleum product wastes. A resolution of this problem is laid first and foremost on such a giant as the NPO [scientific production association] "Yakutalmaz" and on the Council of Ministers of the Yakutsk-Sakha Soviet Socialist Republic.

The second point on which I would like to dwell is associated with the name of a person who has a lot of initiative. To my great satisfaction, I associated with him quite a lot. His name is Nikolay Yegorovich Androsov. He worked as the director of the "Anabar" sovkhoz, and simultaneously he was the chairman of the rayon Soviet of people's deputies. He is an intelligent and reasonable person who has a lot of work experience behind him at various levels of our multistage structure.

He is greatly concerned about the difficult problem of services and facilities for the rayon. The villages are really neglected. The roads are absolutely in ruins. There is no earth-moving equipment. Nikolay Yegorovich is thinking of massive construction in the entire northern region of the mobile settlements of reindeer breeders and hunters. He visualizes a settlement with entire complexes of housing, minischools, a cultural center, a medical sector, a trade store, and a bathhouse. A power supply with the help of a portable electric power station is compulsory. The estimated cost of one such settlement is approximately 200-250,000 rubles [R]. The sovkhozes do not have the capability of building them with their own forces owing to the value of the products they produce. To do this requires the help of the government and of the state.

The next big problem is to provide the nomadic population with light and heat. Under tundra conditions, it is possible and necessary to use portable wind-driven engines, and in the mountainous taiga zone, to employ electric power stations on mountain streams. It is also necessary to investigate somehow the possibility of designing miniature electric boilers. And that will give warmth, and the reindeer breeders will not suffer in leaky tents that are far from the most elementary achievements of civilization. Is it possible that our scientists cannot resolve this problem?

Our special concern is material-financial compensation for irretrievable losses inflicted on the environment of the North and on pasture and hunting lands on the part of Union industrial ministries and departments. These ministries and departments are to blame for polluting and ruining many rivers, reservoirs, and lakes. I was particularly struck by the fact that 33 geological prospecting expeditions were working in the reindeer pastures of Olenekskiy Rayon! As a result of such "development," the "Anabar" sovkhoz lost two-third of its pastures.

Today, the people of the North can bring legal action against Union ministries for hundreds of billions of rubles: nonferrous metallurgy, geology, the river and ocean fleet, and civil aviation, for causing irreplaceable damage to nature and habitation.

I will cite one more example from this category.

The City of Neryungri—the capital of South Yakutia—is well-known in the Soviet Union and abroad. It grew up in a short time in a place where 20 years ago the Evenk [formerly called Tungus] hunter lightheartedly traded in furs and caught large game, roaming all of his life in the southern Yakutsk taiga until geologists discovered very rich deposits of bituminous coal. And so in 15 years a modern city with an excellent infrastructure sprang up in the dense taiga, and indigenous inhabitants—the Evenkis—took shelter close by. That is the bitter paradox.

Recently, the Evenk "Khatyminskiy" state industrial administration was established. Of 40 hunter-fishermen, only 12 are native inhabitants. There is no need to guess here who gets the better hunting sectors, and, apparently, the Evenkis have reason to be offended. The Evenk "Zolotinka" sovkhoz is also located here. Representatives of the Neryungri city branch of the Association of Nationalities of North Yakutia jointly with an aktiv calculated the damage caused agricultural production in connection with the destruction of reindeer pastures: in the building of the railroad line "Yakutsk siding-Berkakit station" and the adjacent highway R7,063,056; in the construction of the settlement Serebryanny Bor R522,224; and of the city of Neryungri R8,268,704. In the construction and development of the South Yakutsk territorial industrial complex, 21,168 hectares of reindeer pastures were expropriated from the "Zolotinka" sovkhoz. In the entire rayon, the extent of the damage caused in the last 15 years amounts to more than R26

million. This gives rise to the legal question: Does the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry intend to compensate for the damage done to the traditional way of life of the Neryungi?

I would also like to ask this question of the Ministry of Metallurgy and "Soyuzalmazoloto," whose powerful subdivision "Yakutalmaz" is situated in the city of Mirnyy and of Udachnyy which forced the Evenkis of Syuldykar from their ancient places of habitation and doomed them to a life of wretched vegetation.

...We are on the threshold of a market. What will be the fate of the small nations of the North? Who will extend them a helping hand? One would like to believe that the Union ministries and departments that transformed the ancient habitation of these peoples into their own private domain and over a long period of time pumped out fabulous profits as a result of the exploitation of very rich natural resources would come to their senses and do what is necessary, nonetheless, to make compensation for the damage that was caused. Truth and justice demand this.

But I believe in the North and in its people who are ready to offer the hand of friendship to anyone, regardless of nationality and religion. Live on, my North!

Reasons for Ethnic German Emigration from USSR

91UN0377A IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Nov 90 p 3

[Article by S. Guk based on conversation with Academician Raushenbakh: "Emigration? Evacuation? Panic Flight? Academician B. Raushenbakh Reflects on the Reasons for the Mass Departure of Germans From the USSR"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA has already written about the mass "exodus" of the citizens of German nationality that has begun. In particular, IZVESTIYA published the data of the sociological research of the Munich Institute for the Study of Eastern Europe (No 225, 1989) on the reasons forcing Germans to leave their long-occupied places. The majority of those surveyed declared at that time that they are leaving the USSR for national, cultural, and religious reasons.

Today, according to press reports, there is still another reason: fear. Academician Boris Viktorovich Raushenbakh, the head of the organizational committee for carrying out the departure of the Soviet Germans, himself a German by nationality, believes that fear is not the chief reason which drives his fellow compatriots from the USSR.

"From the Central Asian republics, where they had pogroms, not only Germans, but also Russians are fleeing. This is not the main thing. At the basis of everything is the continuing discrimination against Germans, which began with their forced resettlement from the Volga Region during the years of the war. We know

what the GULAG is. But few know that the Germans, very likely, as a whole went through these camps. All the adult men were taken there by direct service, they took even women and adolescents. The Germans lost there more than half of those sent to the camps, I myself was in one of them, I know what this was like."

At that time the future academician was 27 years old. He sat behind barbed wire until the end of the war. Then they closed the camp and transferred all the prisoners to the status of exiles. (In the Soviet lexicon this was modestly called "special settlers", Raushenbakh adds). He was lucky: Already before the war he was connected with the defense industry and worked together with Korolev. Upon the petition of Academician Boris Viktorovich Keldysh, they kindly allowed him to work again for the good of the state. (In October of this year, he was awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor). The overwhelming mass of Germans continued to remain in exile for a long time.

Right up to the present time, the authorities did not so much as dream about making amends for the injustice, until the expelled peoples themselves raised the question of returning to their historic homeland. True, in this chorus of protesting voices, the German language was not heard: The Germans did not organize demonstrations, they did not carry out the unauthorized seizure of land and did not commit other excesses. They quietly packed their suitcases and, having obtained visas, departed for Sheremetevo Airport.

Only last year, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decision on the restoration of German autonomy. But... "In it, it is true, it is not stated on what territory," says Raushenbakh. The USSR Council of Ministers was charged with the preparation of a proposal. The government commission was headed by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, V.K. Gusev. I also belong to this commission. Most natural would be the restoration of autonomy in the previous place, but the local authorities are resisting this."

He explains: In Saratov Oblast, where before the war there was an autonomous republic of the Volga Germans, the local party and Soviet authorities have set the Russian population against the return of the Germans. Even closed conferences were held: It is necessary, they said, to stir up the people, to go out into the streets and to protest. "I was in Saratov, I asked the opponents of autonomy what they were afraid of," B.V. Raushenbakh told me. Clearly no one could explain it. I asked: They will what, evict you from your apartment, take away your land, and drive you away from your jobs? No, people are simply scared, they themselves do not know what to fear. This is the first sign of the fact that nothing real stands behind their fears, that this a sentiment artificially created by interested people.

As has already been said, these interested people are made of an influential part of the leaders of the oblast and its rayons. They are afraid to lose their privileges,

their soft chairs. The fact that what has happened is not at all a reflection of the "voice of the people" is indicated by the situation in the neighboring—Ulyanov—Oblast. Here the oblast leadership is interested in the attraction of manpower, and the local population is receiving the arriving Germans cheerfully. In Saratov Oblast they do not permit them to occupy even empty villages. There are also quite outrageous cases: The Rovenskiy Rural Soviet of Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon, for example, decided to evict all Germans from well-equipped apartments and resettle them in bad ones. Here are the results of the artificially stirred-up malevolence.

As happens frequently in life, what has happened also has a comical side to it. When you acquaint yourself with what is happening in Saratov Oblast, with the demonstrations and intrigues, you might think that some hundred thousand German legions are moving to the oblast. In actual fact, the majority of Germans by no means strive to come here. Let us turn to the statistics. In 1989 the number of Germans in Saratov Oblast increased by a total of 700 people. During the same period, 100,000 people left for Germany, and this year still more will leave. Life shows that, if a German family has begun to pack its suitcases, it is to go to Germany, and not to Saratov. Fewer than one percent are going to the Volga, and the hysteria raised there in connection with this looks ridiculous and comical.

Someone is prepared to say after those who depart: "Good riddance!" But let us leave emotions aside and turn to objective data. According to an estimate of the union Gosplan, the departure of 100,000 Soviet Germans turns into R4 billion in losses for the country. Thus, in 1989 we already lost R4 billion, and in the current year we are "drawing" another R5-6 billion in losses. Are we really such a rich country that we can throw away billions? In the FRG they have also made calculations, and it turned out that even after the deduction of expenses for the transport of the immigrants, the construction of housing for them, and various educational courses, the net income will be somewhat more than four billion marks for every 100,000 people coming to Germany. Here losses running into many billions, there income running into many billions. If this regarded as the goal of the state policy of our country, then, indeed, "good riddance!"

In order not to lose tens of billions of rubles, our country must somehow put a stop to this flow of people leaving. Today a successful situation has developed for this. The unification of Germany requires the investment of large funds, and its government is interested in some weakening of the rates of emigration. The only method which to some extent can stop the emigration from the USSR is the restoration of the German republic. The return of autonomy thus becomes not so much a task of the restoration of justice as a statewide problem of the conservation of funds and manpower resources (you know, it is excellent workers who are leaving, not drunkards and loafers, the latter understand that there is

nothing for them to do "there"). With certain reservations it can be said that the restoration of the statehood of the Soviet Germans is not as necessary to the Germans as it is necessary to our country, including the Russians. You see, for the majority of Germans it is easy to solve their problem—they leave. Involuntarily the impression forms that some influential leaders of oblast and rayon scale in the territory of the former autonomous republic are placing their interests over those of the state and are prepared, for the sake of this, to go to the deception and intimidation of the local population. Evidently, they do not care even about the well-being of the inhabitants of their oblast, since the creation of a German autonomy opens up the path for the attraction of large funds from the union budget and from Germany, which can also be used for the needs of the local population (the construction of social, cultural, and consumer projects, the transfer of part of the new housing erected for the quick reduction of queues, etc.). The possibility is opening up of the creation of a unified economic region, consisting of the restored republic (not necessarily in the old boundaries) and Saratov Oblast, which will make it possible for the industrial enterprises of the oblast to establish with comparative ease business contacts with the West and to be linked to sources of convertible currency. Germany is willing to invest money, but you know, if there is no territory, there is nowhere to invest. Not in party committees. The managers of many enterprises understand this, and there is hope that they will convince the part of the oblast leadership capable of thinking in terms of the state of the necessity of reasonable actions.

It should not be thought that the restoration of autonomy on the Volga will take place easily, and not at all because of the resistance of the local population. You know, if they can speak the truth, they will welcome this reconstitution. The difficulty will consist in the fact that few of the Germans will want to come here. What needs to be done is to make the inclination to come to the Volga greater than the desire to leave for the economically flourishing Germany. Here it is possible to make use of the fact that a part of the Soviet Germans has still preserved something like a nostalgic feeling to return to the land of their ancestors, and a certain part is held back by their affection to the Homeland.

How can one make those who have submitted applications for departure from the country (and these are hundreds of thousands) and stop those who for the time being are only thinking about leaving? Here is a statewide (and not at all a German) problem. When you talk with people who are leaving, the following is a typical argument: "If I remain, I will die here a second-rate person (you see, discrimination continues even today); if I leave, I will also die a second-rate person 'there' (to get accustomed to a new environment will be difficult), but for that my children will be free, they will not know discrimination, they will know the German language and German culture." The future of their children is one of the basic incentives for leaving.

But for the children, schools are needed where all subjects will be taught in the German language (at the present time, there is not a single such school in the USSR—one of the signs of discrimination), and for the schools—teachers, German textbooks, and methodical guidance of the educational process. All this as a whole is possible only in an autonomous republic, where there will be a Ministry of Education, pedagogical institutes, and publishing houses, and from where teachers, textbooks, and everything else necessary for the national schools will be sent to the places where Germans live in compact groups in the territory of our union. In the republic itself, only a comparatively small part of the German population of the USSR may live. The republic will become a cultural center for all Soviet Germans, no matter where they would live, as this was also before the war, and the presence of their own statehood in the territory of the USSR, possibly, will stop many from searching for it outside the boundaries of our country.

Everything written about here was completely realizable a couple of years ago. Today the possibility of such a development calls forth doubt in many. There has been too much intensification of the flow of people leaving who are not waiting for anything good from the local Volga authorities and who see the impotence of the central leadership (a decision on the restoration of autonomy was adopted by the Supreme Soviet, but no one intends to carry it out). They talk about the disagreement of the local population, but you know it was artificially created and is constantly supported by information that lacks all conscientiousness. They say that what is happening is the result of democracy, but this is a distorted concept of democracy. Today people in our country understand democracy as the realization of the slogan "I have the right!" (or "We have the right!"), but few people take note of the fact that this is not at all an appeal to democracy, but an appeal to anarchy. It is among anarchists that everyone is doing what he considers necessary, and does not give a damn for everyone else. It is not surprising that this anarchist distortion of the principles of democracy is today leading to the disintegration of the country, where almost every street is starting to shout about its sovereignty and non-subordination to the higher organs. Real democracy begins where people above all see to the observance of the rights of others, and only after this—of their own rights. Margaret Thatcher, appearing on our Central Television, attempted in tactful form to explain this to us, but probably few people understood her.

Whether the question of the mass exodus from the country will be solved, proceeding from the principles of state wisdom, or the forces will gain the upper hand that proceed from the principle of "state stupidity," the future will show. But it is necessary to hurry, you know the flow of those leaving the country will pull after them the relatives that have still remained behind, including Russians, and after the adoption of the Law on Exit even simple acquaintances. We must hurry also because of the fact that every year of delay costs the country no less than R4 billion.

Soviet Koreans on National Identity, Cultural Heritage

91US0106A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian No 317, 13 Nov 90 Second Edition, p 3

[Article by M. Pak, president, All-Union Association of Soviet Koreans, doctor of historical sciences, professor; and G. Yugay, vice-president of the same association, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "When the Roots Are Cut Off"]

[Text] Last May the All-Union Association of Soviet Koreans was founded in Moscow. The congress defined the basic trends for the national and cultural revival of the members of this nation, who live in the USSR.

No such attention to the fate of Soviet Koreans had been paid since Leninist times. The deformations in our society and the establishment of Stalin's dictatorship had a tragic impact also on the fate of the Koreans, who had become an intrinsic part of the multinational family of Soviet peoples.

For nearly 150 years our ancestors, driven by need and hunger resulting from the unbearable socioeconomic and political conditions in Korea, had been forced to settle in an area south of the Ussuri Kray, which became a Russian possession in 1860. Korean emigration increased particularly after the Japanese annexation and the establishment of a colonial regime in Korea in 1910.

At that time the territory of the Russian Far East and neighboring Manchuria became a foreign center of the anticolonial resistance of the Korean people. By the turn of the 20th century, Vladivostok had become a center of the Korean cultural-educational national movement, where newspapers and journals which called upon the people to fight for saving the country from the threat of Japanese enslavement were being published.

After the victory of the October Revolution, the Koreans wrote a number of outstanding pages in the history of the struggle for the establishment of a Soviet system in the Far East. The great "Volochnayevka Days" and the "stormy Spassk nights" were tainted with the blood of the best sons of Soviet Koreans.

After the Civil War, actively participating in peaceful construction, the Korean patriots made a noteworthy contribution to the development of the economy and culture of the Soviet Far East. Some successes were achieved also in the development of the national culture of Soviet Koreans. Until 1937 seven newspapers and six journals and a great deal of educational, fiction and political publications were being published in the Korean language in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and other cities. Some 400 schools, a pedagogical institute and a technical school, a worker university department, two party schools, a theater, libraries, radio broadcasting stations, and so on, were in the Korean language in areas densely populated by Koreans.

All of this was abolished as a result of repressions and mass deportations of Koreans between 1935 and 1937. The Koreans were the first nation which was resettled by force from the Far East to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This Stalinist political action resulted in tremendous losses to the development of Soviet Koreans. Thousands of experienced party, state and military personalities and members of the intelligentsia were subjected to repressive measures. Of the entire array of higher educational institutions, publications and other cultural institutions we quoted, all that are left today... are a theater and a newspaper which is now on the verge of closing down because of the small number of subscribers. Only isolated individuals among the nearly 450,000-strong Korean population living in the USSR speak Korean.

Of late, awareness of the threat of the disappearance of Soviet Koreans as an ethnic group has triggered a movement for the revival of the native language and national culture, as confirmed by the fact that Korean cultural centers, associations and other public organizations have been founded in different parts of the Soviet Union.

Also needed, however, is a governmental program for Korean national development, in accordance with the USSR Law on the Free National Development of the Citizens of the USSR Living Outside Their National-State Formations or Not Having Such Formations on USSR Territory. It is a question of developing a specific mechanism for action of this law fitting the national interests of Soviet Koreans.

The All-Union Association of Soviet Koreans deems relevant the formulation of steps to improve the forms of national self-determination of Soviet Koreans; in places of their dense settlement it intends to help in the creation of national administrative-territorial units, such as national rayons, settlements and rural soviets and production collectives. At the same time, also needed is the development of associations and cultural centers in the localities, together with state organs, of specific programs for the revival of the national language, traditions and customs of the Korean population living in different parts of the Soviet Union.

Naturally, after obtaining its long-awaited political rehabilitation with the 14 November 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet Declaration, the people openly began to speak out about the pain, deprivation and losses of family, children in particular, they had experienced throughout that period of persecution and degradation. The suffering which their resettlement to new places caused was not forgotten. Many people found themselves in the new areas without housing. They also were exposed to internal passport restrictions and loss of the right to move and choose places of residence, restrictions which were abolished only after the death of the "father of all nations." Many among us justifiably believe that a guarantee to the effect that none of this will be repeated would be the establishment of an autonomous republic or oblast as a more reliable political and juridical protection of their national interests.

To an even greater extent, problems of social protection and equality have become once again topical among us in connection with the recent events: the aggravation of interethnic relations in Central Asia where currently more than one-half of all Koreans in the Union reside. No reliable guarantee exists that they too may not become refugees. Where would they go if they have no national roof over their heads?

Despite these difficulties, however, neither the report submitted at the congress nor its final documents mention anything about national autonomy in the Maritime area, although this question was raised by several delegates. This was done for two reasons: first, not to aggravate any further the stress in interethnic relations in the country by creating a new center for such aggravations; second, to continue the study of public opinion, including the population of the area which could be possibly granted autonomy in the future.

Also important is the other problem related to the national revival, which has a socioeconomic aspect as well. By this we mean the national-ethnic features of labor activities. Without engaging in any way in any kind of self-aggrandizement, let us nonetheless remember that for the time being Koreans are in the leading ranks in the Union in the number of heroes of socialist labor in terms of percentage in the overall size of populations of specific nationalities (201 out of 450,000). This accomplishment, however, was possible precisely under the conditions of the compact settlement of the population which is now being lost.

We must also surmount the alienation from our own history. We have still not written the systematized history of Soviet Koreans. It is unnecessary to prove the importance of this matter, for without historical culture and memory of a people, that people loses its self-awareness, self-respect and self-assertion among the other peoples of the country.

Demographic Figures on Assimilation of Ukrainians Reported

91UN0339A Kiev *FILOSOFKA* I
SOTSIOLOHICHNA DUMKA in Ukrainian No 4,
Apr 90 pp 77-83

[Article I.M. Prybytkova: "Children of Various Nations..."]

[Text] Boundaries between people are set not by skin color or eyelid slant, but by prejudices: racial, national, political, religious and God knows what other kinds.

Many of the republics have legislated a national language. This constrained effort is also an unhealthy factor. Who knows how significant its effects will be. Such a law has been passed in the Ukraine. In order to obtain a better understanding of nationality relationships and the problem of language, let us examine the facts. We will analyze data obtained in the 1989 census in reference to

the composition of our republic's residents by nationality and their distribution by native language. A reminder to the reader: the questionnaires were completed during interviews, on the basis of the verbal answers.

Therefore, as of the 1989 census, 72.6 percent of the population of our republic was Ukrainian, the percentage of Russians was 22.0 percent, and the percentage of persons of other nationalities was not high - only 5.4 percent. Figures for other republics are given for comparison.

The base population of persons of the named republic's core nationality were: Moldavian SSR* - 64.4 percent, Tajik SSR - 62.2 percent, Estonian SSR - 61.5 percent, Kirghiz SSR - 52.3 percent, Latvian SSR - 52.0 percent, Kazakh SSR - 39.7 percent (!). The Georgian SSR, Uzbek SSR, Turkmen SSR, Belorussian SSR and Lithuanian

SSR had base populations between 70-80 percent, and only in three republics did the base population exceed 80 percent - in the RSFSR, Azerbaijan SSR, and Armenian SSR. The population is most uniform in the Armenian SSR, where the portion of the residents of the core nationality equaled 93.3 percent.

The proportion of Russians within the various republics of the Soviet Union was significant in the Kazakh SSR (39.7 percent), Latvian SSR (33.9 percent), Estonian SSR (30.3 percent), and Kirghiz SSR (21.5 percent). In most of the republics (except in the Ukraine), it was around 10 percent, and only in Belorussia and Moldavia was it higher, 13.2 percent and 12.9 percent respectively.

Let us turn our attention back to our homeland, the Ukraine. Table 1 shows what nationalities live within its borders, what languages are spoken, who has left it, perhaps forever. Look carefully at the figures, they will explain many things.

Table 1: Composition of Ukrainian SSR Population by Nationality and Native Language

Nationality of Resident	Number of Individuals of Given Nationality		1989 as percent of 1979	Percentage of Total Population (1989)			
	1979	1989		Consider Native Language Same as Nationality	Fluent in Other USSR National Languages		
					Russian	Ukrainian	Other
Total Population	49,609,333	51,449,479	103.7	87.8	45.5	13.3	0.5
Ukrainians	36,488,951	37,370,368	102.4	87.7	59.4	6.9	0.001
Russians	10,471,602	11,340,250	108.3	98.3	1.2	32.7	0.3
Jews	632,610	485,975	76.8	7.1	7.3	46.5	4.7
Belorussians	406,098	439,858	108.3	35.4	33.5	18.6	13.2
Moldavians	293,576	324,480	110.5	77.9	55.6	12.2	6.6
Bulgarians	238,217	232,764	97.7	69.5	61.8	8.5	1.0
Poles	258,309	218,891	84.7	12.5	46.1	17.8	0.7
Hungarians	164,373	163,288	99.3	95.5	42.7	11.8	0.1
Romanians	121,795	134,676	110.6	62.3	50.3	7.1	4.5
Greeks	104,091	98,578	94.7	18.5	18.6	23.7	0.7
Tatars	83,906	86,789	103.4	48.9	46.2	9.5	13.6
Armenians	38,646	60,047	155.4	49.9	44.1	10.9	11.0
Gypsies	34,411	47,908	139.2	58.6	46.6	15.3	5.1
Crimean Tatars	6,636	44,025	660.0	92.0	83.4	0.6	2.8
Germans	34,139	37,912	111.1	23.1	22.7	20.7	0.9
Gagauz	29,398	32,017	108.9	79.4	66.8	2.6	6.2

Our population has increased by 1,840,000, or 3.7 percent, from the time of the 1979 census. This fact, unquestionably, in itself calls for optimism, but in moderation, since the rate of growth of population in the Ukrainian SSR is 2.4 times lower than generally in the Soviet Union. The breakdown of this population growth also calls attention to itself. Due to emigration, the number of residents of Jewish, Bulgarian, Polish,

Hungarian and Greek nationality decreased. There was a marked increase in Armenians and Gypsies. But the population of Crimean Tatars grew at the swiftest rate (6.6 times) in the period between one census and the next.

The population of Ukrainians by nationality grew by a scant 2.4 percent. That is the lowest indicator of growth

in our republic, although its actual count (881,400 persons) was greater than the increase in other nationalities. Second are Russians, whose number grew by 868,600. The Russian, Belorussian, Moldavian, Romanian, German, and Gagauz national representation in the republic increased at a rate of 8-11 percent, which was greater than the norm of their growth in all the republics.

Therefore, there are 37,370,400 Ukrainians in our republic, and 87.7 percent consider their mother tongue as that of their nationality. We can congratulate ourselves on not losing our language! But how does this compare to the other republics?

This indicator is lower only in Belorussia: 80.2 percent of Belorussians remained true to their mother tongue. In all the other republics the portion of the root nationality which considers its mother tongue to be the same as its nationality is much higher, varying within the limits of 95.4 - 99.8 percent.

Ukrainian is spoken fluently by 13.3 percent of the non-Ukrainian residents by nationality. It is most respected by residents of Jewish nationality: almost half of them (46.6 percent) speak fluent Ukrainian. Ukrainian is the second language for one-third of the Russians,

a quarter of the Greeks, and one-fifth of the Germans. Among the other nationalities living in our republic, knowledge of the Ukrainian language is significant among Belorussians, Poles, and Gypsies.

For most residents not of the root nationality, the second language is Russian. Without a doubt, it, and not Ukrainian, is the language of international relations in the republic. Almost half the residents of the Ukrainian SSR (45.5 percent) are fluent in Russian. The Russian language is most prevalent among Crimean Tatars, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Moldavians, and Romanians. 59.4 percent of the Ukrainian residents speak fluent Russian.

Only one-half of one percent of the residents speak another language (besides Ukrainian, Russian, or their "mother tongue"). Polyglots include only 13.6 percent of the Tatars, 13.2 percent of the Belorussians, and 11.0 percent of the Armenians. Ukrainians are the least inclined toward learning other languages (0.001 percent). This can be easily explained. Within their own borders it is enough to know the mother tongue and the language of international relations.

But this is true at home, where even the walls have ears. What about those living abroad? Look at Table 2. It shows statistics about Ukrainians in Diaspora.

Table 2: Distribution of Ukrainian Population by Republic of Residence

Soviet Republics	1979		1989		Percentage of Total Ukrainians in 1989			
	Number of Individuals	Percentage of Total	Number of Individuals	Percentage of Total	Consider Native Language Same as Nationality	Fluent in Other USSR Language		
						Russian	Language of Root Nationality in Territory of Residence	Other
Ukrainians	42,347,387	100.0	44,135,989	100.0	—	—	—	—
Living in:								
Ukrainian SSR	36,488,951	86.2	37,370,368	84.7	87.7	59.4	6.9	0.001
RSFSR	3,657,647	8.6	4,363,992	9.9	42.8	38.1	38.1	16.0
Belorussian SSR	230,985	0.5	290,368	0.7	45.3	41.4	10.5	10.5
Uzbek SSR	113,826	0.3	154,105	0.3	49.5	34.0	3.6	7.9
Kazakh SSR	897,964	2.1	895,964	2.0	36.6	32.3	0.6	6.0
Georgian SSR	45,036	0.1	51,472	0.1	53.0	41.0	14.3	8.8
Azerbaijan SSR	26,402	0.06	32,344	0.07	65.3	39.0	6.8	7.6
Lithuanian SSR	31,982	0.08	44,397	0.1	50.9	41.9	16.9	12.0
Moldavian SSR	560,679	1.3	599,777	1.4	61.6	43.0	12.8	8.8
Latvian SSR	66,703	0.16	92,101	0.21	49.5	43.8	8.9	15.3
Kirghiz SSR	109,324	0.3	108,027	0.2	34.1	28.5	1.6	6.7

Table 2: Distribution of Ukrainian Population by Republic of Residence (Continued)

Soviet Republics	1979		1989		Percentage of Total Ukrainians in 1989			
	Number of Individuals	Percentage of Total	Number of Individuals	Percentage of Total	Consider Native Language Same as Nationality	Fluent in Other USSR Language		
						Russian	Language of Root Nationality in Territory of Residence	Other
Tajik SSR	35,826	0.08	40,646	0.09	50.0	35.3	2.7	8.0
Armenian SSR	8,900	0.02	8,341	0.02	68.1	47.8	21.8	8.6
Turkmen SSR	37,118	0.1	35,814	0.1	52.8	44.4	1.6	8.9
Estonian SSR	36,044	0.1	48,273	0.1	44.2	39.7	6.9	19.0

Only 84.7 percent of Ukrainians live in the Ukraine, the other 15.3 percent are citizens of other Soviet republics. Unfortunately, I do not have statistics about Ukrainian Diaspora outside Soviet borders. The most numerous Ukrainian contingent (4,364,000) is in the RSFSR. 900,000 Ukrainian live in Kazakhstan, 600,000 in Moldavia, 290,000 in Belorussia, 154,000 in Uzbekistan, and a little over 100,000 in the Kirghiz SSR.

When removed from their roots, Ukrainians slowly forget their language. Only 34.1 percent of the Ukrainian in the Kirghiz SSR, and 36.6 percent in the Kazakh SSR consider their mother tongue the same as their nationality. In the other republics the percentage is higher (40-60 percent), but the reader must agree that this is still a low figure! Even in the RSFSR only 42.8 percent of our countrymen maintained their native language. Only in Armenia did Ukrainians, 68.1 percent of them, (they only number 5,700) keep up their taste for and positive attitude to the Ukrainian language.

Ukrainians living outside of their homeland also lose their interest in the Russian language. Possibly a portion of them makes a choice to learn the language of the root nationality in the territory where they are living. Russian is the primary language of between 28.5 percent and 47.7 percent of Ukrainians living outside the Ukraine's borders.

But Ukrainians have an even more difficult time learning the language of the root nationality than learning Russian. The most attractive for them are Armenian, Lithuanian, Georgian, Moldavian, and Belorussian. They are spoken by between 10.5 and 21.8 percent of the Ukrainians living in territories corresponding to each language. Their command of other

languages is also insignificant. Those most likely to learn other languages are Ukrainians in the RSFSR, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics. Although the percentage of those learning multiple languages is not very high (12-19 percent), it is sufficient to maintain the belief that: if absolutely necessary, we will even learn Chinese.

The following principles are evident. Our countrymen, who live outside the borders of the Ukraine, more often (and probably more easily) overcome the language barrier than those living at home. Let me reiterate, only 0.001 percent of Ukrainians "at home" speak other languages, except for Russian. One more fact: Ukrainians living outside their homeland are much less likely to learn the language of the root nationality of the territory in which they live than are individuals of other nationalities living in our republic.

Believe me, it was not pleasant for me to discover this fact, and I did not really want to write about it. But we should know the truth about ourselves, because people are set apart not only by prejudices, but also by an uncritical, undemanding view of themselves. We live in one home, we must be mutually tolerant.

I made one more discovery, which millions and millions of people made before me. I only found statistical proof for it. The greatest, the most beautiful, the most comprehensible language in the world - is the language of love. I am speaking of international marriages. And here we have a dignified image. Who ever said that Ukrainians were nationalists? Do not believe it, it is not true. Look at Table 3 and you will see: one-third of Ukrainian women and men marry persons of other nationalities. The only ones with higher percentages are Belorussians, Tatars, Jews, and Germans.

Table 3: International Marriages in 1988 (as Percentage of Total Individuals of Nationality who were Married)

Nationality of Individuals Getting Married	Percentage of Men Marrying Woman of Different Nationality	Percentage of Women Marrying Man of Different Nationality
Russian	16.0	17.2
Ukrainian	33.4	33.5
Belorussian	38.6	38.1
Uzbek	6.6	5.0
Kazakh	7.5	7.2
Georgian	17.9	9.5
Azerbaijan	11.5	4.4
Lithuanian	12.4	12.3
Moldavian	28.2	28.8
Latvian	25.3	24.0
Kirghiz	6.9	6.1
Tajik	12.9	11.5
Armenian	20.2	11.8
Turkmen	9.0	3.9
Estonian	15.8	15.2
Tatar	40.9	42.2
Jewish	58.3	47.6
Germans	67.6	64.6

But again behavior differs at home and away from home. The farther from home, the more international our feelings. Within the Ukraine only 20.9 percent of the men and 22.4 percent of the women of Ukrainian nationality enter international marriages. Again women lead, women's hearts are keener than men's. Actually, this characteristic is also true for the hearts of Russian, Belorussian, and Moldavian women, as well as women of the Baltic republics (Table 4). Still, our countrymen lead the way. Internationalism, combined with love - what could be stronger?

Table 4: International Marriages in 1988 in the Soviet Republics (as a Percentage of Total Individuals of that Nationality who were Married)

Nationality of Individuals Getting Married	Percentage of Men Marrying Woman of Different Nationality	Percentage of Women Marrying Man of Different Nationality
RSFSR		
Russians	9.7	11.1
Ukrainian SSR		
Ukrainians	20.9	22.4
Russians	57.2	56.7
Belorussian SSR		
Belorussians	20.1	21.7
Russians	74.5	73.4
Uzbek SSR		

Table 4: International Marriages in 1988 in the Soviet Republics (as a Percentage of Total Individuals of that Nationality who were Married (Continued))

Nationality of Individuals Getting Married	Percentage of Men Marrying Woman of Different Nationality	Percentage of Women Marrying Man of Different Nationality
Uzbeks	4.3	3.3
Russians	24.0	29.6
Kazakh SSR		
Kazakhs	4.3	3.5
Russians	24.3	27.1
Georgian SSR		
Georgians	8.5	5.5
Russians	39.6	53.2
Azerbaijan SSR		
Azerbaijans	2.8	1.4
Russians	24.6	40.3
Lithuanian SSR		
Lithuanians	6.3	7.8
Russians	56.5	51.7
Moldavian SSR		
Moldavians	14.4	16.9
Russians	61.9	59.9
Latvian SSR		
Latvians	19.7	20.1
Russians	37.1	37.6
Kirghiz SSR		
Kirghiz	3.7	3.0
Russians	19.4	23.0
Tajik SSR		
Tajiks	6.6	5.6
Russians	26.0	31.9
Armenian SSR		
Armenians	2.3	0.8
Russians	46.5	70.6
Turkmen SSR		
Turkmen	5.9	2.4
Russians	27.2	34.9
Estonian SSR		
Estonians	8.6	8.9
Russians	24.0	27.2

You have one more chance to see that statistics for knowledge of the mother tongue, and for international marriages, and even more for the birth of children in these marriages, are not related. This is shown by the statistics for children born to mothers of certain nationalities. Table 5 shows that the percentage of children born to Ukrainian women in international marriages is fairly high in the Soviet republics: between 54.4 percent

and 87.3 percent. The exception is in republics with a strong root nationality - the Armenian SSR and Turkmen SSR, where the percentage of such births is low: only 12.2 percent and 9.7 percent.

At home, conditions are different. The percentage of children born to Ukrainian mothers in international marriages is 17.1 percent of all children born. This is completely understandable: it is enough to state that only 22.4 of Ukrainian women intermarry, and not every couple has children.

Table 5: Distribution of Children born in Soviet Republics by Mother's Nationality

Mother's Nationality	Percentage of Children with Father of Different Nationality
RSFSR	
Russians	10.5
Ukrainians	74.6
Belorussians	81.4
Ukrainian SSR	
Ukrainians	17.1
Russians	48.1
Belorussians	67.6
Belorussian SSR	
Belorussians	15.7
Russians	63.7
Ukrainians	68.5
Kazakh SSR	
Kazakhs	2.5
Russians	26.6
Ukrainians	74.4
Georgian SSR	
Georgians	4.0
Russians	52.4
Ukrainians	80.5
Azerbaijan SSR	
Azerbaijans	1.0
Russians	37.9
Ukrainians	87.3
Lithuanian SSR	
Lithuanians	6.8
Russians	47.7
Ukrainians	68.8
Moldavian SSR	
Moldavians	12.4

Table 5: Distribution of Children born in Soviet Republics by Mother's Nationality

Mother's Nationality	Percentage of Children with Father of Different Nationality
Russians	58.3
Ukrainians	54.4
Latvian SSR	
Latvians	16.4
Russians	34.7
Ukrainians	66.1
Kirghiz SSR	
Kirghiz	2.3
Russians	20.0
Ukrainians	76.0
Tajik SSR	
Tajiks	3.0
Russians	31.0
Ukrainian	83.9
Armenian SSR	
Armenians	1.0
Russians	25.3
Ukrainians	12.2
Turkmen SSR	
Turkmens	10.0
Russians	9.9
Ukrainians	9.7
Estonian SSR	
Estonians	7.0
Russians	27.0
Ukrainians	66.5

So, what is our attitude toward work? Let us familiarize ourselves with the data in Table 6. We do like to lead, that is evident! Truly, there is nothing bad in this. It is natural and proper to want to be boss in our own home. This desire is evident also in the Baltic and Trans-Caucasian republics. The only exception is the Latvian SSR, where the percentage of Latvian bosses is significantly lower - 63.1 percent. This fact, alongside the problems of migration and the language, are a source of consternation for the Nationality movement of Latvia. Although, to be fair, another fact must be brought out: in the Latvian SSR, as in the Estonian SSR, Georgian SSR, and Azerbaijan SSR, the percentage by which company and organization leaders are members of the root nationality of the country is higher than the percentage of workers and personnel of the root nationality by 15-23 percentage points. This, dear readers, is food for thought.

Table 6: Nationalities of Leaders of Businesses and Commercial Organizations, Agricultural Concerns, Transportation, Communication, and Construction as of January 1, 1989 (as Percentage)

Nationality of Leader of Business or Organization	Percentage of Leaders of Root Nationality
RSFSR - Russians	77.3
Ukrainian SSR - Ukrainians	79.0
Belorussian SSR - Belorussians	77.7
Uzbek SSR - Uzbeks	67.6
Kazakh SSR - Kazakhs	39.5
Georgian SSR - Georgians	89.3
Azerbaijan SSR - Azerbaijanis	93.8
Lithuanian SSR - Lithuanians	91.5
Moldavian SSR - Moldavians	49.8
Latvian SSR - Latvians	63.1
Kirghiz SSR - Kirghiz	55.1
Tajik SSR - Tajiks	66.3
Armenian SSR - Armenians	99.4
Turkmen SSR - Turkmen	71.8
Estonian SSR - Estonians	82.2

I would like to conclude this description with a editorial note. Today, when the threat of hostility between nationalities has become a terrible, bloody reality, I do not ask myself, who should manage an enterprise, a Latvian or a Ukrainian. More importantly, he should be a professional familiar with his job and an honest, just person. I wish to pose a different question: what will happen to the children born in international marriages, if their parents find themselves on opposite sides of the barricades? That

is why today, as never before, the wise refrain from the "Hymn of Democratic Youth" echoes forth:

"Children of various peoples, We live with a belief in peace."

Footnote

* The names of the republics are given according to data of the Soviet Unions census of 1989, which may not correspond to the official names adopted in the last year and a half.

Racketeering Abroad Under Guise of Official Travel

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Second Edition p 3

[Article by Special TASS Correspondent L. Kisinskaya: "Transport Abroad for a 'Legitimate Thief.' The Border Is Locked, but It Seems It Is Not Hard To Find a Lock-Picker"]

[Text] "A 'legitimate thief' need not work for the state. He need not take part in the country's political life—he only needs to be forgiven for the fact that as a child he stupidly became a Pioneer. But the Komsomol and the Party is taboo for him. He cannot have relations with the Soviets, since he does not recognize our social system..."

(From a conversation with a "legitimate thief," who was "employed" in the 1960's and is now an ordinary Soviet pensioner).

How naive the hopelessly outmoded code of "thieve's honor" seems now! For some time many authorities from the criminal world have been striving to occupy leading positions in cooperatives and joint enterprises. There is plenty of money to invest, and border exit is assured, although a brief business trip beyond the cordon can be arranged by other channels as well. Employees at the Department for Struggle with Organized Crime, Moscow Criminal Investigation [Moskovskiy Ugolovnyy Rozysk-MUR], who together with one of the subdivisions of the USSR KGB uncovered such a channel, are convinced of this.

Having learned that two persons known to MUR—Vitya "Kalina," who considers himself a "legitimate thief," and recidivist R. Kabadzhan, nicknamed "Rolik," an authority of the criminal world, set out in May on a business trip to Bulgaria, the operatives effectively displayed their professional curiosity and decided to find out what kind of organization gave "cover" to such valuable "specialists"? And how surprised they were when it became clear that both of the "businessmen" had gone to Sofia as members of a delegation...of the Moscow Soviet. It is true that in their travel documents, which were drawn up in April of this year, they were listed as specialists from Mosgorplan [Moscow City Planning Administration]; however neither one of them had ever worked a day anywhere. It turned out that the members of this curious delegation included quite a few other interesting people as well. Thus, a certain A. Solontsov, nicknamed "Ambal," convicted for fraud, was transformed into an economist of the same Mosgorplan; and Khan Marks, who not all that long ago was released from prison, was designated a graduate student at the Higher Komsomol School at the Komsomol Central Committee. Also on the list were the Sholenbergs, husband and wife, whereas the head of the family was recently arrested in Novosibirsk by the state security organs. He was accused of pilferage of state property on an especially grand scale, and of trading in documents and contraband.

Also included in this enchanting company were citizens of Tver—the director of the Melkovskiy State Fur Farm, B. Cherepnya, and former technologist N. Kupriyanov. (Incidentally, an investigation was even then going on in Tver on the matter of the embezzlement of millions from their farm). Also found on the list was a business partner at the State Fur Farm, V. Popov, chairman of the Moscow Cooperative, "Russian Fur," who was at the same time head of the "Arena-1" cooperative cafe—the favorite gathering place of the criminal contingent in the capital.

On the whole, the greater part of the "delegation," which set out for Sofia for negotiations with the Bulgarian side on developing cooperation, had no relationship to the capital organizations whatsoever. But they had something else in common—all of their arrangements for traveling abroad had been officially approved practically within a 24-hour period. And most of them had entered false information in their documents. It turns out that their documents were drawn up by Specialist First Class V. Zakharova, an employee of the Administration for Foreign and Foreign-Economic Connections at the Moscow City Executive Committee. Criminal charges have been brought against her, since by entering false information about their holders (as I recall, a "legitimate thief" was listed as a specialist from Mosgorplan), she had committed official forgery.

Quite a few other interesting details were brought out in the process of the investigation. In accordance with the cleverly formulated instructions on Zakharova's official functions, she, it turns out, is not—the responsible official. That person is her immediate supervisor, who simply signs already-prepared papers and does not particularly scrutinize their content. But in accordance with the law, the subject of a crime can be only the responsible official. In Zakharova's case it looks as if the case is closed. Perhaps that is why throughout the entire investigation the leadership of the Moscow City Executive Committee never took an interest in just what their fellow employee was up to there?

But in these times, it seems, there is no criminal here. Specifically, Zakharova had concluded an agreement with the "Artist" Cooperative, which was established at the Alma-Ata Zoological Gardens (?). The cooperative had paid her nearly 16,000 rubles for drawing up the passports. That is, for her work—every officially-approved passport—Zakharova received another 100 rubles. In my opinion it was very ingenious. Any person who made such an agreement could, in addition to the wages from their work, receive quite a hefty sum.

Let us now return to the basic "heroes" of the delegation with which everything had its beginning. Both "Kalina" and "Rolik," who before were literally unable to even creep out of the "zones," were filled with childlike amazement: "We could not even imagine that they would let us cross the border!" The trip must have made "Rolik's" head spin, it was so easy; but once again he finds himself behind bars, for the time being in the

isolation cell at least. It turns out that R. Kabadzhan took away 20 valuable icons from a certain collector, ostensibly to have their true value determined, for subsequent sale. Criminal charges were lodged (the icons were appraised at 40,000 rubles), and during a search of "Rolik's" place, some of the purloined items were confiscated. Currently the case of R. Kabadzhan, who is accused of fraud, is being heard in the people's court in Moscow's Dzerzhinskiy Rayon. This tedious case was brightened up by "Rolik's" memories of his brief trip to Sofia, where he and Vitya received several tens of thousands of leva (the origin of which I will speak of a bit later). There they exchanged them for dollars, bought a few valuables and, after staying awhile in a prestigious Sofia hotel across from our embassy building, returned to Moscow.

And now, a few more details about "Rolik's" partner, 26-year-old Vitya—the illegitimate son of the famous "Yaponchik." Thanks to his parent—one of the "godfathers" of organized crime, who was sentenced to 14 years in 1980—Vitya was acknowledged a "legitimate thief." The nickname "Kalina" he inherited from his mom, a "shop-worker" who made millions from her "business." On the whole, a worthy family group. There is in Vitya himself, whom even famous artists have befriended, nothing of the semi-literate "legitimate thieves" of the past. Erudite and elegant, he reads poetry to the young women and brings them flowers. True, he does not shun certain points of the outmoded code of "thieves' honor." For example, it is believed that a "legitimate thief" does not simply pull out a knife; if he does, then he must "plant" someone. They say that he follows this law religiously. Well, it does not much matter what they say... Although quite recently Vitya was arrested specifically for carrying a concealed weapon—cold steel.

Thus they caught Vitya with a dagger; however, he spent only three days in the isolation cell. And although they brought criminal charges, the detectives were not authorized to detain the suspect further. It seems that...they palmed off the knife to Vitya (That is his version). Were there any witnesses to this "outrage," you ask? Of course there were—three persons from Criminal Investigation. But thank God, we are not in America; for no one trusts a detective! And, it goes without saying, it is hard to have witnesses with you day and night. And it is namely for this reason that Vitya, to whom once again a knife was "palmed off," is once again at large; and, although he has been officially denied an exit permit, it seems he is planning a trip to Cologne—to see his grandfather...

I can understand that much of the information cited above might seem unbelievable and a scandalous farce. But have a little patience, reader; that's not all! I've already said that in Sofia "Kalina" and "Rolik" received a large sum of money. As the preliminary investigation showed, this money was presented to them by V. Popov, chairman of the "Russkie Mekha" [Russian Furs] Cooperative. And our artists returned it to him in Bulgaria, thereby concluding, according to the auditors, an illegal business deal.

The fact of the matter is, there is a representative (or branch) of the Moscow "Soyuz" Theater in Sofia. And not long ago the "Artist" Studio, which had been working in Bulgaria for a year under the auspices of the Moscow City Executive Committee, became part of this creative collective. The theater administration, after accepting the studio on its books, discovered a major shortfall and asked MUR officials to delve into this unpleasant situation. Having great difficulties in getting their documents approved (unlike the criminals) and having even more difficulty "acquiring" tickets to Sofia, a team of detectives from the Criminal Investigation Department at the Main Internal Affairs Administration, Moscow City Executive Committee, and agents from the USSR KGB, set out for the capital of Bulgaria.

The inspection established that during its period of activity abroad, 250,000 leva had disappeared from the budget of the creative collective. But according to our amazing laws, in order to prove the fact of misappropriation of funds, one has to prove the fact that they were appropriated. And since the studio lacked proper accounting and accountability, all the documents were officially registered by personal discretion, and then not always selflessly; thus the question of appropriation hung in mid-air. And although the right for a creative collective to engage in foreign economic activity is in doubt, the branch had opened an account in the Bank of Sofia and was engaging in financial operations. The workers at the branch tried to present the only account that made sense—on 4,000 leva worth of telephone calls with Moscow.

The activities of the branch must have brought our capital considerable income, since the conversations with the motherland were lengthy... Incidentally, just what sort of value did the branch contribute to the development of Soviet-Bulgarian ties? It turns out that this creative collective went to Sofia in order to demonstrate—striptease. True, the artists did not delight the state theater spaces with this spectacle for long. Spurning all agreements, the girls began to appear in private variety shows, where at the end of the performance they would render other services, for an additional fee, it goes without saying. I do not know just what did not suit them in the end, but our "striptease stars" next began to go out on "tours" from Sofia to the Appenine Peninsula. According to data from the Bulgarian security organs, in order to engage in striptease and prostitution in Italy, two permits are required—from the police and...the Mafia. Judging from all else, our "stars" have everything in order with these permits; therefore, they soon began to "work" close to the US military bases—and this is quite impossible without the permission of the American special services.

Meanwhile, as the studio was securing its "international contacts" in the West, its leader went to the East—to Israel. But the artists of the studio did not feel like orphans for long. As before they are bearing high the

banner of their "high art" in the international arena, but now under the aegis of the Soviet Center for...Children and Youth.

By the way, it was precisely at this difficult moment for the studio that cooperator V. Popov disbursed 60,000 rubles to the orphaned artists. But where was the generosity of the Russian patrons of old? The head of "Russkie Mekha," having arrived in Sofia, once again appropriated some money, but this time in the form of 50,000 leva, and at the same time generously shared it with the criminals "Kalina" and "Rolik."

Thus, everyone in this strange business is connected with one another. The Alma-Ata Zoological Gardens and the "specialist" from the Moscow City Executive Committee; the capital cooperator-patron, who received more than thanks, and the plundered Tver Fur Farm; our artists in Bulgaria and the Italian Mafia; American special services and our own home-grown recidivists. What a small world!

Yes, the fast-paced life of today brings us amazing topics. And the most surprising thing in life is—a completely "happy ending" for our unscrupulous, to put it mildly, people. Vitya "Kalina" was arrested and released (owing to humanization of the law). At the fur farm, where embezzlement amount to millions was exposed, the investigation was unable to organize a full-fledged audit, since our law-enforcement services do not have a professional auditing staff (This is not the Wild West). As always, no one carries out an audit for the sake of "thanks."

There is yet another paradox. Without an audit, the specialists affirm, it is practically impossible to institute criminal proceedings; and without instituting proceedings, an audit is impossible. Thus the question of the millions of embezzled rubles hangs in mid-air. And the members of the delegation from the Moscow Soviet—Cherepnya and Kupriyanov—are spitting on our justice with their boats and in the upper rooms of their luxurious houses on the bank of the Volga.

It seems that in this entire story only one person is experiencing unpleasantness—"Rolik," who has been convicted seven times, is preparing for another "passage." But according to the new law on the court, I would not dare to predict how this process will end. Otherwise this would be interpreted as pressure on the court...

While occupied with the problems of the struggle with organized crime I have often been forced to come to the uncomfortable conclusion that—our system of justice is undergoing a fiasco. The imperfection of legislation, the obsolete mechanism of the justice system, and blunders in the practical work of applying the law—we are forced to deal with all of this once again in our scandalous case. I have given some thought to another matter as well. Presently we have more freedom to go abroad—and yes, we consider this a gain. Anyone who has gone will no doubt remember both the long-drawn-out procedure for official approval, and the line for currency exchange, and

mainly—the interminable wait at the ticket booths. On the other hand, all these problems, as we see, work in favor of the criminal contingent.

Foreign currency prostitutes, currency speculators, swindlers, card sharps, racketeers, "kidaly," frauds, recidivists and criminals are recuperating at the world's finest resorts. We have only recently entered Interpol, and just what "our people" have managed to do beyond the cordon is not yet altogether clear. What kind of state security can one speak about if any clerk can illegally enter wittingly false information in documents with impunity, and thus open a completely uncontrolled channel to the criminal element for travel to any country on earth? How can this be qualified from the point of view of the law?

True, in the summer the clients of the criminal investigation service prefer not to be seen too much on the Continent, but take their ease for a month or so on the warm sands. The moreso that one can always overcome sentimental yearnings for the Motherland, and can at any moment place an order with their "counterfeiter" for that which causes this nostalgia. Vitya "Kalina" plans to go to Cologne, and in West Berlin, a well-known authority of our criminal world nicknamed "Tayvanchik" is waiting for his Armenian cognac—the one thing which he cannot get enough of here...

USSR MVD Chief on Better Ways To Fight Organized Crime

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in Russian 10 Nov 90 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Colonel A.I. Gurov, chief, USSR MVD Administration for the Struggle Against Organized Crime, by N. Bulavintsev: "Difficult Times Lie Ahead of Us"]

[Text] The editorial offices of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA are being inundated with letters in which our readers state their very serious concern over the exacerbated criminal situation and the outburst of crime. The letters are bitter, and in some of them one hears not simply alarm but even despair and a certain hopelessness. The following question is frequently voiced: "So who has declared war on whom: we against crime or it against us? In any case, the lack of almost all kinds of goods on the sales counters, the precipitous growth of speculation and profiteering, the 'laundering' of money in cooperatives by criminal elements, the larceny, theft, break-ins, homicides, and with all this, the enormous number of unsolved crimes, the passivity of our law-enforcement organs, their inability to protect people from the onslaught of crime—all these factors attest that the war on crime, if, of course, it is really being waged, has already been utterly lost. And so what lies ahead of us...?"

Such gloomy thoughts are completely explainable. The situation really is close to critical. But to solve the problems of the struggle against crime, we must, first of

all, consult the professionals. And no matter how we may revile the police and the procurators nowadays (and, alas, there are causes for this), we must bear in mind that it is specifically these staff members of the law-enforcement organs who are the first to engage in fights against the criminals. In this connection, they frequently risk their own lives. Therefore, any conversation about the outburst of crime and the reasons for this must be carried on, first of all, with the professionals. Fortunately, we have recently come to know more and more names of those genuine specialists who really are on the cutting edge of this difficult struggle. One of them is Colonel A.I. Gurov, a doctor of juridical sciences and an RSFSR people's deputy. His name is linked, first and foremost, with the extremely complex rounds of the struggle against the Mafia in the USSR. The latter is that same all-penetrating, bloodthirsty octopus about which we preferred to remain silent for so many long years. Moreover, there was a prevalent opinion that professional crime did not exist in our country. A.I. Gurov and his colleagues proved the contrary by their work. They dispelled the rose-colored myth and the worthless stereotypes which were hampering not only the law-enforcement organs in their work, but also those persons who were falsifying matters to the entire society.

It has been slightly more than a year now since A.I. Gurov was made chief of the Administration for the Struggle Against Organized Crime, which was set up under the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. And on the eve of their professional holiday we talked with Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Gurov about the work of this Administration, about the reasons for its coming into being, the trends of its development, and the possibilities of its struggle against the criminal octopus....

Aleksandr Ivanovich Gurov's working day lasts for 12 hours out of the 24, and sometimes even more than that. Our conversation was interrupted by a telephone call from which the colonel's face brightened up and which clearly put him in a happy frame of mind. Some subordinates had reported to him that the activity of a large criminal group had been interdicted, as a result of which several million dollars, more than 10 million rubles, and several dozen computers were being returned to the state.... Such was the result of only one operation conducted by the USSR MVD Administration for the Struggle Against Organized Crime. But our conversation did not begin with this. I wanted to find out why the USSR MVD had felt the need to set up such an administration. And how did the scholarly criminologist Gurov come to take this very serious, far-from-secure path?

[A.I. Gurov] It all began back in those years when I was studying in the Juridical Faculty of the MGU [Moscow State University]. I was enrolled as a correspondence student, while I was working in a criminal investigation unit. And at the behest of the service I spent a long time working at Vnukovo Airport. I observed what was going on there, and it was then, for the first time, that the

so-called "kataly" [swindlers] came into my field of vision. They are professional gamblers who make their living by this business.

Then I had occasion to work in a group which was investigating the situation in Uzbekistan. The results were astounding. There indeed the republic was divided into zones of influence, and there were corrupted officials at the higher levels who ensured reliable protection for the criminals. When we brought all this data to Moscow, it caused a state close to shock in the MVD leadership at that time. They began to set up numerous commissions to investigate the results of our work, which had been participated in by staff members of the Procuracy and the MVD.

In general prior to 1988 nobody wanted to know anything about organized crime, and scholarship about it made no forward progress. I proposed to publish several items from my own research, but nobody agreed to do this. Later, though, the article entitled "The Lion Has Sprung" did appear, and it produced the impression of a bombshell. Endless disputes began once more throughout the entire system; a special commission was even set up, and it prepared a scolding for us.... Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov intervened. In his letter to the USSR MVD he requested that all the circumstances be looked into and the necessary measures taken. Strictly speaking, it was this letter which played the key role. Whether it wanted to or not, the USSR MVD leadership had to develop measures for struggling against organized crime. V.V. Bakatin soon became minister of internal affairs, and he invited me to head up the Administration for the Struggle Against Organized Crime. Strictly speaking, our administration has existed since the summer of last year [i.e., 1989].

[N. Bulavintsev] Aleksandr Ivanovich, you are a scholar of criminology, and a doctor of juridical sciences, and now you are engaged in practical work. How do you evaluate the role played by juridical science nowadays? Does it help in practical work...?

[A.I. Gurov] There is no way that I wish to insult or belittle juridical science, but it has fallen into the same lamentable lot that other departmental sciences have. It has been divided into academic and applied categories. As an academic or "large" science, it has lagged far behind in the area of developing procedural norms and criminal-legal norms. And, in general, this is not by accident or random chance, for this discipline is studied by persons who are basically very remote from the practical activity involved. And here is the sad result: our legislation has turned out to be, to a large extent, unprepared to evaluate these extremely serious phenomena. Our laws fail to take into account all the tension of the presently existing criminal situation.

As a specialist studying matters of criminology, let me tell you that juridical science needs to make some serious changes. Under the conditions which have emerged, such changes are dictated by the new times. But we will

need to retrain our future jurists or legal experts in specialized, specific sciences, skills, and subjects: criminal law, criminal-procedural law, and the technical aspects of criminology.... In short, a great many problems have piled up nowadays in our country in juridical science as well as in legislation. They have fallen far behind the practical experience of real life.

[N. Bulavintsev] I would like to touch upon the problems of a lack of respect for the law. Because, you know, some amazing things are happening: The President of the Supreme Soviet makes responsible and important decisions. But the impression you get is that nobody intends to carry out these ukases or decrees. Moreover, they are violated almost everywhere. And such an anti-law policy gives rise to confusion, muddle, and chaos—that very environment in which, to my way of thinking, criminals of all stripes feel themselves to be particularly free....

[A.I. Gurov] I would not even venture to assert nowadays that we are entering upon the path leading to a state based on the rule of law, for the immutable and paramount principle of such a state is not simply a respect for the law, but also the strict and unwavering adherence to it. But in recent years we have observed the reverse tendency. We have to speak about a state of anarchy with regard to the law—each person has his own laws, each person has his own instructions, and so forth.

Our socioeconomic troubles have engendered a whole series of negative phenomena, which also constitute the foundation of crime. The activity of the MVD can only create certain conditions which help to reduce or increase certain types of crimes. And, of course, if the USSR MVD uncovers 10-12 percent more crime this year, that means more overload for our personnel staffs.

We talk about anarchy with regard to the law, but just look at what is happening—after all, a real war of sovereignties is being unleashed. Virtually every tiny district, neighborhood, or even courtyard is proclaiming its own sovereignty. It is just utterly absurd.

There is yet another trouble—excessive campaigning. Just take the struggle against alcoholism—we have had three campaigns. An ukase was adopted, a campaign was conducted, and that was all there was to that. But just how could people form their awareness of the law in such a situation?

I want to note one more thing: we have evolved here in our country a situation whereby people are not equal before the law. Let us recall, for example, the immunity of a deputy. In my opinion, this should not exist. We need a reliable, effective legal mechanism would equalize the chances before the law of a corrupted ispolkom official, a minister, and an ordinary citizen.

Let me repeat: until the law is paramount in our country, it will be very, very difficult to effectively fight against crime. The MVD cannot solve all problems by itself alone. All the more so in that little heed is paid to us.

When the matter of the cooperative movement's development was being decided, we were opposed to legalizing criminal capital through the cooperatives. But, unfortunately, our proposals did not pass. Nowadays we are talking about financial monitoring controls which should operate precisely under the conditions of the imminent switch to market-type relations. However, finance organs are again being set up without taking the real-life situation into account.

[N. Bulavintsev] Aleksandr Ivanovich, you began to speak about the transition to a market-type economy. It seems evident that on the criminal level this will be scarcely trouble-free for society.

[A.I. Gurov] I would not like to irritate anyone by gloomy predictions, but this country, with its disintegrated economy and eroded moral criteria could experience a genuine criminal shock-wave. Because, of course, a market-type economy, in and by itself, is fraught with many situations which give rise to crime. It is clear that the processes of social stratification, which are increasing even without this, will be exacerbated, and the number of unemployed will increase.

I would also like to express my opinion on the following matter. Nowadays a call is being made more and more frequently for legalizing the money plundered by "wheeler-dealers" in the "shady-side economy." I am categorically opposed to this, for it is not merely immoral but could bring about a genuine explosion in the society. There is no way that this can be permitted. In short, exceptionally difficult times lie ahead of us....

[N. Bulavintsev] Aleksandr Ivanovich, the Soviet Union recently joined Interpol. What benefits will this provide for our police?

[A.I. Gurov] First of all, joining Interpol was a political type of act. Of course, we will obtain a large amount of information concerning international criminals, as well as the possibility of pursuing those persons who have committed crimes on the territory of the USSR and then traveled to foreign countries. But if we are to speak about the trends of development in organized crime, then the latest data implacably testify that our Mafia is beginning to "fine-tune" its trans-national ties. Because, of course, for foreign crime our country is a real "Klondike," where "dirty money" can be "laundered" without any trouble. We also hope that joining Interpol will enrich us with experience in combatting organized crime and terrorism, as well as the illegal drug business.

[N. Bulavintsev] Our conversation is taking place on the eve of Police Day. What would you like to wish for your colleagues on this day?

[A.I. Gurov] Above all, I would like to remind them once again that we really must expect difficult times. But I would advise my colleagues to maintain their style and standards, not to lose their sense of dignity and honor, to recognize that, to a large extent, a lowering of the

threshold of pain in the life of society depends specifically upon the police performing their work successfully.

[N. Bulavintsev] Well then, it only remains for me to congratulate you on the occasion of your professional holiday and to join in the wishes which you expressed above.

MVD Official on Counternarcotics Operation

91US0186A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 27 Nov 90 p 3

[Commentary by Yu. Vorobyev, chief of the MVD GUV D [Main Internal Affairs Administration] Department of Criminal Investigation in Transportation, submitted to a TASS correspondent: "Drug Traffickers Change Tactics"]

[Text] In the course of the Operation "Mak-90," the USSR MVD organs have removed from illegal circulation some six tons of narcotics, and identified more than 2,500 people involved in the clandestine drug business. Following is a commentary on the results of the operation made by Yu. Vorobyev, chief of the GUV D Department of Criminal Investigations in Transportation, to a TASS correspondent:

The operation proceeded by stages, as drug-containing plants ripened. Channels for illegal transportation of drugs were blocked and barriers were set up and railroad junctions and air and sea ports. Operations groups consisting of criminal investigations and BKhSS [Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] personnel were assigned to long-distance and suburban trains. Particular attention was paid to the highest crime-ridden Tashkent-Ashkhabad and Tashkent-Krasnovodsk lines.

As in the past, the Chuya Valley remains the main supplier of hashish and marijuana to the central parts of Russia, the Urals, West Siberia and other parts of the country.

As the militia's activities increase, the drug addicts are changing their tactics and their accesses to areas where cannabis is cultivated. They are now choosing safer roads and places for the storing of marijuana.

Under these circumstances, the drug traffickers make special preparations for their trips, involving suitable equipment and weapons. They form detachments frequently numbering 10-15 members.

In addition to everything else, expanding international cooperation, the opening of joint enterprises and simplified customs control and border crossing procedures offer substantially greater opportunities for smuggling, including from foreign countries. In this connection, the USSR MVD and its local subunits take comprehensive operational-investigative and other type measures.

Report by Turkmeninform correspondent:

A passenger car dashed to the Chardzhou-Farab ferry. The mood of the driver, a member of an Ashkhabad cooperative, sharply declined, however, after the car was searched by personnel of the TSSR MVD. A big package of marijuana was found in the passenger area of his Zhiguli.

In the course of their investigation of the member of the cooperative, the militia personnel made several other "discoveries." A large quantity of gold and 40 precious stones of unknown provenance were found in his Ashkhabad apartment. The initiated investigation will help to determine their origin and the connection between the drugs and the valuables....

"This fact is one more confirmation that the harmful effect of drug addiction goes beyond undermining the people's health," says V. Manukovskiy, chief of the TSSR MVD UUR [Criminal Investigations Department]. "Degraded as individuals, the drug addicts will frequently commit any crime for the sake of satisfying their needs. Today just about one half of all crimes involve their participation. For that reason we are intensifying our steps to block the dissemination of drugs. We are not only detaining the purveyors of the "white drug" but also locate the areas where illegal drug-containing plants are cultivated."

Depoliticization of Militia, Recruitment Problems Noted

91UN0517A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Dec 90 Union Edition p 6

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Militia V. Sidorov, deputy minister of internal affairs, by B. Vasilyev and A. Pokrovskiy; place and date not given: "The Political Administration Has Been Closed. Is a New 'Educator' Needed?"]

[Text] The political administration no longer exists in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. On its base, and on the basis of the now abolished cadre administration, a new structure has been created—the Main Administration for Work With Personnel. It is led by Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Lieutenant General of Militia V. Sidorov.

[IZVESTIYA] So, has the talk about depoliticization of the militia moved on to actions?

[Sidorov] The creation of the new structure in no way means any deportation [as published] of the organs of internal affairs. It is a matter of conscience for each person to share the platform of any particular party...

[IZVESTIYA] In that case can you tell us this: Is it possible for a nonparty person to work in your administration?

[Sidorov] Let me answer more broadly. There is but one demand made of a militia worker: that he not deviate from constitutional principles and that he be guided

exclusively by the requirements of the law rather than the interests of particular groupings engaged in political struggle.

[IZVESTIYA] What is your assessment of the state of affairs in the militia?

[Sidorov] Today the tasks being resolved by the internal affairs organs have become much more complicated. Both the responsibility and alas! the danger of the work have increased. Our annual losses in the fight against the criminal world are more than 1,500 killed or wounded. And in this struggle, it is often the best who perish... The first conclusion from this situation is that we must count first and foremost on the professionals. The second is that over the past few years the militia has in general become noticeably younger. And this means that it is less experienced and less prepared for independent decision-making in accordance with the law and the situation. And these qualities are the more important because those surrounding them—the most demanding and strictest of judges—are closely observing the actions of the militia.

[IZVESTIYA] So does this mean that the aim of the new administration is the old one—"tutelage" and "indoctrination" of militia workers?

[Sidorov] Not at all. The fundamentally new formation has been set up for the purpose of sorting out the knot of problems that prevent the militia from carrying out their duties more comprehensively. This applies primarily to selecting for duty the most worthy people and raising the level of their all-around training and providing them with social safeguards.

[IZVESTIYA] Each step taken by a militia worker is monitored, in addition to the public, by an immediate supervisor and the organs of the procurator. Notwithstanding, since the beginning of this year, more than 6,000 former militia workers have been held liable for various kinds of crimes, and more than 30,000 have been fired, including those fired for service misdemeanors. What is this? Inevitable losses or the result of poor selection and training of personnel, and poor indoctrination?

[Sidorov] This acute problem is being discussed in our milieu. The causes that have been suggested include the following: Not all our training establishments are turning out adequately skilled specialists. The laws are imperfect and, therefore, do not provide clear answers about how to act in particular situations. Given their constant work in a stressful situation, militia workers become fatigued and so make mistakes and endure failures. All of this is so, and yet it is not. The superficial causes do not explain the main thing, that is, why out of two people working under the same conditions may one of them deviate from the law while the other does not? This is why specialist professionals are so important! I am convinced that, whatever the public nihilism, concepts such as honor, dignity, and nobility have not been devalued.

And so, another of the tasks for the new service is to instill these qualities in our people.

[IZVESTIYA] No matter how noble the intention, the reality is rather more prosaic. Young people are unwilling to work in the militia. The prestige of the profession has fallen... The demands made of personnel are also not easy. Restraint and self-possession under conditions in which people in uniform can be insulted with impunity, or even struck, are also not limitless.

[Sidorov] The situation certainly is not a simple one. Today the internal affairs organs are more than four percent understaffed. Finally, legal safeguards for militia workers have always been regarded as a matter for the procurator's office. But in practice, when it has been necessary to really show concern for people, the old truth has been confirmed: It is each man for himself. Now we are assuming that function, naturally with the participation of other law enforcement agencies.

This applies not only to material and technical support, but also to finding solutions to everyday problems. For example, at the initiative of the Arkhangelsk Internal Affairs Administration Oblast Executive Committee it has been decided to keep those sent for duty in the militia on the housing list for their former place of employment. Throughout the country the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs has organized a system for collecting and generalizing information on each case of violation of militia workers' human rights. It is now possible to insure an immediate and objective review of conflicts. In addition, we are thinking about entrusting to elected certification commissions the task of decision-making in matters pertaining to regular promotions... We are also working on changes in the law aimed at giving a militia worker who thinks that he has been unlawfully dismissed the opportunity to appeal that decision in the courts.

Increase of Arson in Soviet Union Reported

91UN0409A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Nov 90 Union Edition p 6

[Interview with A. Mikeyev, chief, Fire Protection Main Administration, lieutenant general of internal services, by B. Vasilyev: "Fires Set for Mercenary Purposes"]

[Text] According to data of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the number of arson cases has more than doubled in recent times.

[A. Mikeyev] In 40 percent of all the fires that occur the cause is not ascertained. Arson is one of such causes. To establish the reason why a building or other facility burned down at a time when only its charred remnants are left is virtually a hopeless task. What I just said applies equally to investigating a fire in a transformer vault, in a private rural dwelling which had been insured just a few days prior to the event, or in a store where an audit is anticipated.

[B. Vasilyev] It seems that we have become accustomed to the situation which has evolved and just tote up the damage without a murmur of complaint. Is there any limit to the possibility of sending millions of rubles up in smoke?

[A. Mikeyev] Alas, one gets the impression that these limits are boundless. Until recently arson accounted for approximately four percent of the total number of fires. During the last three to four years there have been more of them. What have been burning are enterprises whose managers have fired loafers and frequent absentees, as well as cooperative organizations and their trade centers where envy or a primitive concept of competition are "in operation." During the course of last year alone the cooperative enterprises of Moscow and Moscow Oblast have experienced 18 fires with a total damage amounting to about a third of a million rubles.

[B. Vasilyev] The state trade system is not in competition with anybody—their store shelves are empty. Aren't things calm and peaceful here?

[A. Mikeyev] Their shelves may be empty, but their basement storage areas frequently have an abundance of items. When people begin to compute the damage caused by goods that have burned (even in a medium- or average-sized store), it sometimes amounts to hundreds of thousands of rubles. And merely by looking at the remnants which have been saved it's obvious that there was quite a bit to be burned here! Moreover, the wires are frequently "crossed" precisely at that time when all the goods have been moved "to the left," i.e., to the "shady side," and the only records of them are in the bills of lading.

[A. Mikeyev] But if a guilty person is, after all, ascertained, just what can he expect?

[A. Mikeyev] Here is another paradox: the existing legislation does not provide for a genuinely effective liability for arson. And this is understandable: nobody could foresee that cooperatives and private enterprises would spring up in our country, or that one competitor would take a "torch" to another. And one thing more: was it conceivable that members of a certain nationality would set fire to the houses of their neighbors merely because the latter spoke a different language? Recent events in Kirghizia—where during the first 10 months of this year there were 571 fires caused by arson, fires which brought about six million rubles' worth of damage—have shown that this is indeed possible. Now about the law. For stealing an ordinary rooster a guilty person bears the same degree of responsibility or liability as he would for unleashing "the red rooster," i.e., for committing arson. In both cases he may be sentenced to incarceration for a term of up to two years. Is this not an example of insufficient punishment...?


Incidence of Serious Crime 1985-1989

91UN0466A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Dec 90 Union Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "Diagram of Serious Crimes"]

[Text] According to data of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 88,000 crimes against persons were committed in the first 10 months of this year. This number also includes premeditated murders, aggravated assaults, and rapes... The increase as compared to the same period last year is 12 percent. It is noted that the operational situation has worsened in all republics without exception. Kirghizia leads all republics for the number of crimes committed against persons (60.5 percent increase).

The inserted diagram shows the dynamics of homicides from 1985 through 1989. If you look closely, you can see that crime is indeed increasing in the country. But is it increasing as catastrophically as we sometimes believe? Another thing: the fact that there was an increase in homicides is not only "thanks to" hardened criminals



Key:

1. Total Homicides
2. In State of Intoxication
3. By Repeat Offenders
4. By a Group of Persons

and criminal personalities. Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizia, where there recently were mass interethnic disturbances and skirmishes, today are among the leaders of republics for increase in homicides committed lately.

Resort Forms Municipal Militia

91UN0466B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Dec 90 Union Edition p 4

[Article by V. Oliyanchuk, IZVESTIYA correspondent, Stavropol Kray: "A Militia for the Resort"]

[Text] Mineralnyye Vody, the largest city of the All-Union Health Resort in the Caucasus, is setting up a municipal militia.

The militia has been formed by order of Maj Gen A. Sergeyev, chief of the Internal Affairs Administration of the Stavropol Kray Executive Committee. It is separate battalion consisting of six 330-man companies. It is being organized on a voluntary basis for the rank and file, and the commanders are young and energetic militia officers.

A distinctive characteristic of the militia is that is funded both by the Internal Affairs Administration and the city budget. The latter, alas, is not rich, but labor collectives of a number of enterprises have come to its assistance.

Plans To Organize RSFSR Criminal Police Service Reported

91UN0409B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Dec 90 p 1

[Reports by S. Zhukov, A. Kirikov, and TASS: "In a War Use Warlike Tactics"]

[Text] *Criminals have been operating in professional or occupation organizations. What can our police do to oppose them?*

Of course, the expression "criminal police" sounds unusual. But, judging from all the evidence, it will become a reality either today or tomorrow. At least in Russia. However, it has not yet been completely decided what this new service will be called—"militia" or "police." But is such a dispute over terminology really so important now?

"The principal task of the new structure," Major General Viktor Yerin, chief of the criminal-police service, declared at a briefing in the RSFSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], "will be to discover and expose the most serious crimes. We propose to unite or combine the services for fighting against common crime, crime in the economic sphere, as well as the subdivisions of the internal-affairs organs which were created to combat organized crime."

More than 100,000 crimes have already been registered in Russia so far this year. This is 15 percent more than

during the "most criminal" year of 1989. There is an increase in the number of serious crimes; larceny and muggings have increased by almost one-third. One out of every six crimes is committed by juveniles. And one out of every 10 crimes is committed by organized criminal groups.

The efforts of the law-enforcement organs have so far not produced the anticipated results. Why not? The leadership of Russia's MVD considers that the lack of coordination in the actions of the various services and subdivisions lowers the level of operational results. And it is for this reason, strictly speaking, that the idea of creating a criminal police came into being.

"A war is going on," said General V. Yerin. "We are being shot at, and we are shooting back. And in order to be victorious, we must concentrate our efforts. The new service will also take preventive functions upon itself. What I have in mind is work aimed at preventing crimes which are hidden, carefully prepared, and therefore the most dangerous."

The exposure of crimes in trade, in state and cooperative enterprises, as well as in the new banking system, constitutes the field of activity for the criminal police's subdivisions for fighting against crimes in the economic sphere. Staff members of the RSFSR MVD consider that, in essence, the BKhSS [Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] has become obsolete. Even its name—Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property—is not in harmony with the new economic conditions. Don't we really need to combat embezzlement in cooperatives or in private enterprises...?

And, finally, the matter of organized crime, which, according to the observations of the experts, is strengthening its own positions more and more with each passing day. It can be opposed only by mobile subdivisions which are well-equipped and which are made up of professionals....

"So far the formation of the new service is being carried out only in the central apparatus of the RSFSR MVD," V. Yerin considers. "Perhaps, the main problem lies in making sure that the new structure begins to operate in the city and rayon internal-affairs administrations. At present the staff of the criminal police has only 200 members of the MVD's central apparatus. But we propose to engage a total of about 10 percent of the Russian MVD's personnel staff in this service."

"Have you calculated how much this innovation will cost?"

"Nothing at all! No additional allocations whatsoever. We will solve all the problems within the framework of the ministry's approved budget. Although, it must be admitted that material aid is simply necessary."

S. Zhukov
A. Kirikov

And Meanwhile...

Thirteen criminal groups directly or indirectly connected with Sheremetyevo-2 were exposed and rendered harmless this year. One of the Moscow Oblast Oblispolkom's GUVd [Main Internal Affairs Administrations] which conducted this "clean-up" of the international airport confiscated motor vehicles, night-vision devices, bullet-proof vests, gas-operated pistols, and automatic weapons.

Sixty-four independent, specialized subdivisions for combating organized crime—units analogous to the one which restored order at Sheremetyevo-2—have been created on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The staff associates of these subdivisions has rendered 915 criminal groups harmless; 23 of these groups were well-entrenched, had been operating for more than five years, whereas 157 had ties to corrupt officials. The staff associates exposed more than 5,000 serious crimes. Moreover, they confiscated a large quantity of military-type supplies and explosives, about half a ton of illegal drugs, money, and valuables worth a total of approximately 10 million rubles.

In Moscow Oblast a dangerous gang has ceased to exist; it had included almost 30 thugs. In the Chekhovskiy Rayon this gang had taken the Avtotekhobsluzhivaniye Center under its "protection." Over a period of two years it had disorganized its work by frightening and meting out severe and harsh physical punishment to the employees there.

A certain Khrunov, an inhabitant of this rayon was supplying the gang with firearms and explosive devices. In his home the police discovered an arms laboratory. They confiscated 19 gun barrels, a thousand cartridges for them, 14 mortar shells, 36 handgrenades, 14 shells of various calibers, and a great deal else.

(TASS).

Increase in RSFSR 'Black Market' Crimes Described

91UN0383A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 27 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Burov, correspondent of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and Nadezhda Potapova, correspondent of TASS: "The Speculator at the Interception: SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and TASS Correspondents Report on the Operations of 'Black Market' Operators"]

[Text] In the ten months of this year, consumer goods valued at R207 billion in retail prices were turned out in the Russian Federation, the RSFSR State Committee for Statistics has reported. This is eight percent more than during the same period in 1989, although the increase was achieved mainly through the non-food group of products (by 10 percent) and alcoholic beverages (by 11

percent). Meanwhile the monetary income of the population during the current 10 months increased by almost 14 percent and their sum came to R301 billion. In spite of the fact that imported goods and goods from stock also come on the market, the crisis in the republic's consumer market is growing. The unsatisfied demand has surpassed R112 billion. And the discussion around the question of a price increase whip it up, which leads to the disorganization of trade and the emptying of the store counters. And not only their...

Thus the inhabitants of Murmansk now have not been able to taste cherry-plum preserves, Vasily Belousov reported from this city beyond the Arctic Circle. A railway car with fruit, sent by the Dagestan Leninskiy Sovkhoz already, . . . vanished. The management of the local City Department for Trade in Fruits and Vegetables submitted an application for an all-union search of the missing railway car. True, there is little hope of finding it. What is more, the cherry-plums may as well be buried: They cannot endure the rest of such a long road from the garden to the consumer.

Alas, on the way to the counters of the Murmansk stores not only fruit disappear literally into "black holes." Moreover, the greater part disappears in the last segment: From the base to the store. The search for what is missing usually does not occupy much time. The officials of the local Department of the Militia for the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation quickly find the "hole", through which goods of one sort or another vanish "on the side." They also establish those into whose hands they have fallen.

This is how it was also with the "loss" of the trailers for light motor vehicles, which have now become the subject of pointed discussions of the members and shareholders of the fishing cooperative of the Murmansk trawler fleet. This commodity, which is going like hotcakes in the oblast, was allotted for the encouragement of the deliverers of mushrooms and berries. Under this pretext they delayed it at the depot.

But in vain are people waiting for trailers so needed by them. As it turned out, others had "set their eyes" on them, although these were people who are not engaged in the procurement and delivery of wild-growing things, but who have good connections with the chairman of the fishing cooperative, V. Churanov. Having bided his time, he willfully transferred the trailers into the category of commodities not being in demand. Naturally, buyers were immediately found. And not ordinary ones: The director of one of the trading depots and the chinovniks of the consumer cooperative. They "accidentally" came into the store precisely on the day when the sale of the unmarketable trailers, and everyone "accidentally" carried the necessary sum in his pocket...

What we have here is an extremely gross violation of Soviet trade regulations, the misuse, by the chairman of the fishing cooperative, of his official position. But the latter feels himself confident in the director's chair. The

official of the Department of the Militia for the Struggle Against the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation, who was engaged in the investigation of this case, explained the situation simply: The wife of one of those who acquired an ill-starred trailer occupies a responsible post in the oblast procuracy. And for this reason, the staff member of the militia, the case will for sure be dropped. As, however, also the previous one, with the illegal sale of imported video equipment, which was intended for the miners of Olenegors, but fell into the hands of the oblast's leading officials.

To pierce through such a thick defense of the trade operators proved to be beyond the powers even of the militia. But who then will defend the interests of the simple buyers?

And where did the goods in Tver disappear to, our correspondent Yuriy Burov asked himself. The answer to it is of great interest not only to buyers, but also the officials of the Department of the Militia for the Struggle Against the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation and the deputies of the city soviet. Not long ago, they were at all trade depots of the oblast, but they did not discover anything stored there illegally or for a long time. Which they reported to the participants of the session.

The point is further that there cannot be more channels "on the side" in Tver than in the neighboring cities. Statistics confirm that much less fabric, clothing, footwear, fewer refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, television sets, and everything else are distributed by the center per inhabitant than for the inhabitants of Leningrad and all the more so for Muscovites. For some groups of articles, the difference is three to fourfold.

Most likely for this reason, unexpected second-hand dealers turn up here more frequently than others. Two of the latest cases. At the Central Market, Zhukov and Fedorov were arrested with a substantial batch of cigarettes. They had purchased them in Leningrad. In Tver they counted on "skimming off a profit" of almost R3,000, but they did not sell everything they had intended.... Criminal proceedings were instituted. The Tallinn residents T. Khayu and O. Vint also brought 900 packets of things to smoke, and one of the speculators was arrested. It turns out that the trade in Leningrad, Tallinn, and as the geography of similar criminal cases indicates, is flourishing everywhere through "the back door."

As before, many goods are removed from stores and buyers. The impression is such that this is directly encouraged by people with respectable posts. The following case, for example. At the Zavidovo Station of the Moscow branch of the October Railway, two trains (about 90 cars), loaded with multi-purpose containers, have been standing already since the first days of October. In them are clothing, footwear, books, and other commodities in short supply, earmarked for Moscow stores. In these railway cars there are also

containers with household goods of those who have moved to the capital for permanent residence.

"Our, as it is, crowded territory has been converted into a warehouse on wheels, no one can safeguard the railway cars," the station chief T. Zemskaya testifies. "We are calling everywhere for help, but there is no use...."

The trains were left halfway between Tver and Moscow and, it would appear, forgotten. Because in October the Moscow-Tovarnaya Station, citing lack of space, refused to accept them. A month after the parking of the trains at the Zavidovo Station, that is at the beginning of November, the chairman of the oblispolkom, V. Suslov, sent a telegram to the chairman of the Moscow Gorispolkom, Yu. Luzhkov. This document contained a detailed statement of what sort of goods were on the trains, for whom they were earmarked, and a request to accelerate the delivery of the goods. The response was silence. Yesterday, I questioned the chief of the Department of Transportation, Power, and Communications of the Tver Oblispolkom, Ye. Petrov, about the fate of the trains with goods that have been standing there for too long. "They have been standing there, like bewitched," Boris Alekseyevich responds with pain. "People are embittered about empty counters, and before their eyes there has been an unclaimed mass of goods in short supply...."

"...At the Kemerovo Depot of the city trade organization for trade in industrial commodities they transferred them to the Kamskiy Automobile Plant," Grigoriy Shalakin communicates to the editorial board. A heavy truck with trailer turned around with difficulty in the small square covered with icy mounds. The truck rolled away from the entrance to the rayispolkom with the assessment commission. Attractive women darted out of the cabin and disappeared into the warehouse piled high with carpets and other popular things, having bolted the door behind them.

"The warehouse will not work," the goods managers explained. The commission will see what to sell at the old prices, and what at the new ones.

This is how in a humdrum and simple manner a barrier was put up to the transport conveyer, which begins, as a rule, many thousand kilometers from the Kuzbas and ends in the local stores, whose shopping halls in recent times have been more similar to gymnasiums.

But meanwhile at the Kemerovo freight station, 22 containers with new freight, which had come addressed to the city trade organization for trade in industrial commodities, were waiting to be unloaded.

"Delays in unloading are typical for this organization," said N. Zolotareva, the chief of the container yard. "If there is no mechanization at the depot, in the stores even more so. What is more, the freight receivers are not interested now in the quick delivery of goods to the counter. It is no mere chance that the Kemerovo is

keeping, there is no other way to put it, freight in more than 100 containers at the city freight station, the timber trade depot—in 98.

It occurred to me: Here the intervention of the executive organs of Soviet power is needed, and not behind warehouse doors.

"Up to now this has not taken place," Yu. Osipov, the chief of the service for container transfers and commercial work of the Kemerovo Railway, continued the discussion. Recently the oblispolkom held a conference with freight recipients, but all the same they left these problems without attention. You know, never before was there such a thing in Kemerovo Oblast that they expected more than 3,000 containers and almost 2,000 were on the approach to the freight stations. And in them is everything which is not available in the stores: Canned goods, coffee, macaroni foods, sugar, television sets, refrigerators, and clothing.

In the labor collectives of the oblast they know about the situation that has taken shape. People are prepared, as, for example, in the Kuzbasselektromotor Association, during their free time, to transport the containers by enterprise transport to the stores and to unload them. But on the condition that for the gratuitous labor they be given the opportunity to purchase something in the stores. But, alas. The trade organization cannot take such a decision, and the local authorities, it appears, do not dare.

"The goods 'are sold' basically through trade channels," I. Lobko, the deputy chief of the Administration for the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation of the Internal Affairs Administration of the Sverdlovsk Ispolkom, told Tass correspondent Nadezhda Potapova. This is shown by the majority of criminal cases of the past.

In Sverdlovsk Oblast, 928 cases of speculation in industrial and food products were unmasked during the 10 months of the current year, and criminal proceedings were instituted in 551 cases. The figures are higher than those of the past year by approximately 10 percent. In all cases, all the criminal cases either at the depot or in the store. Precisely there the speculator purchases part of the goods in order to then sell them.

What do they sell? "Everything you like," I. Lobko continues. The difference in the speculation of our day from the previous speculation is that any commodity has become its object—from matches to sets of furniture. Among the latest criminal cases, for example, speculation in batches of 40-60 units of refrigerators and imported sets of furniture. In the Verkh-Neyvinskiy urban-type settlement, a number of persons were arrested who had sold sets [of furniture] at a much higher price than the state price. The furniture was purchased in the stores of the Administration for Workers' Supply of a local factory.

To eliminate the chief reasons for speculation—the economic ones—the staff members of the Department of the Militia for Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation are not in a position. The basic thing in our work today is to unmask or to prevent violations of the rules of trade. In 1990, 670 cases of the concealment of commodities and trade "from the back chair" were registered. Twice as many criminal cases were instituted compared to the past year.

With what methods are they fighting? Lobko with regret recognizes that the method is the same—checks. The have also become three to four times more frequent compared to the past. Those guilty are punished by administrative means and have criminal proceedings instituted against them. More often in accordance with Article 150-2 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the Law—on responsibility for the sale of goods above the established retail prices. The punishment is a penalty, and confiscation of the objects of speculation. To some extent this has a sobering effect on the others as well. In the opinion of I. Lobko, workers' control is helping little now, but in such a situation it is necessary.

The reports of the correspondent unequivocally indicate: Frequently the goods simply do not reach the counters. There are various reasons. But if we talk about the "pumping out" of goods for the benefit of the shadow economy, it is stimulated by the speculation that is gathering force. The minimal risk the "black market" operators cover with profits which previously they did not even dream of: Speculative prices which, according to the report of the same RSFSR State Committee for Statistics, on the average are two to three times higher than the state prices, and even higher for some commodities. For example, cigarettes and medicine are eight times more expensive, books—six times, electric irons—five times, meat, black caviar, winter boots for men—four times, vodka, chocolate candy, high boots and shoes for women—3.7 times, and clothing—three times. And this is "on the average." But more precisely—at a minimum. The price for a Zhiguli in various cities vacillates on the "black market" from 33,000 to 50,000, for a Volga—from 40,000 to 120,000.

One can find quite a few "theoretical" explanations of the situation that has developed, put away on the shelves all the ailments from which, alas, our economy is suffering. But it is impossible to agree that speculation today is justified, and, moreover, it is necessary, they say, to regard it "philosophically." The mail received by the editors convinces one: People are on the verge of an explosion. Those who are working honestly and are living on their wages are not inclined to go on putting up with the wild outburst of the trade and near-trade mafia. Let us hope that the special service for the struggle against the shadow economy, speculation and crime, which is being created under the President, will take the most decisive actions against those who "intercept" the property of the people and shamelessly profit from the shortage.

RSFSR MVD Chief on Economic Crime Extent

914D0056B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Nov 90
First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel of Militia V. Bulgakov, chief, Main Administration for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, by T. Lisitsina: "The Economy and the Militia"; for the first part, see JPRS-UEA-90-046, 20 December 1990, pp 72-73]

[Text] It seems that even the most patient are no longer able to endure. Where could it possibly go from here? Ten eggs cost 10-15 and a kilogram of beef costs 20-25 rubles in the Moscow market.

We must hold out in these critical times. But how! Where is it, that light of salvation, however weak it might be, at the end of the tunnel? The average statistical citizen is losing his trust in the institutions of government power. "It is in the hands of the mafia!" "The shadow economy is holding the steering wheel"—such assertions are being sounded ever louder, ever more insistently. It was with this that we began our talk with Colonel of Militia V. Bulgakov, chief of the Main Administration for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Lisitsina] Everything has become scarce. It is by far easier to list the things that are not yet in this category. And just try to persuade the reader that these are the unfortunate costs of perestroika, that our "temporary difficulties" have "fully objective causes."

[Bulgakov] I would never accept such an absurd role. When, for example, as many as 20 out of 24 tobacco factories in our republic are not working, it would take some talent to come up with "objective" causes for such a scandalous fact.

[Lisitsina] Does that mean that what they are saying is

[Bulgakov] Let's take a look at things soberly. We know that the criminal world is consolidating, and that dealers in the shadow economy are not being stingy in bribing the "necessary" people in the state apparatus. Corruption, bribery and parasitism upon the shortcomings in the transitional structures of the society's life not only exist but are flourishing in radiant colors. It would be somewhat inconsiderate, though, to ascribe excessive might to organized crime. Yes, it is no secret that corrupted elements are fighting for power, but wishes and reality are not always the same thing.

I am not going to discount the fact that the old, comfortable structures of the national economy's administration are no longer functioning. And the new ones have not yet been created. Therein lies the misfortune. To begin with there was that same infamous tobacco boom that I mentioned earlier—a model of Russian "planning." But then there are also facts such as these. The cigarette shortfall in the RSFSR was 45 million rubles as of late

August. Moreover the republic trade ministry predicted a shortfall of imported cigarettes of 140 million rubles and of cigarettes from other union republics of 112 million rubles by the end of the year. This is despite the fact that the republic plan for producing tobacco products is lower than last year's as it is. So what is it that we want? And what about the "unprecedented harvest" that has now befallen us?

[Lisitsina] The potato boom has perhaps surpassed even the tobacco boom. The people were scared so much by the forthcoming winter famine that thousands of citizens, unable to wait for the gifts of nature, themselves spontaneously attacked the kolkhoz and sovkhoz fields, digging out and taking away whatever they could.

[Bulgakov] Do you know what I would like to say? Paradoxical as this might seem today, we still suffer an acute shortage of glasnost. There is more than enough twaddle—excuse my coarseness—in regard to all matters, as is also true of all kinds of unimaginable rumors. But truthful, reliable information happens to be another one of our scarce goods. Sometimes people behave as if the Soviet government no longer exists at all.

The economy of Russia, and of the entire country, is experiencing its most acute crisis. The losses inflicted upon the state by various self-interested crimes, speculation and bribery total hundreds of millions of rubles. Imagine how much the responsibility of our colleagues increases under such conditions. I think that the service for combatting economic crime is entitled to much more attention from the press.

[Lisitsina] What is this, Vladimir Nikitovich, the new name of your service?

[Bulgakov] Yes, while the matter of the name change has already been resolved, for the moment we are still the Main Administration for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation. But this is not at all an attempt to be in fashion—it is a requirement of life. Cooperative ownership has already existed several years side by side with state ownership, and it will not be long before we see the birth of other forms of ownership, including private ownership. The logical course of events makes the former name of this service—for combatting the embezzlement of socialist property—fundamentally incorrect. But the name is not what is important. The content of all of our work is changing significantly.

The transition to a market economy will be accompanied by changes in the structure of economic crime. Social psychology and the motivations for committing economic crimes will become different in many ways. Look around you, and you will all see that an orientation on getting rich anyway you can, envy of those who are more fortunate and justification of criminal acts as compensation for unsatisfactory social justice are already spreading through broad strata of the society.

[Lisitsina] This is understandable. The new economic relations will compel you to work in a new way as well. But will the main direction of your activity remain the same?

[Bulgakov] Fighting crime and abuses in the economy and in management of the national economic complex is still the goal of the service. However the accent of our activity is being shifted to promoting, within the limits of its competency of course, successful realization of citizens' rights to ownership and economic activity, the freedom of consumer choice, and fair prices. We will defend the interests of the state simultaneously in the guise of specific enterprises, institutions and organizations. We will begin preventing and revealing crime in both the market and nonmarket sectors of the economy.

[Lisitsina] Everything we have talked about reflects the position in the country as a whole. But might the Russian militia also have its own problems associated with the unique features of this republic?

[Bulgakov] Of course. Russia is a place of huge deposits of minerals, gold, oil and gas. That is one unique feature. On the other hand, it is an enormous market for articles of light industry from the Baltic states, and vegetables, fruits and illegally produced wine and liquor products from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Entire carloads of tea from Georgia are being sold on the basis of forged documents. Some regions of the republic have declared themselves to be free economic zones.

It would be pertinent to recall that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs is not even a year old yet. For many years no one has seriously dealt with the problems of Russian crime in general. Directors of, for example, the Ryazan, or Sakhalinsk, or Irkutsk militia have been put on the carpet and ordered to explain themselves, but peaceably only. Ties between the oblasts have been weak. What this has led to, I can show with an example.

Fish industry is the most developed sector of the Far Eastern region. The annual fish catch exceeds 3.5 million tons, which is half the unionwide catch (up to 80 percent of the caviar and salmon, 100 percent of the crab). Just food industry alone produces 3 billion rubles' worth of goods annually. Further development of the sector and growth of the fish catch to 5.3 million tons have been foreseen. International cooperation and production of products for export are widening.

And now some other figures. Accounting and control were organized extremely unsatisfactorily in the Dalryba Association. Losses due to mismanagement, shortfalls and embezzlement were over 50 million rubles just last year. Cases of using contraband channels, of sending unaccounted-for products abroad, of signing contracts economically disadvantageous to the republic, and of criminal deals based on bartered deliveries have been revealed. Thus, an inspection of vessels belonging to the Kamchatrybprom and Vostokrybkhodflot production associations, which supply pollock abroad, revealed

dozens of tons of surplus fish and roe. Unlicensed export of Kamchatka crab out of the country has been revealed, for example.

[Lisitsina] It is good to know that a turnabout was recently made in support to law enforcement organs, that good decrees have been adopted.

[Bulgakov] Yes, the decrees are good, but who is monitoring their fulfillment? Many good intentions remain on paper. It's a paradox, isn't it? Economic crime is growing from one year to the next, while the service for combating the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation is being reduced slowly but surely. In the meantime the volume of its work has risen immeasurably. The consequences of this sort of "wise" personnel policy, pursued by certain ministries and administrations of internal affairs, are obvious: overtime work, working in jobs outside of one's specialty, dissatisfaction with work results, and constant nervous stress. All of this creates a situation where colleagues seek other work and are dismissed from internal affairs organs. As of now the manning shortage republic-wide is in the hundreds of persons. Moreover we continue to perform dozens of functions atypical of us. Wherever you look, for example, we are usurping workers' control at enterprises, and departmental control in trade. Sometimes sales-clerks get angry because we torment them so by our inspections! But what can you expect, when instead of the comradely observance of principles that they like to talk so much about, everyone covers up for everyone else?

Our hope is that with the creation of local, so-called municipal militia, we will finally free ourselves of functions associated with administrative transgressions.

[Lisitsina] In the meantime the situation in the consumer market continues to grow worse.

[Bulgakov] And economic crime is growing as well. In 10 months, 129,000 such crimes were revealed in the RSFSR. Thefts from national economic facilities have increased by 10 percent. They are often accompanied by more dangerous crimes. During a burglary in Pskov the warehouse of Rostorgodezhda suffered fire damage. The criminals were identified and arrested, but the damages totaled over 300,000 rubles. Embezzlements of especially large proportions, committed with the participation of executives, were revealed at the meat packing plants in Saransk and Kursk. Money and valuables worth over 800,000 rubles were confiscated during a search of the criminals. A criminal group consisting of officials and driver-agents of a bakery was identified in the Udmurt ASSR. This group conspired with trade workers to pilfer and sell bakery articles, sugar and yeast through stores. Similar cases were revealed in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR and in Sverdlovsk, Tula, Tver and a number of other oblasts. A total of over a thousand cases of embezzlement were revealed at food industry enterprises.

The picture is not any brighter in trade. In just one month, 3,200 cases of concealment of goods from free sale were established. Goods and food worth a total of 2,350,000 rubles were discovered to be concealed from sale in the industrial and food bases of Omsk. Violations were discovered in one out of every two trade enterprises inspected in Sverdlovsk Oblast! And in Kuybyshev Oblast, store workers bought up meat products intended for invalids and participants of the Great Patriotic War and sold them at inflated prices through cooperatives.

I am not going to tax you with figures any longer. But tell me this: What do you do about a situation such as this? The Kemerovo City Soviet of People's Deputies established higher liability for speculation in locally produced tobacco articles. But at the same time private persons were officially permitted to sell cigarettes brought in from other regions at the market price. Need I say more?

[Lisitsina] A very alarming trend. May God preserve us now, in our time of trial, from falling apart into minor principalities. You would think that the bitter history of our ancestors had taught us something.

[Bulgakov] Then there's also that fabulous tradition of the Russian people: Solidarity in the face of misfortune. Have we forgotten that? It's time for us to finally come together and clean up the great mess we've made of our common home. And with the people's support, the militia will have enough of both experience and resolve to do its work with honor and merit.

RSFSR MVD Official on Future Goals

91UN03534 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 10 Nov 90 p 2

[Interview with Anatoliy Anikiyev, RSFSR deputy internal affairs minister, by S. Doronin: "Crime: Are We Getting It or Is It Getting Us? A Non-Holiday Interview With RSFSR Deputy Internal Affairs Minister Anatoliy Anikiyev"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Last year, 1,619,000 crimes were registered in the Russian Federation. In the first nine months of this year, already 1,294,000. The figures testify that crime in the republic has risen to the highest level in the past decade. Anatoliy Vasilyevich, does it work out that in a country living by peacetime rules there is a real war going on now?

[Anikiyev] That is the case. The criminal world has loosed a war against society, against all of us. And its actions are becoming ever more brazen. The coalescence with the shadow economy is all the more noticeable, the penetration into the foreign economic sphere, the cooperative movement.

Just as any other, this war is accompanied by victims. And, I would note, there are more than a few: In the Russian Federation alone, 45,000 over the last five-year-plan. Think about it, an entire city knocked out.

In general, the criminogenic situation in the entire republic is extremely unfavorable. Particularly in the Karelian and Mordovian autonomous republics, Tuva, Yaroslavl, Novosibirsk, and Vologda oblasts.

The situation is complex, and making a breakthrough is not simple. But I am certain that a unification of all forces will yield results. Programs and plans of joint measures of the RSFSR MVD, the USSR KGB, and the republic procuracies are now being realized in the fight against organized crime.

Over 2,000 organized criminal groups have been revealed this year. Participants in 300 groups have already been held criminally accountable; approximately 7,500 crimes committed by them have been solved.

But nevertheless, we are not satisfied with the results of our work. The USSR and RSFSR ministers of internal affairs Comrades V.V. Bakatin and V.P. Barannikov, together with the ministries of internal affairs of other union republics, have appealed to personnel to intensify their actions to halt criminal encroachment on the honor and dignity of citizens, to ensure the inviolability of all forms of property.

[Correspondent] Many people are afraid to go out on the street in the evening; they are afraid to let children out. Why is it that crime is growing in public places?

[Anikiyev] First and foremost because we do not have a somewhat effective public order service. One such as the police have in Western countries. Incidentally, up to 70 percent of their personnel there are in that service.

We cannot get along without that service; it must be created immediately. What do I and other ministry specialists see it as? A division of four to eight militia men, two to four operations personnel, and one to two questioners [doznavateli], headed by a senior precinct inspector, could be the primary link in serving an urban population, let us say, a microrayon of 8,000-10,000. In a rural locale, a senior precinct inspector and his assistant could service the administrative precinct-village soviet territory.

But will we solve this problem independently, without the support of the public? Hardly. It is also necessary to create a fund of voluntary contributions, resources that would go toward the social rehabilitation of persons released from places of incarceration, for the development of a system to protect apartments, cooperative and personal property, to set teenagers up with work...

[Correspondent] But all the same, the most dangerous work falls to the criminal investigation staffers. Their's is the leading section of the front, if such a comparison is permissible. Giving them their due, serious claims are also being made against them today.

[Anikiyev] And completely justified claims. It would be somewhat unexpected if I were to say that our detectives

are losing their professionalism. I should say so; how many years they were spoken and written of only in rapturous tones!

But we had better get to the facts. Currently, the rate of solved crimes per criminal investigation staffer has dropped significantly, to 16.8 cases. Over nine months of this year, the remainder of unsolved crimes has grown by 30.7 percent, comprising over 492,000.

The given phenomenon can hardly be explained by the growing load (although, to clarify, certain rayon militia departments do indeed have this). The reason lies elsewhere: Whether we want to or not, we ourselves at times are encouraging dependency, breaking the desire to increase the efficacy of labor, to improve the skills of operations-investigations work. According to expert evaluation, the correlation of staffers working effectively to the total number is within the limits of one to four.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, you are extremely critical in evaluating the actions of militia staffers. And certainly they have enough troubles without that, through the fault of that same society.

[Anikiyev] Indeed, today everybody knows the complicated conditions under which the staffers serve. Issues of the personnel's material-technological and social provisions are not being resolved satisfactorily. There is not enough special equipment, a catastrophic lack of vehicular transportation. There is only a 65 percent rate of outfitting with portable radios.

And the state of the social defense of a staffer of the internal affairs system is good for nothing. God forbid that tragedy strike him; what would happen then to the family, who would take care of it? At the same time, the miserly monetary stipends; it is embarrassing to even talk about them.

Fundamental measures are necessary, first and foremost the development and adoption of the RSFSR Law on the Militia. The numbers of the basic services should be increased by 30-40 percent, and salary should be doubled at least. For the militia, this is not simply paying for labor, but covering over channels of corruption. And it is a very good thing that the USSR and RSFSR Councils of Ministers supported these proposals.

[Correspondent] And what tasks for the republic internal affairs organs do the conditions of a market economy pose?

[Anikiyev] I shall attempt to give the criminogenic prognosis. It is clear that we will be required to become significantly more active in the defense of economic rights of citizens, entrepreneurs and the state, of all forms of property, including private property, income from it, and to remove the legal hindrances to revitalizing economic activity, the establishment of a market. The given circumstance particularly stresses the union Council of Ministers decree "On Urgent Measures to Strengthen Legality and Law and Order in the Country."

Under the new conditions, the previous approaches are completely unacceptable. That is why we particularly need to be extremely cautious and even-handed in order not to lose in the most important thing: Not to allow dishonest people, the shadow economy operators who "launder" ill-gotten capital to take advantage of the sanctioned economic freedom.

You could not relegate this to the area of proposals, but at the stage of the stabilization of the economy and the transition to the market, the motivation of a number of violations will change. Whether we want it or not, such psychological motives for crimes as enrichment by any means, envy, and approval of unlawful actions toward the better-off strata of the population will become common.

[Correspondent] What about violations in the system of banking institutions, attempts to get around tax legislation, the creation of false firms, fake declarations of bankruptcy, machinations in the area of credit, unlawful entrepreneurship, embezzlement and mercenary use of information comprising trade and technology secrets, the discharge of harmful and ecologically dangerous products? Society is talking about this a great deal now.

[Anikiyev] We still have not come up against such crimes, but we are the ones to fight them. At the present time, the committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for mutual assistance with the republic Ministry of Justice, the Procuracy, the Supreme Court, and the MVD are working on this problem.

The conditions of RSFSR state sovereignty, the tasks of providing reliable defense of citizens' rights and interests is persistently demanding the accelerated formation of a new legal basis for the fight against criminal violations. In accordance with the democratic principles of a rule-of-law state, priority in this struggle must be given to republic legislative regulation.

The most important thing is expected from us—effective results in the fight against crime. We are obligated to justify the hopes of the people.

Creation of RSFSR Investigative Committee Proposed

91UN0303A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Nov 90 p 1

[Interview with Boris Kondrashov, deputy chairman of the Committee for Legality, Law and Order and Anti-Crime Efforts, conducted by L. Nikitinskiy: "Now the RSFSR Investigative Committee Will Get To Work—If It Is Established, That Is"]

[Text] Our editorial staff has learned that the Russian Supreme Soviet now has a draft regarding establishment of an RSFSR Investigative Committee. We asked Russian people's deputy Boris Kondrashov, deputy chairman of the Committee for Legality, Law and Order and Anti-Crime Efforts, to comment on this prospect.

Also present at the interview was Yevgeniy Shcherbinskiy, RSFSR MVD Main Investigative Administration chief and head of the group presently working on the draft in question.

[Nikitinskiy] At the present time law enforcement work in our country is handled by the courts, procuratorial organs, the Ministry of Justice, the MVD and sections of the KGB—have I left anyone out? And now you are proposing the establishment of an RSFSR Investigative Committee with its own structure in addition to them? Is that not a bit excessive?

[Kondrashov] Today investigators work in procuratorial organs, the MVD and the KGB, as well as in the separate Main Military Procuracy system. Too many cooks spoil the broth.

Investigators under various official jurisdictions perform essentially parallel functions, but whereas in the militia, with an average annual caseload of 60 cases, they earn 362 rubles per month, in the KGB, which investigates 1.2 cases per person each year, the pay is 442 rubles per month.

In procuratorial organs investigation is combined with supervisory duties, making the latter ineffectual and creating the preconditions for violation of the rights of individuals under investigation. In the militia and KGB investigators are subordinate to police inquiry organs, though actually things should be the other way around. There have been cases in which directors of MVD organs, whose work is assessed primarily on the basis of the statistical level of crime in their region, forcing investigators to "close" criminal cases without a legal basis for doing so, to put it mildly.

Establishment of an Investigative Committee with its own independent vertical structure is in our opinion the only way to ensure procedural independence and adherence to law in investigations.

[Nikitinskiy] How do you feel about the idea of creating an Investigative Committee within existing law enforcement organs?

[Kondrashov] In its resolution of 18 April the USSR Supreme Soviet instructed all concerned agencies to submit proposals regarding the establishment of a union-republic Investigative Committee. It would seem that the process had begun; everyone, including the USSR Council of Ministers, gave their approval. But the heads of the USSR MVD are stubbornly clinging to the opposite position, one which in our opinion reflects not national interests in the fight against crime but rather their narrow departmental interests: the MVD is very unwilling to part with such an intimidating weapon as investigation, even though the MVD took control of it in violation of the law.

[Nikitinskiy] Could this be a financial issue?

[Kondrashov] Combining all investigators under one roof could not yield anything but savings.

Of course, good investigation does not come cheap. But it costs less than losses from rising crime. Crime is on the increase, yet the number of investigative personnel is decreasing; they are simply scattering in every direction. During the first six months of this year alone MVD organs lost another 500 experienced investigators. Almost 2,000 staff units have gone vacant for a lengthy period of time.

[Nikitinskiy] I am not at all surprised that investigators are quitting; I have seen the conditions under which they have to work.

[Kondrashov] That is precisely it! Their working and living conditions are completely unsatisfactory. Seldom does an investigator have a separate office, and five people have to use the same telephone. How can investigations be conducted when there is not even any place to interview witnesses, something which is a very delicate and confidential matter?

And the caseload of 60 cases per year precludes any normal quality of investigative work on each case; some investigators do as many as 100 cases a year! Add to this the fact that their entire technical equipment consists of a pen and a shoemaker's needle for sewing together volumes of cases.

Their pay is miserable, even in comparison to the salaries of people employed by the procuracy or in cooperatives. There is no housing; in the Russian Federation alone there are 4,000 investigators waiting for a place to live. The cars specially designated for investigative purposes are "confiscated" for use by militia higher-ups. There are not even enough typewriters, not to mention dictaphones or essential criminological equipment. The criminals just laugh at us...

[Nikitinskiy] Or offer you a bribe.

[Kondrashov] That happens, too. And people accept, what can I say? There is no way to justify that, but I must say that it is a lot easier to buy a poor man... And what about the pressure put on investigators by local organs? This is particularly evident in connection with cases involving embezzlement and corruption, which have virtually not been pursued at all in recent years because no one wants to get into them under the conditions which presently exist.

[Nikitinskiy] Let us say that you have convinced us. But just imagine that the Russian Parliament decides to establish an Investigative Committee, yet at the Union level this issue remains unresolved. What would happen in that case?

[Kondrashov] The situation in the investigative field has become so critical that there is no time to wait for the center to get moving. We hope that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet itself will in the near future vote to establish an Investigative Committee and that this will not exceed its constitutional powers.

Then there will happen in Russia what should have in a law-governed state: the investigative apparatus will finally gain a legal foundation, and along with it the opportunity to perform its assigned tasks more fully and efficiently.

'Anonymous Interview' with Latvian KGB Officer

90UF0216A Riga LATVIJAS JAUNATNE in Latvian
6 Nov 90 p 2

[*"Anonymous interview"* by Janis Grava]

[Text] There will not be anything sensational, he said, agreeing to answer a few questions about work in the Bureau, which people call the Check, or "the corner house."

—How is the mission of Bureau staff workers developed?

—That is developed by the leadership of each subsection depending upon the specialties that are most urgently needed at that particular time. This is why the composition of Bureau employees is very varied—almost all professions are represented, both in the technical and also in the humanities branches. Of course, the personnel roster is set up, however, so that the specific leader himself takes care of who fills these posts—here he has full discretion. One rule must be observed—*aspirants* are required to have "clean papers"—there must not be a blemish on their biography or any compromising connection. It is, of course, beside the point for agents.

—People associate the Bureau with everything negative that the nation has experienced in Soviet times...

—It wouldn't be right to associate the Bureau's activity only with the repressive measures carried out by workers. Our institution's work directly meets standard universal requirements—to carry out intelligence and counterintelligence. All the work of the bureau's sections and subsections is subordinate directly to solving this main task. Only one—the fifth section—is engaged in specific tasks, and it is exactly the activity of this section that has compromised itself and continues to disrepute the Bureau.

—In what kind of work is the fifth section engaged?

—Earlier, this was called the political section, but since last year, both in the republic and in the Soviet Union, it has become a constitutional order protection section. The paradox: a non-existent state—LPSR—as also others—PSRS—constitutional protection in a sovereign Latvia. Exactly with this section's work, its workers come into contact with everyday Soviet citizens. Through this section's mediation, departures and awards are arranged, u.c. [as published] questions. In reality, that is a true political police and it is presently fulfilling its functions. On that basis the Communist Parties filled and are filling, it is better said, CK instructions and in a large part influencing

political direction. The work of other sections goes almost unnoticed, but it is there before your eyes, for a person's career still depends upon this. Because of the fifth section, the Bureau is involved in its unusual functions, in order to help the Communist Party save its authority. And everyone else has to eat the mess it has cooked up.

—Is there some sort of hierarchy within the Bureau?

—As in any institution. Professionals rise the highest in the intelligence section—for this workers have to exhibit the highest "aerobatics." Counterintelligence representatives see themselves as the true coryphaeus, because they can "dig off" anyone from another section. According to professional criteria, the workers of the fifth section are the lowest. However, they still have the greatest opportunity to "eat up" someone—it's enough for someone to show a little disrespect toward the Party (PSKP) or to question the correctness of that line, and they can look for another job.

—Still?

—Still. Also the Bureau and government leaders at the republic level come from the ranks of the fifth section or their proteges. Talking about material privileges, it must be said that there is no principal of distinction. There is the possibility, using your service position, to run into debt. For instance, there are those called curators, who control some branch—trade, tourism, the main ministries, and so on. And, using their position, they can get a hold of a lot of goods—tickets, roadway tokens, telephones, and so on. It the same old system.

—Did B. Pugo come from the fifth section?

—No, he acquired his training through Komsomol and party work. At that time, authorities evidently viewed that that kind of experience, plus a course in Moscow, is fully enough to lead the Bureau in putting into practice the correct policy.

—Recently, during the regular television program, "Look," which was devoted to an expose of Bureau alliances, rang out the designation "ideological counterintelligence."

—Yes, there is work in that vein. Today our technical level is sufficient to acquire all information about our rival's material and economic capabilities, as well as military strength. However, everything is based on the person, his thoughts. A person's behavior is often determined by the public political situation, and it's not possible to get a picture of this type of information. Ideological counterintelligence is tasked with gathering this information, exposing agents who try to influence our public political situation and in turn influence their rival's political direction. Important political information goes through this channel, and using it, a political kitchen [as published] can be made, even as far as the highest echelons of power. The

diplomatic service also uses this information. Having acquired information about various sections of society and the strength of their political mood, it is possible to forecast the future. I consider that the very idea and direction of this activity is right and necessary for every normal country. A different question: How and in who's favor is the fifth section using this, because, in filling the Communist Party leadership's orders, this idea has been so compromised. The PSKP, having gotten all the information from the VDK, used that only for their own ends. But information is a powerful weapon.

—Then the Bureau gives all information to the CK?

—Not automatically. Only by request. The Bureau has always had and has information about everything. Also about the CK, governing members' personal lives. Only the CK leadership decided how to deal with the information acquired. That certainly doesn't correspond to the basic direction of the Bureau's work. I must add that thanks to the professional honesty of some, not all the information went to the CK. That was halted or hidden, and along with that many people were saved from being in trouble and various undertakings ended without unpleasant consequences.

—There exists the opinion that the Bureau has a dossier on each member of society.

—That is myth. There wouldn't be enough buildings to store information about everyone. Also, the Bureau's material-technical order and level don't provide the opportunity to do that. However, there is nonsystematized news about anyone. There is systematized news beginning with middle range workers and ending with the highest representatives of authority.

—Is it difficult to gather information about some particular person?

—No, there are always plenty of informants. There are people who hand out information unknowingly, for instance when they blurt things out. But there are also those who do so knowingly, who people call "stoolpigeons."

—From what circles do "stoolpigeons" usually come and what motives determine their actions?

—They are in all strata. It is interesting that it is much easier to get information about someone among the highest circles of representatives. Motives: These are varied—money, envy, career, etc. There are chance occasions that they inform for blind ideological convictions, not asking for any pay. The most unpleasant, repulsive and dangerous ones are those that inform for career considerations.

—A Latvian magazine called "Furrow" is published in Canada, in which is published the roll of Bureau employees and reporters. In this roll are many noteworthy Latvian artists, teachers, journalists, and so on. To what extent is that true?

—In order to clarify that, it must be compared to a document, but that is very difficult to do. However, that is why people are given brains, so they can draw the correct conclusions.

—In Latvia not infrequently the view is heard that the popular front is a Bureau-directed organization.

—That is already partially answered, talking about public political information. Knowing that, it's always possible to control political direction. So, all public organizations and parties (new ones) in Latvia were originated with the Bureau's knowledge. Also in these organizations' leadership are many people who, to a greater or lesser extent, are tied to the Bureau. There are also those who, having interrupted whatever ties with our establishment - but there is no shortage of these - continue double play. Among other things, the latter most vociferously look for agents among the competitors. The Bureau doesn't lead this organization, but in the archives is information about everything, including about agents.

—Now the questions about archives is timely. Many are impatiently awaiting the ruling about archives, which would provide the opportunity to get at Bureau hiding places.

—No ruling could do that. Our archives could only be taken with a fight. It is difficult even for Bureau employees to get at them. And part of the documents has already been taken out or destroyed.

—But there are historians that get to your archives?

—There aren't many of them. They have earned this "honor" by helping the previous regime. And they use the archives fulfilling the corresponding political order for the corresponding pay. To begin, all readers carefully and reservedly use the information that the Bureau officially gives out about itself and its activity.

—In the newspaper "Absolutely Frankly," is expressed the thought that the Latvian Republic, as an independent, neutral state, has no need for the Bureau.

—This type of state institution is particularly necessary for Latvia, and particularly in our circumstances, because an independent state needs information about its neighbors far and near, and this information is furnished by the reconnaissance service. For the government to be stable, it must have good knowledge of the internal political mood, and here we also offer help. And what about economic and industrial intelligence, which is currently offering the most profitable information... The Bureau is an integral part of any state structure, the only question is what concept does it help?

—Society has worries that the Bureau could overturn the government.

—It can't be said that worries are groundless. In our Bureau are about 20 people who have certain opportunities to move influential levers, and divert the development of events into another channel. It is an erroneous view that all Bureau employees as one will throw themselves into trying to realize such attempts. Also, we have tired of totalitarianism. I must say that it is easier for the Bureau to operate when arbitrariness governs, where there aren't any kind of controls.

—Does someone control the Bureau's actions?

—The procurator's office is a division which oversees that conformance is observed in our establishment. However, the Bureau itself oversees and maintains the workers in this division. You can draw conclusions about objective and effective controls yourself.

—What's the problem with going over to a democratic track, then?

—I think it's fear. Both within the Bureau and outside it. In the previous time period, however, quite a few people "dirtied themselves." And, in order for the institution to conform to control by a democratic state, you will have to pull out into broad daylight many documents that compromise many new leaders, not to mention the old bucks. That is also why draft laws calling to account Stalinism's criminals are drawn up so slowly; nothing is done so that the republic would bring the Bureau and all its archives under its authority. That is also why the myth about the Bureau being the root of all evil is upheld. The Bureau is like a boogey man, with which one can intimidate credulous people, but a frightened isn't able to think constantly and analytically, and that is why he is easier to influence and lead. Any genuine information, which uncovers one of today's heroes to have had a not particularly clean past, is immediately presented as a falsification dreamed up by the Bureau. And life goes on tomorrow on the principle—the king is dead, long live the king.

Latvia's Procuracy Conflict Continues

91UN0319E Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
30 Oct 90 p 1

["Declaration of the Latvian SSR Procurator"]

[Text] The Latvian Republic Law "On Procurator Supervision in the Latvian Republic" was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic and went into effect on 26 September 1990. The leadership of the procuracy of the Latvian Republic was formed on the same day.

Thus the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic made an attempt to eliminate the current procuracy of the Latvian SSR, or at least to isolate it from law enforcement and other state organs and organizations in the republic. According to the intentions of its creators, the Latvian Republic procuracy in time would also be

responsible for checking on the execution of laws in transportation and by military organizations and troop units.

Instead of resolving urgent economic and social problems relating to improving the living standard of the people of Latvia, the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet is directing activity toward the creation of parallel law enforcement organs which are supposed to ignore Union legislation in their activity.

The leaders of the Latvian SSR procuracy conducted lengthy and patient dialogue with the republic Supreme Soviet just before adopting this law. Our viewpoint was also presented in the mass media. We have nothing against discussing the question of procurator supervision as a concept for further development of the procuracy. Under the conditions of the restructuring of the entire system of the country's law enforcement organs, we allow the possibility of changing the structure and functions of the procuracy organs. It is quite possible to create a system whereby there would be both federal and regional procuracies with clearly distinct functions. But this is not a task for the present day. Such a system could not appear before the conclusion of the Union treaty and the determination of the status of the Union republics. As of today throughout the country the USSR Constitution and the law "On the USSR Procuracy" are in effect and they do not envision the creation of such parallel structures. To create them actually means to completely ignore existing legislation, to which we cannot agree.

All attempts to convince the republic Supreme Soviet of the inexpediency and anticonstitutionality of such a hasty decision without the corresponding agreements from Union organs have been in vain.

The creation of the procuracy of the Latvian Republic became a reality. In the current situation this means nothing other than a split in the procurator collective, which will undoubtedly cause irreparable harm to the fight against crime.

The Latvian SSR Procuracy continues to exist and perform its functions. The republic Supreme Soviet, of course, has the right to create its own structures of state organs, but it does not have the authority to eliminate organizations which are constituent parts of Union organs, which applies fully to the Latvian SSR Procuracy. By an order of the USSR Procurator General, Ya. Skrastinsh, A. Raups, and E. Ziyedinsh were fired. They were the ones who agreed to head the procuracy of the Latvian Republic created by the Supreme Soviet.

It must be emphasized that the newly created procuracy does not have its own material base and is starting its work from zero, and therefore in this situation it is hardly capable of carrying out its tasks.

All the property of the procuracy, the archives, the surveillance files, transportation, and criminal investigation and organizational equipment belong to the Latvian SSR Procuracy. The discharge of workers wishing to

leave us because of ideological or personal considerations is conducted on an individual basis, at the times set by law, and materially liable individuals—after the material values are turned over. Their positions will be filled by new workers, taking into account professional qualities exclusively, and not taking into account their ideological convictions, nationality, faith, or whether they belong to one political party or another.

The Latvian SSR Procuracy notifies all leaders of ministries and departments, enterprises, associations, institutions and organizations, kolkhozes [collective farms], sovkhoses [state farms], officials, and citizens that, in keeping with the authority vested in it by the USSR Constitution and the USSR law "On the USSR Procuracy," it will continue in the future to exercise high-level supervision of the execution of laws throughout the entire territory of the republic.

[Signed] V.B. Dauksis, Latvian SSR procurator, state legal adviser second class.

Law on Amendments to Lithuanian Criminal Code
91UN0361A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
31 Oct 90 pp 3, 4

[Law of the Lithuanian Republic: "On Making Changes and Additions to the Criminal Code of the Lithuanian Republic"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic decrees:

To make the following changes and additions to the Criminal Code of the Lithuanian Republic ratified on 26 June 1961 by the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic:

1. To consider null and void articles 2, 5, 71, 74, 81, 143, and 214¹.

2. To make section one of Article 24 read as follows: "Use of capital punishment—execution—is permitted as exceptional punishment, until its complete abolition, for especially grave crimes in those cases specifically provided for in the Special Section of this Code."

To amend this article with section three as follows:

"When sentencing a person to death, the court can substitute this sentence with life imprisonment. Persons sentenced to life imprisonment are kept in prison."

3. To reword the last sentence in section one of Article 25 as follows:

"As a pardon, the death penalty can be substituted with life imprisonment."

4. To reword section two of Article 32 as follows:

"The size of the fine is set between 50 and 10,000 rubles according to the danger of the crime. In exceptional cases specified by legislation, higher fines may also be set."

5. To reword section two of Article 38 as follows:

"When a person convicted for a grave crime has been awarded an order or medal of the Lithuanian Republic or holds an honorary title or military or other degree or rank conferred by the government of the Lithuanian Republic, when enacting the sentence, the court decides the question of the expediency of submitting a statement to the body which awarded the convicted person the order or medal or conferred on him the degree or rank about their deprivation."

6. To reword chapter one of the Special Section as follows:

"STATE CRIMES

"I. ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS STATE CRIMES

"Article 62. Treason

"Intentional participation by a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic in the activities of another state or foreign organization aimed at violating the sovereignty of the Lithuanian Republic, its territorial inviolability, or defensive capability, or violent overthrow of state power, based on the interim Basic Law (Constitution) of the Lithuanian Republic, is punishable by imprisonment for 10-15 years with confiscation of property or by the death penalty with confiscation of property.

"A citizen of the Lithuanian Republic enlisted by foreign bodies or organizations for conducting hostile activities against the Lithuanian Republic is relieved of criminal liability if in execution of the criminal mission received he did not commit any acts and voluntarily reported his ties with foreign bodies or organizations to the authorities of the Lithuanian Republic.

"Article 63. Espionage

"The transfer as well as the theft or collection of information comprising state secrets or secrets safeguarding the territory of the Lithuanian Republic for the purpose of passing it to a foreign state, foreign organization, or their agents

"—is punishable by imprisonment for 7-15 years with confiscation of property.

"The transfer or collection of other information on assignment for foreign intelligence

"—is punishable by imprisonment for 3-10 years with confiscation of property.

"A person who has set out to commit crimes specified in this article but who voluntarily breaks off such criminal activity and reports the actions committed to the authorities is relieved of criminal liability if the confession and steps taken in this regard heads off damage to the Lithuanian Republic.

"Article 64. Attempt on the Life of a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, Member of the Government, or Other Official of the Lithuanian Republic

"An attempt on the life of a deputy of the Supreme Soviet, a member of the government of the Lithuanian Republic, or other official appointed by the Supreme Soviet in connection with their state and public activities

"—is punishable by imprisonment for 10-15 years with confiscation of property.

"The same actions resulting in the death of individuals indicated in part one of this article

"—are punishable by imprisonment for 12-15 years with confiscation of property or by the death penalty with confiscation of property.

"Article 65. Attempt on the Life of a Representative of a Foreign State

"An attempt on the life of a leader of a foreign state or government or other representative of a foreign state who is on an official visit to the Lithuanian Republic

"—is punishable by imprisonment for 10-15 years with confiscation of property.

"The same actions resulting in the death of individuals indicated in part one of this article or international complications or other grave consequences for the Lithuanian Republic

"—are punishable by imprisonment for 12-15 years with confiscation of property or by the death penalty with confiscation of property.

"Article 66. Sabotage

"Carrying out explosions, arson, or other actions aimed at destroying people, inflicting bodily injury, or other harm or at destroying enterprises, buildings, means of communication, oil and gas pipelines, electric power lines, communications equipment, or other state or public property for the purpose of weakening the Lithuanian Republic, as well as committing mass poisoning or spreading epidemics or epizootic diseases

"—is punishable by imprisonment for 8-15 years with confiscation of property or by the death penalty with confiscation of property.

"Article 67. Economic Sabotage

"Action or inaction aimed at undermining industry, energy, transportation, agriculture, the monetary system, trade, or other sectors of the economy as well as activities of state bodies in order to weaken the Lithuanian Republic, if this act is committed by using state or other enterprises or institutions or by interfering with their normal operation

"—is punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years with confiscation of property.

"Article 68. Public Calls for Forced Violation of the Sovereignty of the Lithuanian Republic

"Public calls for forced violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Lithuanian state or overthrow of state power, or public calls for committing grave crimes for the same purpose

"—are punishable by imprisonment for up to three years.

"Those same actions committed by an organized group

"—are punishable by imprisonment for up to six years.

"Commission of actions specified in parts one and two of this article, when carrying out assignments of other states, foreign organizations, or their representatives

"—is punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years with confiscation of property.

"Article 69. Fomenting War

"Public calls for fomenting war—

"—are punishable by imprisonment for up to five years.

"Article 70. Creation of Anti-state Organizations and Active Participation in Their Activities

"Creation of organizations striving to disrupt state or public order based on the Interim Basic Law (Constitution) of the Lithuanian Republic, restrict the sovereign rights (power) of the Lithuanian state, or to forcibly separate part of the territory of the Lithuanian Republic, as well as active participation in the activities of these organizations

"—are punishable by imprisonment for three to eight years or by a fine in the amount of 5,000-12,000 rubles.

"Article 71. Repealed

"OTHER STATE CRIMES

"Article 72. Violation of National and Racial Equality

"Restricting the rights of citizens or establishing privileges for citizens depending on their nationality or race, as well as deliberate actions to incite nationality or racial hostility or dissension

"—are punishable by imprisonment for up to two years or by a fine in the amount of 1,000 to 5,000 rubles with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or to engage in certain activities for up to three years or without deprivation of this right.

"Public incitement to physical violence with persons of another nationality

"—is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or by a fine in the amount of 3,000-10,000 rubles with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to five years or without deprivation of this right.

"Acts specified in parts one and two of this article resulting in the death of a person or other grave consequences

"—are punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years.

"Article 73. Divulging State Secrets

"Divulging information comprising state secrets of the Lithuanian Republic by an individual to whom this information was entrusted or became known through duty or work

"—is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or by a fine in the amount of 3,000-10,000 rubles with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to five years.

"The same act, if it resulted in grave consequences,

"—is punishable by imprisonment for up to eight years.

"Article 74. Repealed

"Article 74¹. Passing Official Secrets to Foreign Organizations

"Passing of economic, scientific-technical, or other information comprising official secrets to foreign organizations or their representatives by the person to whom this information was entrusted on the job or became known by other means and causes major property damage to the Lithuanian state or results in other grave consequences

"—is punishable by imprisonment for up to three years or by a fine in the amount of up to 10,000 rubles.

"Article 75. Gangsterism

"Organization of an armed gang for the purpose of attacking state or other enterprises, institutions, organizations, or individuals, as well as involvement in such a gang and in the attacks it makes

"—are punishable by imprisonment for 3-15 years with confiscation of property.

"Article 76. Actions Disrupting the Work of Prison Institutions

"Persons serving a sentence in the form of imprisonment who organize convicts in places of imprisonment not to carry out work assigned by the administration or not to observe the established routine

"—are punished by imprisonment for two to five years.

"Persons confined in corrective labor institutions or investigatory isolation wards who terrorize other persons confined in these places or make attacks on the administration and also who organize criminal groups for this purpose or participate in such groups

"—are punished by imprisonment for three to eight years.

"Especially dangerous habitual criminals and also persons convicted for grave crimes or who have committed acts specified by parts one and two of this article

"—are punished by imprisonment for 8-15 years or by the death penalty.

"Article 77. Smuggling

"Smuggling, i.e., illegal movement of goods or other valuables across the state border of the Lithuanian Republic, committed either with concealment of objects in special repositories, with fraudulent use of customs or other documents, in large amounts, by a group of persons organized to engage in smuggling, or by an official using his official position, as well as smuggling of explosives, drugs, toxic and poisonous substances, weapons, and ammunition

"—is punishable by imprisonment for 3-10 years with confiscation of property.

"Article 78. Riots

"Organization of riots accompanied by pogroms, destruction, arson, and other similar actions, as well as commission of these actions by participants in these riots or their offering armed resistance to authorities

"—are punishable by imprisonment from 2-15 years.

"Article 79. Evasion of a Scheduled Call-Up to Active Duty To Protect the Territory

"Evasion of a scheduled call-up to active service to protect the territory of the Lithuanian Republic or to alternative (labor) service

"—is punishable by imprisonment for up to two years.

"Article 80. Mobilization Call-Up Evasion

"Evasion of a mobilization call-up for service to protect the territory of the Lithuanian Republic

"—is punishable by imprisonment for two to five years.

"Article 81. Repealed

"Article 82. Illegal Crossing of the State Border

"Illegal crossing of the state border of the Lithuanian Republic

"—is punishable by imprisonment for up to three years or by a fine in the amount of 1,000-5,000 rubles.

"This article does not apply to cases when a foreign citizen arrives in the Lithuanian Republic to take advantage of the right of asylum.

"Article 83. Violation of International Flight Rules

"Flight into or out of the Lithuanian Republic without prescribed authorization, nonobservance of flight routes,

landing sites, air gates, and flight altitudes indicated in the authorization, and also other violations of international flight rules

"—are punished by imprisonment for up to five years or by a fine in the amount of up to 10,000 rubles.

"Article 84. Violation of Traffic Safety and Transport Operation Rules

"Violation of traffic safety and transport operation rules by rail, water, or air transport workers resulting in accidents with people, a wreck, mishap, or other grave consequences and also the inferior repair of transport equipment, tracks, or signaling and communications devices resulting in the same consequences

"—are punishable by imprisonment for 20-10 years.

"Article 85. Damaging Lines of Communication and Transport Equipment

"Intentional destruction or damaging of lines of communication, structures on them, rolling stock or vessels, or communications or signaling devices that threatens the safety of rail, water, or air transport

"—is punishable by imprisonment for two to five years or by a fine in the amount of 1,000-5,000 rubles.

"The same actions resulting in a train wreck or ship or aircraft accident without human casualties

"—are punishable by imprisonment for 5-10 years.

"Actions specified in part one of this article resulting in a train wreck or ship or aircraft accident with human casualties

"—are punishable by imprisonment for 10-15 years.

"Article 86. Making or Selling Counterfeit Money or Securities

"Selling or making for the purpose of selling counterfeit state treasury notes, state bank notes, metal coins, or state securities

"—are punishable by imprisonment for 5-10 years with confiscation of property.

"The same actions committed by a person having a previous conviction for making or selling counterfeit money or securities

"—are punishable by imprisonment for 8-15 years with confiscation of property.

"Article 87. Violation of Rules on Currency Transactions

"Violation of rules on currency transactions

"—is punishable by imprisonment for two to five years with confiscation of property or without confiscation of property or by a fine in the amount of 5,000-10,000 rubles.

"The same violations committed for the second time

"—are punishable by imprisonment for 5-10 years with confiscation of property.

"Article 88. Failure To Report State Crimes

"Failure to report known committed state crimes specified by articles 62-67 and 75 of this Code

"—is punishable by imprisonment for one to three years or by a fine in the amount of 1,000-3,000 rubles.

"Article 89. Concealment of State Crimes

"Concealment not promised in advance of state crimes specified by articles 62-67, 70, 75, 77, and 86 of this Code

"—is punishable by imprisonment for one to five years."

7. To reword Article 199² as follows:

"Article 199². Committing an Outrage Against State Symbols

"Tearing down, ripping, breaking, destroying, defiling, or committing other outrages against the state coat of arms or state flag of the Lithuanian Republic, as well as public derision of the national anthem of the Lithuanian Republic

"are punishable by imprisonment for up to two years, corrective labor for the same period, or a fine in the amount of up to 1,000 rubles.

"Tearing down, ripping, breaking, destroying, defiling, or committing other outrages against an officially posted coat of arms or raised state flag of a foreign state

—are punishable by imprisonment for up to two years or by a fine in the amount of up to 1,000 rubles."

8. To make the following changes to the title and text of individual articles:

To replace the words "Lithuanian SSR" and "USSR" in the title and text of Article 1 with the words "Lithuanian Republic" and also delete the word "socialist."

To replace the words "Lithuanian SSR" in the title and text of Article 4 with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To reword the title of Article 6 as follows: "Validity of the Criminal Code of the Lithuanian Republic with Respect to Acts Committed Abroad;" replace the words "Lithuanian SSR" in the text of the article with the words "Lithuanian Republic;" replace the words "Citizens of the USSR" in part one of this article with the words "Permanent residents of the Lithuanian Republic;" delete the words "beyond the borders of the USSR" from part two and enter the word "abroad" after the word "crimes;" in part four replace the word "USSR" with the words "Lithuanian Republic," delete the word "Soviet," and enter the words "Lithuanian Republic" after the word "laws."

In part one of Article 8 to replace the word "USSR" with the words "Lithuanian Republic," delete the words "socialist," "socialist," and "socially" and enter the words "established in Lithuania" after the words "infringing upon." Delete the word "social" in part two of this article.

To replace the number "71" in part two of Article 8¹ with the number "70."

To replace the word "Soviet" in part one of Article 14 with the word "Lithuanian."

To replace the word "Soviet" in Article 15 with the word "Lithuanian."

To delete the word "socialist" from part one of Article 21, part four of Article 53, part two of Article 47.

To replace the words "Union of SSR and the Lithuanian SSR" in part two of Article 25¹ with the words "Lithuanian Republic," and replace the number "71" in paragraph one of part three with the number "70."

To replace the number "71" in paragraphs one and two of part one of Article 26 with the number "70," and replace the words "criminal codes of the Union of SSR and this Code" in part five with the words "the Criminal Code of the Lithuanian Republic."

To replace the words "Union of SSR and the Lithuanian SSR" in Articles 27, 28, and 29 with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To replace the number "71" in paragraph one of part four of Article 34¹ with the number "70."

In part three of Article 35 to delete the word "only" and replace the words "Union of SSR, and for mercenary crimes—also in cases specified by legislation of the Lithuanian SSR" with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To delete from Article 39 the words "Fundamental Criminal Legislation of the Union of SSR and the union republics" and the word "socialist."

To replace the words "Union of SSR and the Lithuanian SSR" in part one of Article 46 and part four of Article 47¹ with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To replace the word "USSR" in part three of Article 131¹ with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To replace the words "Lithuanian SSR" in part two of Article 37 and in Article 134 with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To replace the word "USSR" in part one of Article 174 with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To replace the word "USSR" in the title and text of Article 175¹ with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To replace the word "USSR" in the title and text of Article 213¹ with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To replace the words "USSR or union republic" in Article 220 with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

To replace the word "USSR" in articles 221, 245², 245³, and 245⁴ with the words "Lithuanian Republic."

9. To reword the title of Chapter Two of the Special Part as follows: "Crimes against state or public property."

10. This law enters into force on the date of its promulgation.

**V. Landsbergis, chairman,
Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet
Vilnius, 4 October 1990**

Moldovan People's Deputy Analyzes Citizenship Draft Law

*91UN0518A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 1 Dec 90 p 1, 2*

[Article by A. Safonov, Moldovan SSR people's deputy: "Am I a Citizen of the Soviet Union: We Discuss the Draft Law on Moldovan SSR Citizenship"]

[Text] The Moldovan SSR draft law "On Moldovan SSR Citizenship," published in the republic press on 22 November, has provoked a whole series of questions and has presented us all with many problems. We will attempt to examine them.

This draft law has been long awaited, and it is understandable why. Every person is worried about his personal destiny, about the destiny of his children, grandchildren, and friends. Will a person have a full measure of citizenship rights, or will they place before him a range of gradations, in the Baltic manner? Moldova's people's deputies are no exception. But our lives consist of paradoxes. The first paradox: One version of a draft law on the functioning of languages was published in the spring of 1989 for purposes of general discussion but, in August, a fundamentally different one appeared. The result was confusion and political strikes within the republic. It was thought that lessons had been drawn. But here is a second paradox: In May and June, the Moldovan SSR people's deputies received a packet of draft laws to work on and, among them, was one on citizenship. Its essence: Every citizen of the republic is also a citizen of the USSR and enjoys all corresponding rights. On 22 November 1990, I repeat myself, a fundamentally different draft law was published, the essence of which is embodied in its preamble:

"In accordance with the Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Moldovan SSR, Moldovan SSR citizenship is instituted within the republic. Dual citizenship is not recognized within the Moldovan SSR."

In other words, we are being denied the right to be citizens of the USSR. However, there has been a fierce polemic concerning precisely this point. When we discussed the draft declaration of sovereignty on 23 June 1990, the refusal, at that time, to recognize formally the

necessity of the Moldovan SSR remaining within a renewed Union, to an enormous degree, pushed us into a deep crisis. Afterwards, there were months of confrontation. Then, the activities of the conciliatory commission. So why, precisely now, is the non-compromising "dual citizenship is not recognized" being placed on scales?

Just like the Moldovan SSR declaration, the draft law does not clarify at all the question of whether Moldova will remain a part of a renewed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or not. If not, then what is the meaning of the point contained in the preamble about the fact that only citizens of Moldova "have the right to exercise social, citizenship, and military functions"? If this means the earlier course toward establishment of a national army, then we are falling into an abyss, because this idea is categorically rejected in the South and the Dnestr area [Pridnestrovye], and it is not accepted by many people on the Right Bank [Pravoberezhye]. It is no secret who has fought for a national army and with what goal, if one recalls the constantly heard talk about the necessity of "teaching a lesson to" the people of Gagauz and Tiraspol. I am deeply convinced that only a overall Soviet Army is capable of saving all of us from bloodletting and a civil war.

Further, Chapter I, "General Provisions," opens with Article 1, "Membership to Moldovan SSR Citizenship," which proclaims that, among others, citizens of the republic are "persons who resided within the territory of Bessarabia or the Moldavian ASSR before June 1940." But, if all this is understandable with regard to the Moldavian ASSR, having been an autonomous formation possessing statehood, then things are more complicated with Bessarabia. While under the heavy hand of the Romanian king during 1918-1940, it did not have even minimum autonomy and, consequently, one cannot speak about any kind of citizenship with respect to it. For example, until 28 June 1940, a large number of representatives of the Romanian administration, of the Romanian officer corps, of the gendarmerie, etc. resided in our territory. And Romanian colonists (or, using the political terminology accepted today, "migrants") were resettled on the territory of Bessarabia with the active assistance of the Bucharest government. A question: Do these people or their descendants receive Moldovan citizenship? Is there a serious basis for this?

Then, an extremely ticklish point. The basic version of Article 1 envisages that, of those of whom arrived in the Moldovan SSR after 28 June 1940, citizenship will be received by persons who, "on the day that the present law goes into effect have been living within the territory of the Moldovan SSR for five (ten, in an alternate version) years..." The authors of this formulation are clearly taking an example from the Baltics, while not caring to take note of the intensification of resistance in that region following inclusion of provisions about a time qualification within the text of the citizenship law. In this connection, an alternative version of Article 1, which envisages citizenship for those persons who, on

the day the present law goes into effect, reside permanently within the territory of the republic and have here a permanent source of livelihood, clearly appears more democratic. We think those who are proposing this, so to say, "zero option" are correct; however, here too, the question of Union citizenship and the difficulties stemming from this are not eliminated. But, from the other side, the question of Union citizenship will not be resolved as long as the question of whether or not to sign a Moldovan union treaty has not been finally decided. Meanwhile, as is clear from a published interview of certain leaders of the Moldovan SSR, the future "renewed Union" or "community of sovereign states," or "confederation" should not have a general Supreme Soviet, Constitution, army, and, I underline, citizenship. As was once said, "we will not accept limited sovereignty."

But the problem remains! Neither the Left Bank [Levoberezhye] nor the South will accept the absence of the above-mentioned union attributes, which give at least a minimum of hope for just solution of questions of interethnic relationships.

Article 2 stipulates that "only citizens of the Moldovan SSR have the right to elect and be elected, in accordance with procedures established by law, to soviets of people's deputies..., and also to take part in referendums." It would seem that, in case of acceptance of the alternative ("zero option") version of Article 1, many questions will be removed, and this is so. However, let us also not forget the fact that the recently published draft Moldovan SSR law on the foundations of local self-government in fact envisage the abolition of soviets of peoples deputies at all levels other than the Supreme Soviet.

Studying the draft law, the reader cannot but turn attention to the concept of "another state," which is frequently encountered in the text. Thus, Article 6 says that citizens of the Moldovan SSR "cannot be surrendered to another state." Article 7 asserts that a citizen of Moldova in principle cannot be the citizen of "another state," and finally, Article 22 envisages the possibility of withdrawing Moldovan citizenship from persons who enter "into the service of another state without the knowledge and authorization of competent organs of the Moldovan SSR."

What kind of "another state"? What is the innuendo? It would doubtlessly be irresponsible on my part to assert specifically what the authors of this extremely vague concept had in mind. I hope that, in the course of discussions of the draft law in the Supreme Soviet, they themselves will throw light on the unclarity. But, I also cannot remain silent about the fact that the concept itself did not appear for the first time in Kishinev. It is being whipped up with particular force in Lithuania by the Landsbergis group, which has established there a totalitarian nationalist dictatorial regime with clear elements of a fascist trend. This regime obviously understands "another state" to mean the USSR and an organization

in "the service of another state" to mean the Communist Party of Lithuania based on the platform of the CPSU. People see this, and questions remain. It is necessary to remove them through a clear statement by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

In my view, the formulation of Article 15 is legally wrong, where it says that "the right of Moldovan SSR citizenship is preserved for persons who were resettled from the territory of Moldova and who abandoned it since 1940, and also for their children and grandchildren." Again it is necessary to remind the anonymous authors that, until 1940, Moldova (Bessarabia) was neither a sovereign state nor an autonomous formation but at the end of 1918 was incorporated into Romania without any conditions and against the will of the enormous majority of Bessarabians. There was not, of course, any Moldovan state, and those who possessed citizenship were citizens of the Kingdom of Romania. So, why will refugees from the old kingdom, including the already-mentioned gendarmes and administrators, who fled beyond the Prut River during the time of the unification of Bessarabia with the USSR, receive Moldovan SSR citizenship? How have they helped our land? By the fact that for 22 years they catastrophically undermined its economy?

Article 18, "Granting of Moldovan SSR citizenship," in fact creates difficulties, moreover clearly artificial ones, for obtaining citizenship. Thus, a person is required to know the state language (other than persons 60 or more years old), proclaims paragraph 1 of Article 18. It is hardly possible to agree with this. A person needs to know the Moldovan language—one can only benefit from this—but such a categorical demand is simply nonsense. In the outside world, for example, the main criteria of a citizen's loyalty is unswerving observance of the constitution and laws of his country of residence. However, by no means is knowledge of the English language absolutely required of a citizen in the United States, or of Hindi and English in India, or of Finnish and Swedish in Finland, etc. This is to say nothing about the fact that in Switzerland there are several state languages, which, moreover, is done so that the residents of all the regions in the Swiss Confederation, which possess different language environments as a result of special characteristics of historical development, feel themselves at home. And if we do as suggested by the authors of the draft law under discussion, then a minimum of a million people within the population of the republic will be left without the rights of citizenship.

There is also another consideration. In the USSR, the language of international intercourse is Russian. But, for example, I have relatives, Moldovans, who live in the countryside, have spoken Moldovan their entire lives, and know practically no Russian. They, these people, are Soviet citizens with full rights, and it would be preposterous to call into question their rights as citizens of the USSR based upon their knowledge of the Russian language.

One of the key articles in the draft law is Article 19, describing the basis for refusing to grant Moldovan SSR citizenship. Thus, paragraph 2 of Article 19 proclaims that citizenship will not be granted to those "who have participated in repressions during foreign occupation or in the period of Stalin's personality cult." Dear drafters, what do you consider "foreign occupation"? I, for example, consider Romanian rule during 1918-1940 and fascist dominion during 1941-1944 to be such. But, indeed, on 23 June 1990 the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, having condemned the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, resolved to consider the reunification of 28 June 1940 to have been an occupation, an annexation. If this is so (and, judging by the political line dominating within the republic, this is so), then paragraph 2 of Article 19 is directed against those who in one way or another struggled for the restoration of Soviet power in Bessarabia or worked in the Moldavian ASSR. Knowing the present atmosphere within the republic, I very much doubt that they will seriously strive to distinguish a Yezhov investigator, who violated the law, from the hundreds of people who fought against the real fascists, the Iron Guards, the police, and the gendarmes, all the more so as the latter have come for some to be favorite heroes, "fighters against Stalinism."

Citizenship, judging by paragraph 4 of Article 19, will not be received by those who "incite national or racial enmity or spread the ideas of fascism, chauvinism, or Stalinism." Here, it is necessary to agree on terms. The more so because today labels are so easily applied in the pages of newspapers. If you are for the inviolability of the Union, then you are inevitably a "Stalinist." If you are for the equality of all peoples living in Moldova, you are necessarily a "chauvinist." The logical conclusion is that paragraph 4 of Article 19 is directed generally against opposition and heterodoxy, against opponents of that political current that is presently in power.

Such an impression is strengthened due to Article 19, paragraph 5, which advises that those who, "by their activities undermine the foundations of the state, threaten its security, the maintenance of public order, and the health and moral principles of the population," will also remain without citizenship. The above formulations represent a strange mixture of contemporary Lithuanian political terminology and Romanian declarations of the 1920's and 1930's. Besides this, paragraph 7 denies citizenship to those connected with "terrorist activities." In truth, I do not know any people who advertise their connection with terrorists, but if there are such people, then the competent organs usually deal with them. It is a different matter if it is also intended to turn this into the next label (in the Baltics, for example, USSR KGB employees have been christened "terrorists.") And paragraph 8 specifies: Citizens of the Moldovan SSR cannot become "citizens of other states." Of what ones? Let us make it clear, all the same: Are citizens of the USSR meant here or not? As we see, there are more than enough questions.

Article 21 considers secession from Moldovan SSR citizenship. With surprise I read: "Secession from Moldovan SSR citizenship may be denied if this threatens the security of the state." Honestly speaking, I have never seen a more absurd provision. In the first place, nobody can forbid a person from renouncing citizenship, in particular if he is protesting against totalitarian procedures reigning within a state, against violation of human rights. Only departure from the state can be denied for "security considerations"; however it is difficult to envy a state that confines its citizens within its own borders by force. In the second place, "threatens the security" of what state? Really, is the USSR Constitution, in accordance with which the provision of a military capability and state security fall within the competence of the Union, not operative within the territory of a union republic, of which the Moldovan SSR is one? Incidentally, a similar concept is also contained in the draft Union treaty that was published on 24 November 1990. The creation of national armies and security organs, intended as weapons in a struggle for political power, is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences, including the spilling of blood, as is convincingly demonstrated by the sad experience of the Armenian National Army (ANA).

The demarcation that has taken place on Moldovan soil—this is a reality. Certainly, however, it can be overcome not by methods of pressure, nor by propagandistic sensation, nor by shooting at unarmed people, but only through a persistent search for civic consensus and compromise. Alas, in the articles of the Moldovan SSR draft law on citizen ship that I have mentioned, I have not detected any search for compromise. Categorical positions and an absence of possibility for appeal—this is what is characteristic of these articles, and therefore, in my opinion, the draft law cannot be approved in its present edition.

A basis for agreement is contained in the draft union treaty, published on 24 November, which makes an extremely positive impression due to the clear, laconic, and constructive principles that characterize this document. The signing or non-signing of this document, it seems, will become a test of the good will of the leaders of all the union republics. Article 2, Chapter II of the draft union treaty is devoted specifically to the question of citizenship: "A citizen of a republic belonging to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is at the same time a citizen of the USSR. Citizens have equal rights and obligations secured by the Constitution, laws, and international agreements of the USSR."

A basis for agreement lies before us and it, agreement, must necessarily come if, with confidence in the future, each of us is going to be able to say: "I am a citizen of the Soviet Union."

Official Describes Present, Past Work of Uzbekistan's KGB

91UF0260A Tashkent SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
3 Nov 90 p 4

[Written interview with Viktor Leonidovich Ivanchin, Uzbek KGB public relations center associate, by A. Kovalev: "Whom Does the KGB Serve?"; includes introduction and commentary; date not given]

[Text] The assignment stated concisely—prepare material on the activities of the Uzbek SSR KGB. Everything was clear and I "sat down" at the telephone. I spent a long time dialing the number—the office of the first deputy chairman of this department was absolutely silent. I did not know any other telephone numbers, so I decided to drop by the "bogey-building," located in the heart of Tashkent.

It turned out there was no list of telephone numbers at the pass office. After listening to me, the elderly lady in charge of this "little office" called the duty officer and spoke with him, and then handed the phone to me. I told the story of the purpose of my visit and finished with the request:

"Tell me who I should call."

"I do not know myself," a soft voice answered sincerely. "I will find out right now... Just a second..."

There was a pause for a minute and then the soft voice again:

"None of the people you need are here."

"Can I have their phone numbers? I will call them from the editorial office."

"No," the voice answered altogether softly, "call me."

I returned to the editorial office. I got hold of the duty officer several times—without any result; the people I needed were not there. Finally the soft voice informed me:

"Call 39-66-10 and ask for Rikhsitulla Dzhurayevich Akramov; he is the head of the public relations center."

I got hold of Akramov. I informed him that I had received the assignment to prepare material on the subject: "Whom Does the KGB Serve?" or "From the Archives of the KGB".

"That is great!" Rikhsitulla Dzhurayevich exclaimed.

"So should I understand that these subjects are all right with you?" I followed up, somewhat surprised.

"Anything will be fine with us, as long as you present our work to your readers in a good light," the KGB officer explained his position amicably.

"You can prepare the material yourselves and give it to us. The commentary to it is the editorial office's job."

"Of course, we can. But we are glad you came to us with the proposal. Thank you! Our duty is to help. I think we will solve this problem. Tell me where you can be reached. I will report to the leadership and get permission... and then we will invite you over and talk a bit and show you some interesting files."

An hour later the phone began to squeal. It was Akramov. He said that Viktor Leonidovich Ivanchin would manage things with me. Then he introduced us on the telephone. And Ivanchin called a day later and said:

"The pass has been ordered. When you receive it, call me from the pass office—I will meet you at the second entrance."

Viktor Leonidovich was an interesting, well-read person to talk to and, as it appeared, not a very devilish man. He immediately won me over, even though I had made up my mind to be cautious. I was surprised at the ascetic furnishing of his office with its high ceiling and walls which smelled of fresh paint. I noticed a button on the wall—within reach of the occupant of the office.

"Investigators used to work here," Ivanchin explained, "they need a call button. Now we associates of the public relations center occupy this and several other offices."

Viktor Leonidovich informed me in detail of the tasks their section faced: establishing close contacts with the press, the public, scientists, and writers, and informing them of the state security organs' activities. That is wonderful! It has long been time to turn to the people! He also reported that admission to their center would soon be easy, without passes.

The head of the center, Rikhsitulla Dzhurayevich, arrived and invited me to his office and gave me tea. He tactfully refused me and Ivanchin permission to smoke, since he cannot endure tobacco smoke. A cordial conversation also took place with Akramov. Then they—Akramov and Ivanchin—introduced me to scientists from the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences History Institute who had been studying criminal cases from the KGB archives for several months already. The stories of the scientists astounded us: they already had their own opinion on the truth and falsehood of the period from 1923 through 1953 and on the prejudice and error of the conclusions in many present-day publications on these subjects. It was not without a thrill that I held in my hands and read the materials of the trials of Fitrat and Chulpan and other well-known figures of Uzbekistan executed in the years of arbitrary rule and saw dozens of pictures telling of the struggle of the Red Army soldiers against the Basmaks and of the Basmaks against the Red Army soldiers.

Candidates of historical sciences M. Khasanov and V. Germanov, speaking in turn, said: "It is a pleasure to work here. There are so many facts and documents which cannot be found in other archives. And most importantly, no one bothers us and no one impedes us.

Any criminal cases or documents of that period are all at our service. Thank the KGB associates for that!"

I spent several hours within the walls of the KGB and then returned to the editorial office stunned. KGB officers, it turns out, are by no means a fierce bunch. In any case, not the ones I met. And the next day I sent Ivanchin my questions to the leadership in written form—that was our agreement.

These are the questions and the answers to them prepared, as it turned out, by Viktor Leonidovich on behalf of the KGB leadership.

[Kovalev] There is no sign "KGB of the Uzbek SSR" on the facade of the KGB building. Why?

[Ivanchin] Yes, the entrances to our administrative building do not have such signs, with the exception of the one where the pass office and reception are located. For many years that satisfied both us and many citizens who visited the committee with various complaints, appeals, and statements, especially since our reception office is open round the clock. But there will be a sign soon, and at the central entrance it has already been sketched, ratified, and sent for production.

[Kovalev] What is the ethnic make-up of the republic's KGB organs?

[Ivanchin] Officers of more than 20 nationalities serve with us. More than half of them are representatives of indigenous peoples: Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, Tajiks, Kazakhs. The principles of military service envision constant rotation of cadres. Many native Uzbeks have worked and work today in the state security organs of Moscow, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the oblasts of the Russian Federation, and other republics. In turn officers come to us from other regions of the country. That is normal for military service.

We especially emphasize that the USSR KGB has already devoted a great deal of attention specifically to questions of training cadres from among indigenous peoples of the Union and autonomous republics and sending the most promising of them to the central apparatus. The overwhelming majority of our leaders have followed that path.

[Kovalev] How often do you report to the president of the Uzbek SSR on KGB activities? And who else do you report to?

[Ivanchin] Information analysis work is one of the most important directions of the committee's activities. Our conclusions and assessments are regularly presented to the leaders of the republic and the country. Today this work has risen to a new, higher-quality level. We try to better and more fully inform the republic's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the materials obtained by the KGB on the most important elements of the operational situation which is taking shape and the negative processes going on which may lead to mass or

group antisocial phenomena. Nor do the local soviets of people's deputies remain uninformed.

[Kovalev] Are there "scales" by which we could evaluate, even roughly, the effectiveness of your department's activity?

[Ivanchin] Of course there are. Judge for yourself. Subversive actions of dozens of intelligence officers and agents of foreign special services have been localized from among the foreigners in the republic. More than 200 situations have been prevented from developing at enterprises and institutions which might have resulted in emergencies or negative group demonstrations. As for contraband cases, currency and material assets worth more than one million rubles were confiscated and turned into state income last year alone. Various ministries and departments were given aid and assistance in protecting the republic's foreign economic interests, and that saved substantial hard currency and other resources.

Along with Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we stopped the criminal activity of 20 major gangs who were involved in extortion using cold weapons and firearms and threatened to murder their victims or kidnap their children. Seventy criminals were brought to criminal responsibility and a substantial quantity of firearms, ammunition, and explosives and narcotic substances were confiscated from them. In two cases terrorists' intentions to seize and hijack Aeroflot planes with passengers abroad were thwarted. The KGB continually helps other law enforcement organs prevent and localize mass riots and identify the organizers and active participants of illegal extremist group actions. After the well-known Fergana events alone, materials on more than 500 such persons were handed over to procuracy organs.

An enormous amount of work has been done to rehabilitate citizens who were illegally repressed in the 1930s-1940s and early 1950s. We reviewed 12,672 files involving 18,247 people. Of those 17,914 people were rehabilitated, and in the rest the sentences remained in force.

Everything listed as well as a great deal of work along the lines of intelligence, guarding the southern borders of the USSR, preventing accidents at enterprises of industry, aviation, railway and auto transport, communications, and life support objects—these are those "scales" which interest you. Do you really think that kind of work is unnecessary? Do you think that Chekists do not earn their bread?

[Kovalev] But all the same, have many spies or traitors, for example, been exposed in the years of perestroika?

[Ivanchin] As I already said, several dozen. You are obviously interested in specific examples. Certainly! Last year the activity of the embassy of one of the eastern states to set up a spy residence in Tashkent was cut short. The time has not come, to be sure, to give the name of the resident. But the resident of Pakistan can already be named—Abdulla Basit, now the former third secretary

of the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow. The assistant military attache of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow can be named too—Van Gandhi Daniel, who along with his wife actively tried to gather military intelligence during their stay in Samarkand. All these diplomatic spies were expelled from our country.

[Kovalev] Can you confirm that Chekists have always served and now serve the people?

[Ivanchin] Only the people can evaluate the activity of Chekists at all stages of the country's development; that is for them to say. But let me remind you that the spirit of the military oath is loyal service to the people and the Motherland. And only to them! No one has rescinded the oath. It should be fulfilled just as sacredly by all military people, including the officers of the organs and troops of the USSR KGB. And it is treated that way, with the exception of certain turncoats.

[Kovalev] When I looked over your department's archives, I was simply puzzled by the perfect condition of all the criminal files—there was not a speck of dust on them. Half a century has passed. Criminal files are valuable, granted, and historical, but still they are only paper. Do the Chekists treat the people who have fallen into the orbit of attention of the KGB as carefully?

[Ivanchin] Here you have to ask the opinion of the people again, especially those who were stopped by Chekists literally on the brink, just short of state crime, treason. How did they come to this point? Each one has his own story. But we are certain that today these people and their relatives and close friends are grateful to the Chekists who kept them from plunging into the abyss. If they agree, you will have the opportunity to talk with them.

But many of those who crossed the line (and that is the greatest failure in our work) hate us, of course. For that matter they hate not only us, the government, and our system. A feeling of love for their people and for their native land has atrophied in them too. But even in dealing with them, our investigators rigorously follow the demands of the law, above all the principle of presumption of innocence.

[Kovalev] What is the mortality rate of KGB associates at combat posts? Please give the names of the Chekists whose life and activity the republic's people can be proud of.

[Ivanchin] Fortunately, it is not high. In recent years two of our comrades died in fulfilling their international duty in Afghanistan. One received a gun wound during the tragic Fergana events.

The names of many Chekists whom the people can be proud of still cannot be published, alas—by virtue of state interests. The time is not far off, however, when the people will know all our legendary heroes. One of them is Bakhram Ibragimov, a famous son of the Uzbek people. A major Orientalist scholar who knew several foreign

languages, he became an associate of Soviet intelligence in the mid-1930s out of patriotic duty. He penetrated the residence of fascist German intelligence and won the trust of the heads of the pro-Hitler national Turkestan Committee and supplied exceptionally important information. In order to win even more trust, Ibragimov deliberately risked being arrested abroad on suspicion of participating in Hitler's intelligence. When he was in prison, even there he managed to organize the gathering and delivery of important military and political information to our intelligence center. In postwar years Ibragimov penetrated subunits of the American special services in the Middle East and made a large contribution to the cause of ensuring our country's state security. After he returned to the Motherland, he worked actively in patriotic indoctrination of youth till the last days of his life. One of Tashkent's streets where the Chekist intelligence officer lived is now named after him.

[Kovalev] It is an indisputable fact that journalists exposed a KGB associate for interfering in the work of the editorial office of an oblast newspaper. Several days later the oblast's leader invited the editor to his office and gave him a "tele" signed by the chief of the oblast KGB administration to read. It contained slander and lies. What is this, the Chekists' style of work too? If you want, I can give the exact address of the editorial office.

[Ivanchin] The case is by no means indisputable. Above all because the KGB did not interfere and does not interfere in the work of the mass information media. But let us look into your specific example.

In fact, on 22 December 1987 the oblast KGB administration sent a report entitled "On the Bad Situation in the Editorial Offices of Oblast Newspapers and the Printing Plant" to the founding organ of the oblast newspapers. Among other things it said that "there is virtually no guard or pass system in editorial offices and the printing plant"; "the teletype set up in an unequipped area can be used by anyone who wants because of the negligent attitude of the operators toward their duties"; "matters are no better with the reader mail and materials prepared for press"; and the like. The same and even more serious shortcomings of an organizational nature were discovered at the printing plant too.

The Uzbek KGB associate who was the author of this information, and, incidentally, a former journalist, came to the conclusion that organizational violations were possible because of the unfavorable moral-psychological climate which had taken shape in editorial offices. The editor obviously took that to be "slander and lies." We agree that questions of morals are not the prerogative of the KGB organs. However, we believe that our evaluation is in no way interference in the editorial office's work.

[Kovalev] Three years ago an associate of the republic KGB (I can tell you his last name) tried to recruit me. He tried to "win me over" so I would give him information on the activities of Ministry of Internal Affairs

employees, since I often dealt with them in fulfilling my editorial assignments. Is the institution of informers a harsh necessity or does it show the impotence of Chekists? And is it ethical to maintain it? Informers are living people. But we must not forget the moral core of their souls.

[Ivanchin] Yes, our associate met with you several times in 1987. He explained that he was talking with you on a question that interested him and you believed that he was trying to recruit you. But we regard it this way: our associate made a mistake in work, not because he failed to recruit you, but because after talking with him you did not understand his intentions and were convinced that the KGB wanted to include you in the "informer detachment."

I do not feel like polemicizing on the rest of the aspects of the issue. There has been so much talk on that already, all the way up to the podium of the USSR Parliament. But we say once again that there is no institution of paid agents or institution of secret informers in the KGB organs today. In many cases we rely on the help of Soviet people, but this help is not for profit; it is patriotic in nature and based on citizens' understanding their duty to participate in defending the country's security.

And one more thing. It is not society which exists for the KGB, but the KGB for society. And whom should we turn to for help if not to our own people, whom we are a part of and with whom we are tied by living threads? Or should we turn to the CIA, the FBI, the mafia bigwigs, or the slick operators of the shadow economy?

[Kovalev] What do you think the future of the KGB organs will be like?

[Ivanchin] There are special services in any country; they will operate while a state exists which needs to be protected, and that includes using special forces and means. But both the Law on the KGB, a draft of which has been sent for first reading to the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Law on State Security, which is being developed by legislators and which will provide the concept of this important area of our life, will determine the future of our country's security organs. It is these laws which will determine not only the future of the KGB organs as a subject, but also the country's security system as a whole.

[Kovalev] What sins would the KGB like to repent for before the people?

[Ivanchin] That is not an original question. Some people simply pose it to the KGB workers, and others demand repentance from them, while still others try to lay the blame for the Stalinist repressions not only on the present generation of Chekists, but even on the buildings where they work. All this is nothing new in principle, since history knows how the *veche* [popular assembly in medieval Russian towns] bells were beaten with whips and sent into exile under military guard.

But once again we say the workers of the USSR KGB, which was formed in March 1954, have nothing to repent for before the people. There are no persons among them who participated in carrying out Stalinist repressions. Any attempts to transgress Soviet laws which took place in the work of some of our associates were immediately stopped. As for Article 70 of the Criminal Code, it was not our committee which adopted it as law. Our committee carried it out. It was the procurator's office and the people's court who detained and tried dissidents.

If we do have something to repent for before the people, it is that the Chekists did not find the turncoats and outright traitors in their own ranks. For that cannot be called just a failure in our work.

Instead of Commentary

The questions were used up. I received the answers to them on the day the republic's people's deputy and chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Defense, State Security, and Social Protection of Military, Vilor Niyazmatov, met with the Chekists. Journalists participated in the meeting too. Useful talk took place on the life and affairs of Chekists and their concerns and needs.

Yes, there is a service and there are people. Service in the KGB is round the clock and universal—on land, in the air, and on water, under any weather conditions. People are trained for daily difficult, intense work. At any moment they may find themselves in a situation which no instructions can foresee nor the most refined computer predict. That is so!

However, there are some cases which do not become the state security organs. The bitterness, the insult, and the humiliation which many unconventional thinkers have experienced has turned into hatred. Let us recall Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Galich, Nekrasov. And these people, who gave others purity and light, had dirt thrown in their faces. And what is the vindication? We were following the law! That is not convincing. For both Yezhov and Beriia also wrecked human fates, relying on Article 58 of the Criminal Code. But their actions have now been officially condemned and the millions who suffered have been rehabilitated. Even many dissidents have gotten their good names back.

But the bitterness of the former state security associate, M. Lyubimov, is understandable; on the pages of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA he was talking about his colleagues and exclaimed: "... Nonetheless there were a lot of decent people around, and there are a lot now, and it is a great pity when some people portray all KGB associates as 'stupid hacks.'" Yes, there are an awfully lot of loudmouths and slanderers these days. And they do not have an aversion to using the most refined demagoguery and the most antidemocratic and at times even criminal means for their own ends.

And here it is difficult not to agree with V. R. Niyazmatov, who said to the Chekists: "The actions of

the state security organs to expose and cut off spy networks and various abuses and violations of the law do not always receive the proper evaluation on the part of the public. People simply do not know anything and believe rumors. We must overcome the wrong ideas which exist among the population concerning the KGB organs' activities and the opinions that they serve only the powers that be. That is certainly not so. I know that a time will come when we will put up dozens of monuments to the Chekists. We people's deputies and journalists of the republic will silence the slanderous voices against you. You will always find help from us. But you must be open with the people too."

It is for the readers to judge the degree of sincerity and truth, for example, of the answers to my questions. But were the arguments on the question of the KGB interference in the work of the press organs really straightforward? Of course not. The very fact they sent an "essay" confirms interference. The fact that the Chekist responded after the journalists exposed him gives rise to sad thoughts. He was insulted, got angry, and decided to get the newspapermen. It is good that the party obkom understood that too.

The answer to the question about informers also disturbs me. Dozens of truthful articles and frank confessions of "patriots" confirm the existence of the institution of informers. "I provided information on events, and very rarely on people..." That was the title of one of the last confessions which the deputy of the Saratov Oblsovet, journalist G. Akhtyrko, made in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. So why the slyness, the evasions, and the attempts to pass off black for white? Incidentally, the KGB associate who tried to entice me into the informers' swamp tried to recruit other people too, even using compromising material gathered beforehand to do so. He failed, however, and Viktor Leonidovich knows the names of those who "suffered"—you can check it.

And the last thing. I profoundly believe those who like M. Lyubimov assert that there are many decent people in the KGB. It may be that they are in the majority. But, you must agree, decency must be shown not selectively, but always and in everything. I will explain why I say that.

Vilor Rakhmatullayevich told about an Armenian officer Nazarov, who was defamed for four years but, as it turned out, unfairly. After the deputies intervened, all his rights were restored to him and he continues in the service. The question of the fate of B. Tursunov also arose; he "manned a plow" in the KGB for 10 years and then just as long in the MVD, but after that he fell into disgrace and he has been hassled for over a year now—unfairly, out of prejudice, and relying on denunciations. And when the official part of the meeting was over, several Chekists came up to Niyazmatov and to me and said quietly: "That is right. Batyr Radzhabovich must be defended." And that was all. And they retreated quietly.

When someone is drowning, people on shore rush to help without thinking—excellent swimmers and not very skillful ones alike. One thing motivates them all—saving the person. But tell me, esteemed Chekists, is it really less dangerous when it is beyond a person's strength to flounder in the abyss of a labor conflict, when his fate is being ruined and his faith in decency and the law is being crushed? So then why doesn't the idea that they not simply can but must offer him a helping hand come to the kind and in all regards fine people who were around Tursunov, who worked with him? Then the insult would

not remain a black spot in memory, and the man would not despair. Remember, Niyazmatov also gave an opinion on this question: "There are people who constantly talk about social protection and aid to the military, but when the matter concerns a particular person and his fate, they forget their words."

I shall end with a request: I earnestly ask the Chekists to arrange a meeting with those whom they managed to keep from falling into the abyss of treason. This is an extremely important subject.

Demographer Cites Statistics on Aging Soviet Society

91UN0507A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 49, 8 Dec 90 p 6

[Article by Mark Tolts, demographer, under the rubric:
"Private Life in the Mirror of Statistics:" "At Dusk"]

[Text] The population of our country is aging. This is visible to the naked eye—on the street, in shops, and in public transit.

By 1959, when the first postwar census of the population was held, 19.7 million people had crossed the 60-year line. The 1989 census indicated that the number of people of this age increased by a factor of more than two, to 40.6 million. In these 30 years, the percentage of such people in the populace also increased from 9.4 to 14.2.

The process of aging is developing with particular vigor in Russia, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic area. Those who are 60 or older account for 26.3 percent of the residents of Belorussian villages, whereas in the Tajik rural areas they account for 5.4 percent.

Our elderly are the generation that shouldered the entire burden of the war. Wartime losses are manifested virtually the most markedly in the development of the marital structure in these age groups. According to the data of the latest census, 88.1 percent of men and 54 percent of women were married in the 60 to 64 age bracket. Among those who are 70 or older the disparity is even more glaring—74 percent of men and only 17 percent of women. A retired single woman is a dominant figure in our life. Loneliness has become one of the habitual burdens of the old age.

Statistics prove convincingly that modern people refuse to consider the twilight of their lives a time of quiet dying away and the withering of interests. In the year 1988, preceding the census, approximately 69,000 men and more than 50,000 women who were 60 or older entered into marriages. A quite high number of divorces may also be considered an indication of activity of senior citizens; 31,000 men and more than 23,000 women of this age dissolved marriages which appeared unsuccessful to them.

In the few years to come, major changes are in store for us. The ratio of numbers of males and females in the final segment of life will become more healthy and natural. In 1989, there were 655 men per 1,000 women in the 60 to 64 age bracket, and 472 men among those between 65 and 69. The picture is entirely different in the generation now coming to replace them. In the 50 to 54 age bracket, there are 877 men per 1,000 women, and in the 55 to 59 age bracket, 810 men. Being doomed to loneliness by fate is becoming a thing of the past. Without risk of error, we may predict that thousands of senior citizens will be able to take advantage of this opportunity.

We should anticipate this and prepare for this. The need for housing will be different. The entire social support strategy should be different when we have to gear it to family couples rather than single older people. In Europe, which encountered the phenomenon of an aging populace before us, demographic problems associated with it are considered to be a priority.

Unfortunately, this is not the case in our country. Neglect of the elderly manifests itself not only on the daily round. For example, statisticians have traditionally entered marriages and divorces for those 60 and over "in a lump," without a detailed breakdown by age brackets, despite the obvious fact that people aged 60, 65, or 70 are different, and their lives proceed according to different rules. The practice of censuses is structured likewise, the only difference being that the age cutoff is shifted to "70 and older." Meanwhile, a good 17 million people end up in this category, and it would do us good to know more about them.

We frequently confuse marital and family status, despite the two being altogether different. As people grow older, the significance of both of them increases. The USSR State Committee for Statistics took two extensive surveys of young families (they have been discussed previously in our column). The contacts of the young spouses with their parents, that is, representatives of the middle-aged generation, were carefully traced. What about the elderly? Who do they live with, who helps them, and who do they help themselves? Alas, these questions were not even asked.

It seems to me that these were not random errors. No matter what the slogans proclaim, our society sort of "lets the cat out of the bag" through these small details and reveals its genuine rather than affected attitude toward the people. They are of some interest for as long as they are capable of work and have child-bearing potential. However, when you cannot get anything from them anymore...

We have a realistic opportunity to remedy this mistake. In 1985, what the specialists call a micro-census of the population was held, the records of which are indispensable for developing social programs. According to plans, the next such census should occur 10 years later. It is very important to hold it when scheduled, without being tempted by the illusive saving of funds, thus paying back all debts, including our debt to the elderly.

Reasons for Suicide Increase in USSR Examined

91US0151A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 8 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by V. Yunisov, special correspondent: "When Visiting God, There Are No Latenesses!"]

[Text] *Everyday some 60,000 persons commit suicide in our country. People! Don't be in such a hurry!*

What is happening to people? Direct your attention to railroad waiting-rooms, church squares and subway passage-ways: there has been a sharp increase in the number of poor people begging for charity and people without housing or employment. According to the forecasts of the economists, under such conditions whereby there is a precipitous inflation and bankruptcy of enterprises, there will be even more unemployment. Nor are the legal and medical experts happy about the consequences of the imminent conversion to a market-type economic system: they consider that, in the very near future, there will be an increase in the number of suicides. Even now the suicide statistics in the USSR are very, very alarming—every year 60,000 persons take their own lives. This is more than in the United States by a factor of approximately 2.5.

But, of course, what is really alarming is not this comparison with prosperous America, but the fact that in our country there are more people driven to this extreme point of despair, people who have lost all faith in a joyful, stable life, and who have put their neck in a noose...more of them than there are people killed by criminal elements.

People who have had merely a faith in a shining future and who have suddenly lost this faith simply cannot stand it.

The party and our state always used to condemn speculation, for example, as a social evil and all kinds of commerce as a bad sign of bourgeois morality. But nowadays there has been a shift of moral as well as economic values: the party—at times driven into a dead-end by unjustified attacks from the press—has itself engaged in commerce (joint enterprises within obkoms and various types of NTTM [young people's scientific and technical creativity] centers within Komsomol organs), whereas the state, agonizing and rent by contradictions, has given the "green light" to commerce. No, I do not personally condemn entrepreneurship as a new phenomenon in our life—perhaps it is the very leap which is very necessary these days. The cause of the trouble lies elsewhere: hundreds of persons will make the leap (they have engaged in this activity even previously—see Art. 154 of the RSFSR Law Code); but millions of persons will remain at the barrier of insuperability and unreachability because for them business is something alien and wild. And for them a market-type system is something dreadful, since they they again (again!) remain in the class of the poverty-stricken.

From a Letter to 'KOMсомOLKA'

"One of the principal reasons for my imminent suicide is the complete decay of what is going on. (I am omitting my own, endless contradictions or conflicts at home and in school). What have we come to? We are besmirching those individuals who were holy to us. Lenin, for example. Because, of course, up to very recently we were taught that Ilich was a symbol of happiness, that the revolution was carried out for our well-being. But what

about now? Nowadays every one who feels like it is writing or saying that Lenin was a tyrant and that the revolution was a great mistake. Our magic vase with its flowers of happiness has been smashed or shattered, so to speak, by accident, even though there is no new vase. And, even if there were, it would be made of plasticine or molded of something like that. We, or, more precisely, I, do not believe in anything nowadays. And people who have lost their ideals are becoming more and more harsh, cruel, and malicious. They are killing each other 'for kicks.' I'm afraid to live in this world, even more so alone. I want to die."

Valera I., age 16,

Kirov Oblast.

...Suicides, those who are brought to the point where there is no way out are persons who have never engaged in speculation, who neither desire nor know how to be businessmen under the new conditions. The universally known assertion that the majority of suicides are psychologically abnormal persons is false: from recent foreign and Soviet research in this field, as well as from letters to our editors, it is obvious that insane persons are in the minority among suicides. And, to be more precise, they constitute less than one-fourth of the total. After publishing the interview entitled: "I Want To Put an End to Myself..." (KOMсомOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 31 July 1990), we received about 1500 letters from persons who wished to "settle their account" with life but did not know how to do this quickly and painlessly. Many of them—healthy young persons—**proposed the introduction of a special service which would take upon itself the task of carrying out this joyless mission.** Others proposed that a special fund be organized for persons living alone and those who have become tired of life....

Who are they, these persons who have become disillusioned and are powerless to adjust or adapt themselves to life? An analysis of the mail which has arrived at our editorial offices shows that, basically, they comprise ill and very old people, single mothers, men between the ages of 30 and 40, and—most dreadful—girls between the ages of 15 and 16. It was noted, according to data compiled by the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], that there has been an increase in the number of suicides and attempts at suicide among children ranging in ages from 10 to 14.

In my opinion, the time has come when we must urgently introduce theology in schools because theology condemns suicide; we must also introduce lessons to instruct students about entrepreneurship and business. It is a very bitter thing when schoolchildren hang themselves—schoolchildren who have written creative compositions and who have exposed the bad morals and stagnation (a favorite word) of Prerevolutionary Russia and the scoundrels who forced Anna Karenina to throw herself under a train and Ostrovskiy's Katerina—into the river. And it is not merely bitter but also hypocritical to note the "exposure" of the environment around the two most

famous women-suicides in our country's literature. And what kind of environment do we have in our country nowadays?

From a Letter to 'KOMсомOLKA'

"I have three children—two sons who are already students and a daughter who is a schoolchild. I receive 100 rubles a month—there is no other assistance; I have no husband. We do not live; we just exist. My boys have been wearing the school uniform at school for two years now. And they are wearing these same trousers even now. There's no place where I can get shoes or trousers for them. The cooperatives probably have them, but what could I use for money?"

Nowadays I have the following obsessive thought: to poison myself and my children. Why should we live and torment ourselves? And here's something else that hurts: some other people, who do not work anywhere, rake in as much as 1500 rubles a month. They have chic clothing and food. Perhaps they also engage in speculation—that is fashionable nowadays and is not punished. The only trouble is that I am incapable of doing this."

Marina S.

Kurgan-Tyubinsk Oblast.

Aleksandr Zazybin, my colleague from Saratov, has examined the problem of suicides in his oblast and has even drawn up a table by age groups. Thus, during the first six months of 1990, he reports, 70 persons drowned in bodies of water, 84 burned to death in fires, 128 were killed in crimes, and 225 died in road accidents. **But 361 ended their lives by suicide!**

Let me repeat: it is not psychological illnesses which are the basic causes of mass suicide. Of 644 suicides in Saratov Oblast, only 30 had psychiatric causes, and during the year before last only 34 persons out of 648 were under treatment by psychiatrists. Furthermore, where is the guarantee that these 30 persons were abnormal people?

In a Moscow clinic for neuroses, for example, well-known but untraditional methods of treatment (acupuncture, reflex therapy, hypnosis, and auto-training) are very often employed on persons who have a fixed idea of doing away with themselves.

"We certainly do distract them from this obsessive thought, this fixed idea," states the psychiatrist Sergey Kananovich. "But the trouble is that there are no other analogous clinics in the Soviet Union. And what are people who live in 'very remote areas' to do? Where can they turn for help? I have a feeling that when our society entered the stage of perestroika, it became afflicted with a serious ailment: I would term it a 'penetrating neurosis,' which is connected with the gloomy social background, instability of the institution of the family, universal bitterness toward the country's leadership, which has been incapable of improving life for its own citizens.

Well, what is there to say when our pharmacies do not have the usual tranquilizers or any other means for removing stress? Because, after all, it is a well-known fact that a person commits suicide in an extreme state of agitation and excitement."

...Of course, 60,000 persons is a rounded-off figure. And even this is not the entire upper limit. For example, in 1984 there were more suicides in our country than in the entire Western world (including Europe, the United States, and Canada)—81,417 people! Then, during the years of "perestroika," when the people had some new hopes, there was a certain decline. A considerable role in this decline, was, perhaps, played by the anti-alcohol campaign, which was unleashed and failed during the years 1985-1986. In the last two or three years the suicide curve has turned sharply upward again. However, in patriarchal Russia, which was guided by untold ages by spirituality, and which condemned suicide as a sin, prior to the October 1917 coup ranked last in Europe with regard to the number of suicides. For each 100,000 of population there were only three-four suicidal outcomes per year. Nowadays there are 30. (According to UNESCO data, Finland has 25 suicides a year per 100,000 population, Japan—19, Sweden—18, Canada—14, the United States—12, Portugal—10, Italy—8, Mexico—1.7, Guatemala—0.5, Kuwait—1, and Egypt—0.5).

People usually say that the higher the living standards in a given country, the higher is the percentage of suicides. Permit me to disagree with this. I do not think that we have come to live 10 times better than at the beginning of this century, one which started out with wars, revolutions, Stolypin's reforms, and a mass decadence. The poet Dmitriy Merezhkovskiy at virtually every poetic soiree used to call for death, and anyone desiring to do so could, indeed, walk into a shop, purchase a pistol, and put a bullet into his head. However, the small-sized contingent of suicides, as shown by the Tsarist Russian statistics, was accounted for not by those who attended the soirees of the decadents, but by recruits, officers, and political prisoners.

In our own times nobody is calling for death, but, alas, there are incomparably more persons desiring to depart from this life. Moreover, this is true among all strata of the population. It must be admitted that Russia and the Baltic republics lead in this gloomy statistic; as reported by Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], this figure amounts to 29 persons per 100,000 of population per year. But in various oblasts and autonomus units this coefficient varies between alarming limits: in Ryazan Oblast it amounts to 17 persons per 100,000, in Arkhangelsk Oblast—70, in the Mari Republic—90, and in Udmurtia—100.

On an All-Union scale the suicide rate among men is three times that of women. However, in the Central Asian republics, women's suicide surpasses men's by a factor of 1.5. This fact is explained by the backward, right-less status of Eastern women.

In short, no matter what may be said, trouble has "entered our house."

We are killing each other.

We are killing ourselves.

But, alas, whereas the law-enforcement organs concern themselves with persons who have been killed and their killers, nobody is concerned with persons who raise their own hands against themselves and do away with their own lives. In general, the organs of the procuracy do not consider suicide to be a crime. In this case, Article 107 of the RSFSR Criminal Code ("Committing Suicide") is considered as a kind of empty formality. It is simply inoperative. Not a single jurist of my acquaintance, nor Police Colonel V. Vinogradov, who has been concerned with the problem of suicide all his life, can recall a single case where someone was indicted for bringing a person to the point of suicide and sentenced, as the article stipulates, for a term of up to five years. Staff members of a procuracy almost always brush aside such sinners (they have more than enough "cases" without these because there has been a sharp rise in the crime rate), whereas investigators—let me divulge a service secret—at times confused and having poor prospects for solving a particular homicide—write it off as a suicide. Such "cases," as a rule, are stored in the archives for about five years and then are burned as useless.

And thus are burned the souls of the deceased; also burned are the last threads, which, so to speak, connected them with us who have remained among the living. And nobody, not a single state or party bureaucrat studies the causes, the social and everyday conditions of those persons who were on the brink of suicide or who committed THIS ACT on themselves.

From a Letter to 'KOMSOVOLKA'

"How I envy those persons who have no children—they are free to depart from life at any time! But I do have children. Did I have the right to give birth to them at all, knowing that I could not provide for them materially? Probably not. I cannot even take my son south even once to warm his chronically ill bronchi. What am I to do when our life makes the transition to market-type prices? Expire from starvation? Because, you know, up to this point my children have not seen anything extra, and now we will have to switch entirely to bread and water. Unfortunately, my parents did not teach me how to steal and cheat. And that's a pity.

"I hate this life. I hate beauty contests and the [?] on which insane amounts of money are wasted. But what about us and our children! It's ludicrous! It's even more ludicrous that my children have never tasted bananas and only had oranges twice.

"If I decide to perform THIS ACT, I will kill my own children first."

Lyudmila, age 23.

Borisov.

The only thing that our nonspiritual and atheistic state is capable of is to automatically establish in the Goskomstat the number of suicides on the basis of the impersonal and indifferent data provided by the legal and medical experts. There is, to be sure, another organ which is studying this problem—the Suicide Study Center at the NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Psychiatry. But what can it accomplish and what kinds of recommendations can its learned scholars provide if 70 percent of suicides are not psychotic cases but simply ordinary Soviet people under extraordinary conditions of a moral and economic cataclysm? And whom, indeed, or what should people believe who have been brought up on the bright ideals of the party—people who believed and trusted in the industrial foundations of the world's most powerful state?

There is a feeling that people have been trained and then cast away, that something of the utmost importance has been stolen and taken from them, something for which it is was worthwhile living. And now they must engage in private business in order to survive. No wonder that the number of suicides will continue to increase in the immediate future; and who will be responsible for this?

But, after all, we are "forever responsible for all those persons whom we have trained," said a great Frenchman.

FROM THE EDITORS

We suggest that those of our readers for whom things are very bad pause for a moment and not take that last step in their lives. Write a letter to the editors about yourself and about your problems. We will turn it over to a highly skilled psychologist who will reply to you and give you the necessary advice. And today we include our telephone number 257-22-45, and we await calls from those persons who KNOW, WHAT to do and HOW to survive under the present-day conditions. Please call between 1200 and 1600 hours.

Poor Conditions in USSR Institutions for Elderly Reported

91US0157A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 8 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by N. Kozlova: "Forgotten Consciences: A Bitter Report"]

[Text] The column stretched like a gray snake along the rural road. Everything was frightening, as in a faded newsreel from years long ago. The first thought was, "Where have they all come from?" Are they prisoners of war? Or prisoners released from concentration camps? All are wearing identical flannelette housecoats of the same dirty color, and gray standard-issue shirts with smeared lettering stamped near the throat. All had emaciated faces staring into space. The serene gray sky and the bright

autumn flares of the poplars only emphasized the nightmare of what was going on. Suddenly the column broke off its monotonous rhythm, people stopped, and then they began to shift from foot to foot, talking incoherently. Heads turned in one direction. It took me a while to realize that the smell of meat was wafting from a dining hall.

A menacing shout from a portly guy quickly got the gray housecoats moving. Stumbling over one another, these strange people started moving ahead until they disappeared behind a turn in the road. In response to my question of who they were, a woman who was passing by sighed and said, "They're taking the poor souls from the poorhouse to the bath house. I hope to God that I don't have to live like this..."

Boarding homes. Places where old single men and women, in quiet and peace under the vigilant eye of sympathetic medics, rest after a difficult life. A picture taken from the movie and television screen, a picture that has become a cliché. We have become accustomed to it. But in recent years we have been surprised to learn that everything is not going well there. In fact, things are even very poor. We remember these places infrequently. But this is an entire world. The world of age...

It has turned out that the attempt was made to open up the boarding homes somewhere far away from cities and settlements. It would seem that the explanation for this is very convincing—the quiet and the fresh air there are just what old people need. Actually, the isolation provided the opportunity to avoid observation by outsiders when not only building, but also reinforcing, in the country an inhumanitarian system that turns into a hell the last years of our old people's life.

Believe me when I say that this is no journalist's fantasy. The Vypovskiy Psychoneurological Boarding Home is located in Vladimir Oblast. For many decades it has been living without a telephone, without roads. The rain and the snow make the surrounding dirt roads impassable for ten months of the year. The only way that people can get here or that visitors and food supplies can be delivered is by tractor. But if there is nothing to deliver or if there is other work to be done, then nothing is brought in.

Hunger is today's reality for the boarding homes. I happened to be on an official trip to Kursk recently. There an inspection by the procurator's office at a boarding home in the oblast center itself showed that, from the beginning of the year, tens of thousands of kilograms of fruit, juices, and vegetables had not been delivered to the old people. Moreover, they had not even had simple potatoes for a month and a half. The daily allotment by the government to feed each old person was only one and a half rubles. It was necessary to think of ways to divide that miserly sum into four meals a day. An inspection of the old people's homes in Kazakhstan provided convincing proof that clear-thinking heads exist. They successfully "economize" in the calorie content of the poor people's soup, at best, by 50-60 percent.

Such a concept as dietetic or therapeutic nutrition is completely unknown in our boarding homes.

Thievery is rampant in the boarding homes. The materials provided by the infrequent inspections of boarding homes always—that's right, always!—indicate the under investment of products. As a rule, these products are meat, sugar, and sausage. Then all of this is found in the subsidiary buildings. In hundreds of kilograms and dozens of bundles and cans. The guilty individuals—and this also is the rule—are punished by being given a reprimand. Sometimes the losses are repaid, but the law-enforcement agencies are never informed.

The ambulatory old people are not fed, but it is absolutely awful to write about those who are confined to their beds. In Vladimir Oblast, the administrators of the Sobinskiy Boarding Home, in a completely unthinking and mean way, put metal soup bowls on the chest of immobile people. Perhaps they were cynically attempting to say, "Bon appetit!" Old people who were seriously ill spilled the soup all over themselves and the bedding... Last year a state committee asked the elderly people how they were being fed. More than half of them stated that they were constantly hungry.

There exist more than just one governmental decree about the providing of medical assistance to old and disabled people. But no one has executed them or intends to execute them. In Russia the staffing rate for medics provided to homes for the aged varies between 30 and 60 percent. True, many boarding homes can brag of a schedule according to which the physicians from the rayon hospitals examine the old people. But that is on paper, which tolerates everything. Actually, however, the schedules are not observed. And even if a physician does come, he stays for only a moment. Is it really normal to think that a person can examine approximately a hundred people in one or two hours? Add to that the chronic lack of medicines, prosthetic devices, and wheelchairs.

The overloading of buildings that often have been adapted from other purposes has become the norm. In Amur and Chelyabinsk oblasts, in Buryatia, Udmurtia, and Kalmykia, two to three square meters of housing area are allowed for each old person.

The situation is getting to a point where bed linen is becoming a luxury. In Vitebsk Oblast, oilcloth is put on top of the mattresses instead of sheets. New beds, tables, and television sets most frequently remain at the homes of the employees of the boarding homes. The lack of punishment encourages the appetites of the dishonest individuals.

Karaganda Oblast is no exception, but is the rule, in this regard. According to the standard, the Karakalinskiy Boarding Home is supposed to have more than a hundred warm overcoats and light topcoats. Actually the boarding home does not have even one! For the long days of autumn and winter, the old people there are deprived of the opportunity to even breathe fresh air. In the Tikhonovskiy Boarding Home, out of almost two

hundred men's overcoats there are only four, and out of 250 women's overcoats, only 70.

The stripping of old people down to their last threads has long been a widespread phenomenon throughout the country. Literally everything is taken away from them. Ye. Kudrya, housekeeper-nurse at the Bezmyatezhenskiy Boarding Home in Kharkov Oblast, took away clothing and shoses by the dozens and hundreds. In Moscow Oblast, housekeeper-nurse Lisyakova took from the Yegoryevskiy Boarding Homes underwear and clothing with a value of thousands of rubles. Two hundred fifty dresses alone, and more than 70 nightgowns. She even took off the old women's heads at least 129 kerchiefs. She didn't leave a single kerchief behind. The other housekeeper-nurses at Yegoryevskiy Boarding Home have not been lagging behind her.

The dirt, poverty, and semistarvation conditions are the breeding grounds for diseases. In Brest, E. coli was found on the hands of almost all the personnel. And also, naturally, in the food. Inspections also revealed typhoid fever in Chervenskiy Boarding Home, and pediculosis in the Dzhabulskiy Boarding Home. As it is during war-time, the scourge of these places is lice. For months on end, the old people are not issued even a piece of the soap that completely fills the subsidiary buildings.

There is no need to go far for examples: in the RSFSR, every eleventh boarding home lacks plumbing.

But a real tragedy for the old people is the criminals. It has already been more than a year since the country's Council of Ministers enacted the decree according to which those who have been previously sentenced are to be kept separately. But absolutely no action has been taken yet. The UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] put into the Makeyevskiy Boarding Home at a single time 70 criminals, including especially dangerous repeat offenders. A situation of the most real terror surrounds the old and defenseless people. In the past two years, in Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, 15 people have died from the hands of criminals in boarding homes. But how many victims of violence, how many people beaten up, how many people injured have there been! In this situation, the administrators, as a rule, remain silent. But when it becomes a matter of whom to deal with, many boarding homes set up jails, where they put old people, regardless of how sick they may be.

People are sitting on the cement floor of a narrow, dirty corridor. Some of them lie curled up on the floor near their beds. These are old people at the Olshanskiy Psychoneurological Boarding Home, Kursk Oblast. But no one writes angry reports about them. The personnel at the boarding home do not rip the telephones off the wall. Everything is normal. It's just that there isn't any furniture...

Our social security system has completely had its day. This is attested to by the fact that, at a session of the board of the USSR Procuracy, when speaking about the elderly, speakers constantly emphasize that the people

living in boarding homes constitute the category of our citizens that is the most unprotected in the legal and everyday-living senses.

The facts that I have cited here were mentioned at that session at USSR Procuracy. They are facts from today, not from the "era of stagnation." Are we really going to allow them to continue into the future? Are we really not going to protect those who gave us life and who protected us in that life by their own present adversities?

A country's level of culture is measured by the standard of living of its old people. In our country it is simply shameful to talk about any level at all.

Old people will not go out into the streets carrying posters. They cannot declare a strike. All they can do is wait. Wait for our help. From everyone individually and from the state. Will we help them? Or will we pretend to?...

Law Protecting USSR Invalids Published

91US0166A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Dec 90
Second Edition p 4

[Text of USSR law: "On the Foundation for Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR" signed by President of the USSR M. Gorbachev in Moscow, 11 December 1990]

[Text] This Law defines the foundations for the state policy respecting invalids in order to ensure them equal possibilities with all other citizens of the USSR in exercising their rights and freedoms, removing barriers in their daily life, and creating favorable conditions for leading a full life, actively participating in society's economic and political life, and fulfilling their civic duties.

The state carries out measures to protect public health, prevent disabilities and create conditions for integrating invalids into society.

I. General Principles

Article 1. Basic Legal Position of Invalids

Invalids in the USSR enjoy the full range of social-economic and personal rights and freedoms ensured by the USSR Constitution, the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics, and other legislative acts of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

Discrimination against invalids is prohibited and is punishable by law.

Article 2. Definition of the Concept of "Invalid"

An invalid is a person who needs social assistance and protection in connection with a limited active life due to physical or mental handicaps.

The limitation on a person's active life is expressed in their total or partial loss of the ability or potential for self-care, mobility, orientation, social interaction, and control over their behavior, as well as the ability to engage in labor.

A person is certified as an invalid under the established procedure by duly authorized government agencies.

Article 3. Social Protection of Invalids

In ensuring the social protection of invalids, the government creates for them the necessary conditions for personal development and realization of their creative and productive potential and abilities by considering their needs in appropriate government programs and providing social assistance in legally established ways in order to remove barriers to invalids' enjoyment of their rights to health protection, labor, education and professional training, housing and other social-economic rights.

The government establishes additional guarantees for invalids to ensure their rights and lawful interests; it also exhibits particular concern for handicapped children.

The special benefits for invalids and families with an invalid in the allocation, acquisition and construction of housing and its use are defined by the housing legislation of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics

Article 4. Protection of the Rights, Freedoms and Lawful Interests of Invalids

Protection of the rights, freedoms and lawful interests of invalids is ensured by the government in a legal or other fashion established by law.

A citizen has the right to legally challenge the decision of an authorized government agency regarding his recognition or nonrecognition as an invalid.

Government officials and other citizens guilty of violating invalids' rights, freedoms and lawful interests bear legally established material, disciplinary, administrative and criminal liability.

Article 5. Participation of Public Organizations and Citizens in Preparing and Adopting Decisions on Invalids' Problems

Public organizations participate in accordance with their charters in solving problems related to the social protection of invalids, and in financing corresponding measures.

Government agencies, as well as enterprises, institutions and organizations, regardless of their forms of ownership and management (referred to hereafter as "enterprises, institutions and organizations"), involve representatives of public organizations of invalids in preparing and adopting appropriate decisions in resolving questions affecting invalids' interests.

Invalids and their legal representatives have the right to participate in making decisions directly affecting their interests, and to obtain necessary information.

Article 6. Legislation on Social Protection of Invalids

Legislation of the Union of SSR defines the following, if not provided otherwise in the Union Treaty:

- the principles for social protection of invalids regardless of their place of residence within the USSR;
- the procedure and conditions for providing invalids with minimal social assistance from the national budget, with allowance for the price index level;
- the procedure for establishing and financing national programs for social protection of invalids;
- the basic principles for ensuring the upbringing, general education and professional training of invalids, their employment and labor protection.

The laws of the union and autonomous republics regulate all public relations in the area of social protection of invalids, with the exception of questions specified in the first part of this article.

Article 7. International Treaties of the USSR Relating to the Social Protection of Invalids

If an international treaty of the USSR establishes other rules than those provided in this Law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply.

II. Creating the Conditions for Invalids' Unimpeded Access to Social Infrastructure Facilities

Article 8. Ensuring Invalids' Access to Residential Buildings and Other Social Infrastructure Facilities

Government agencies, enterprises, institutions and organizations create the conditions for invalids (including those using wheelchairs and seeing-eye dogs) to have access to residential, social and production buildings, structures and facilities; unimpeded use of public transportation, transport, communications and information media; and free orientation and movement.

Article 9. Considering Invalids' Needs When Designing and Building Social Infrastructure Facilities

The design and construction of population centers; layout of residential districts; implementation of design decisions; construction and reconstruction of buildings and structures, including airports, railroad stations, sea and river ports, complexes and communications; and design and manufacture of transportation equipment, including personal vehicles and communications and information facilities, without the adaptation of such facilities and equipment for access and use by invalids, is prohibited.

Article 10. Adapting Existing Social Infrastructure Facilities for Use by Invalids

Existing transportation, communication, information and other social infrastructure facilities (articles 8 and 9)

must be adapted for access and use by invalids under the procedure and conditions defined by the respective union, republic and local agencies of government control and management with the participation of public organizations of invalids.

In those cases where such facilities cannot be adapted for invalid access, the appropriate enterprises, institutions and organizations must elaborate and carry out the necessary measures to ensure that invalids' needs are provided for.

Article 11. Adapting Residential Buildings for Access and Use by Invalids

Residential buildings occupied by invalids or by families with an invalid must be fitted with special devices and equipment in accordance with invalids' individual rehabilitation program.

Such residential buildings shall be so equipped by local soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, institutions and organizations managing the housing stock. Individual residential buildings shall be equipped under the procedure defined by the appropriate soviets of people's deputies with the participation of public organizations of invalids.

The procedure for financing such measures is defined by the laws of the union and autonomous republics.

Article 12. Economic Liability for Failure to Meet Obligations to Ensure Invalids' Access to Transportation and Other Social Infrastructure Facilities

Enterprises and organizations failing to carry out the measures stipulated by this Law to adapt existing transportation, communication, information and other social infrastructure facilities for access and use by invalids, shall assign to the appropriate budgets the funds necessary to meet invalids' needs, under the procedure established by the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

Such funds may only be used to implement measures to adapt social infrastructure facilities to invalids' needs.

Article 13. Ensuring Invalids' Access to Cultural and Entertainment Institutions and to Sports Facilities

Local agencies of government control and management must ensure invalids the necessary conditions for free access to and use of cultural and entertainment institutions and sports facilities and for engaging in physical exercise and sports, and shall ensure that special sports equipment is available.

Article 14. Participation of Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations in Financing the Construction, Equipment and Maintenance of Social and Cultural Institutions and Sports Facilities for Invalids

Enterprises, institutions and organizations have the right to assign funds to finance construction, acquire equipment and maintain social and cultural institutions and sports facilities for invalids. The funds directed to such purposes are exempt from taxation.

Article 15. Social and Everyday Services for Invalids

Social and everyday services for invalids, including the supply of foodstuffs and consumer goods and the provision of communal and other services, are provided under the procedure and conditions defined by local soviets of people's deputies with the participation of public organizations of invalids and social assistance institutions.

Article 16. Benefits for Enterprises and Organizations Producing Goods and Equipment for Invalids

Benefits shall be established for enterprises and organizations producing industrial goods and special technical and other equipment for invalids, as well as those specialized in providing services to invalids, under the procedure and conditions defined by the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics, and by decisions of local soviets of people's deputies.

III. Medical, Professional and Social Rehabilitation of Invalids

Article 17. The Tasks of Medical, Professional and Social Rehabilitation of Invalids

The government organizes and promotes the establishment and development of the system of medical, professional and social rehabilitation of invalids, which consists of a set of measures aimed at restoring or compensating for impaired or lost bodily functions or the ability to care for oneself or perform various types of professional activity, as well as measures enabling invalids to lead a full life and ensuring them the realization of their rights and inherent abilities.

The government finances and organizes scientific research and training of specialists in the field of medical, professional and social rehabilitation of invalids and preventive care of disabilities.

Article 18. An Individual Invalid Rehabilitation Program

Medical, professional and social rehabilitation of invalids is carried out according to an individual rehabilitation program, defined based on a medical and social evaluation by government agencies authorized for this purpose by rayon and city soviets of people's deputies, with the participation of representatives of public organizations of invalids.

The individual rehabilitation program recommended for an invalid includes a definition of the specific amounts, types and durations of rehabilitation measures, and the types of social assistance.

Article 19. The Mandatory Nature of the Individual Rehabilitation Program

The individual rehabilitation program presented by the invalid is a document which must be implemented by the appropriate government agencies, as well as enterprises, institutions and organizations.

Article 20. Institutions Providing Rehabilitation of Invalids

Republic and local agencies take into consideration invalids' needs for rehabilitation assistance as well as local conditions in setting up a network of rehabilitation centers, including scientific production centers, departments for recovery care in outpatient and inpatient treatment and preventive care facilities, specialized sanatorium and resort facilities, and specialized enterprises and institutions for offering social and everyday services to invalids.

IV. Education and Professional Training of Invalids

Article 21. Providing Invalids Conditions For Obtaining Education and Professional Training

The state guarantees invalids the necessary conditions for obtaining education and professional training.

Public education agencies, together with public health and social welfare agencies, must ensure preschool and out-of-school education of invalid children, and the opportunity for invalids to receive general middle, special middle and higher education in accordance with their individual rehabilitation program.

Article 22. Preschool Education of Invalid Children

Conditions shall be created in general preschool institutions to accommodate invalid children in order to create the most favorable possibilities for their education and provide them the necessary rehabilitation assistance.

Special preschool institutions shall be created for invalid children whose health condition prohibits them from attending general preschool institutions.

Article 23. General Middle, Special Middle and Higher Education of Invalids

General middle, special middle and higher education of invalids takes place in general educational institutions, and in special educational institutions where necessary.

Courses are also organized for invalid children undergoing treatment in inpatient and preventive care facilities or rehabilitation institutions.

Article 24. Education and Training of Invalid Children At Home

Where it is not possible to provide education and training of invalid children in general or special preschool institutions and educational institutions, and taking into consideration the parents' wishes, education and training is provided at home. In such a case, one of the parents or a person taking their place shall be provided material assistance and benefits under the

procedure and conditions defined by the laws of the union and autonomous republics.

The appropriate teaching and educational institutions provide assistance to parents in teaching invalid children at home.

Article 25. Out-of-School Education of Invalid Children

For the comprehensive and harmonious development of invalid children and to foster their social activity, interest in work and access to science, technology, art and sports, public education and other government agencies must create the necessary conditions to ensure invalid children access to out-of-school education.

Article 26. Education and Training of Invalid Children in Inpatient Institutions

Invalid children permanently residing in inpatient institutions are provided continuous education and upbringing by these institutions in organic connection with their social and working adaptation.

Article 27. Professional Training and Improving Invalids' Skills

Professional training and upgrading of invalids' skills are provided in educational institutions, at enterprises and in organizations (specialized or general-purpose) in coordination with social assistance agencies in accordance with the individual rehabilitation program.

Invalids are provided material assistance during the period of professional training and improvement of skills under the procedures and conditions defined by the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

Article 28. The Forms In Which Invalids Receive Education, Professional Training and Improvement of Skills

Education, professional training and improvement of skills are provided in various forms, including in class and by correspondence, external studies, and training in special groups and classes and by individualized curricula including instruction at home.

Article 29. Sign Language

The government recognizes sign language as a means of interpersonal communication.

The legal status and range of use of sign language are defined by laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

V. The Labor of Invalids

Article 30. Invalids' Realization of Their Right to Labor

For invalids to realize their creative and productive capabilities, and in consideration of their individual rehabilitation programs, they are ensured the right to work at enterprises, institutions and organizations with ordinary working conditions, at specialized enterprises,

and in workshops and departments using invalid labor, and to engage in individual and other labor activity not prohibited by law.

Refusal to conclude a work contract with or to promote an invalid, dismissal at management's initiative, and transfer of an invalid to another job without his agreement because of his disability are prohibited, except in cases where a medical and social evaluation has concluded that the state of his health prohibits him from performing his professional duties or threatens the health and safety of other persons.

Article 31. Ensuring Invalids' Employment

To ensure invalids' employment, government agencies with the participation of public organizations of invalids establish standards for reserving jobs for invalids at enterprises, institutions and organizations amounting to not less than five percent of the work force (not less than 20 persons) under the procedure defined by the laws of the union and autonomous republics.

Enterprises, institutions and organizations not providing reserved jobs for invalids or refusing to employ them shall compensate the local government agencies of control for the costs associated with finding jobs for invalids and providing them material assistance, under the procedure established by the laws of the union and autonomous republics.

Taking into consideration invalids' needs and local conditions, specialized enterprises, workshops and sections are created for the use of invalid labor.

Local government agencies of control and management provide the necessary assistance to invalids working at home, and to invalids engaged in individual labor activity, in obtaining nonresidential premises for such activity, acquiring raw materials and selling products.

Article 32. Working Conditions of Invalids

The necessary working conditions are created for invalids employed at enterprises, institutions and organizations in accordance with their individual rehabilitation program.

The working conditions, including pay scales and work and vacation schedules defined in a collective or individual labor contract, may not worsen the condition or infringe upon the rights of invalids relative to other workers.

Article 33. Privileges and Benefits for Enterprises Using Invalids' Labor

Enterprises, institutions and organizations in which not less than 30 percent of the workers are invalids are entitled to favorable tax treatment, financing and material-technical supply.

If invalids comprise over 50 percent of the total number of workers, the enterprises, institutions and organizations are exempt from paying taxes and making payments.

The order and conditions for preferential tax treatment, financing and material-technical supply of enterprises, institutions and organizations using and employing invalids are established by the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

VI. Social Assistance to Invalids

Article 34. Types of Social Assistance

Social assistance to invalids is provided in the form of monetary payments (pensions, benefits, one-time payments); the supply of technical and other equipment, including automobiles, wheelchairs, prosthetic-orthopedic devices, publications with special type, and sound amplification and signalling equipment; and the provision of services in medical, social and professional rehabilitation and everyday services.

The procedure for providing invalids with pensions and benefits is defined by the laws on pensions and social welfare.

The procedure for providing invalids free competent medical assistance is defined by the public health laws of the Union of SSR and the union republics.

Invalids are provided medicinal products and drugs and technical and other equipment, and provided everyday services, free of charge or under preferential conditions under the procedure established by the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

Article 35. Providing the Invalid With Equipment or Other Supplies

Equipment or other supplies are provided the invalid in accordance with the individual rehabilitation program free of charge or under preferential conditions.

If the equipment or other supplies specified by the individual rehabilitation program cannot be provided the invalid by a government agency, or if the invalid has acquired the appropriate equipment at his own expense, he is reimbursed under the procedure established by the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

Article 36. At-home Care. Inpatient Facilities for Social Assistance to Invalids

Social assistance agencies provide medical and everyday services at home or in inpatient facilities to invalids needing professional care and assistance.

The government promotes the development of a network of inpatient facilities for social assistance to invalids needing professional care.

Article 37. The Rights of Invalids in Boarding Houses and Other Inpatient Social Assistance Facilities

The conditions under which invalids reside in a boarding house or other inpatient social assistance facility must ensure the possibility for invalids to enjoy their rights and lawful interests and must promote the maximum satisfaction of personal needs.

Where rehabilitation measures have eliminated the need for an invalid to remain in a boarding house or other inpatient social assistance facility, local agencies of government control must provide him with satisfactory living space in accordance with the requirements of Article 11 of this Law.

Invalid children living in inpatient facilities who are orphans or are without parental care have the right to receive housing upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with their individual rehabilitation program, if such a program allows the person to care for himself and lead an independent life.

Article 38. Government Agencies Providing Social Assistance to Invalids

Social assistance to invalids is provided by local soviets of people's deputies, their executive and administrative agencies, agencies of social welfare, public health, public education, culture, physical education and sports, and other government agencies, based on the conclusions of a medical and social evaluation (by medical labor expert commissions, specialized evaluation services and medical consultation commissions) in accordance with the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

Article 39. Sources of Financing for Social Assistance

Social assistance is funded from union, republic and local budgets, as well as voluntary contributions of organizations and citizens.

Enterprises, institutions and organizations financing measures related to providing social assistance to invalids are provided tax benefits under the procedure and conditions defined by the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

VII. Public Organizations of Invalids

Article 40. Invalids' Right to Establish Public Organizations

To protect their rights and interests and provide mutual support and services, invalids and their representatives have the right to establish public organizations, including various funds, under the procedure established by the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

Quotas shall be established for public organizations of invalids in elections to agencies of government power and local self-government, if not provided otherwise by law.

Government agencies offer comprehensive support and assistance to public organizations of invalids and to organizations representing their interests.

Article 41. Benefits and Privileges Provided to Public Organizations of Invalids

Public organizations of invalids and their enterprises, institutions and organizations enjoy tax benefits and privileges under the procedures defined by the laws of the Union of SSR and the union and autonomous republics.

USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution Enacting Above Law on Invalids

*91US0166B Moscow PR 11 DA in Russian 16 Dec 90
Second Edition p 4*

[USSR Supreme Soviet decree: "On Enacting the USSR Law: 'On the Foundation for Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR'" signed by Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. Luk'yanov, Moscow, 11 Dec 1990]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees

1. The USSR Law "On the Foundation for Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR" shall go into effect on January 1, 1991, with the exception of provisions stipulated in articles 9, 10 and 12 of this Law.

2. The proposal is made to the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics to reconcile their laws with the USSR Law: "On the Foundation for Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR."

It is recommended that the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics adopt the appropriate laws based on the provisions of the USSR Law "On the Foundations for Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR."

3. It is decided that

(a) the provisions specified by Article 9 of the Law regarding the design and construction of population centers, the layout of residential areas, and the design of construction and reconstruction of buildings, structures, complexes and communications facilities, as well as for the manufacture of means of transportation, communication and information, shall enter into force on January 1, 1992.

(b) the provisions specified by Article 9 of the Law regarding the construction of social infrastructure facilities and the manufacture and purchase of means of transportation (communication and information) shall enter into force on January 1, 1993.

4. It is decided that the adaptation of all existing social infrastructure facilities for use by invalids (Article 10 of the Law), with the exception of the reequipment of buildings of railroad stations, sea and river ports, airports and intercity bus stations, must be completed by January 1, 2000. Operation of such facilities without equipment for use by invalids (including those using wheelchairs and seeing-eye dogs) after this date is prohibited.

The reequipment for access by invalids (including those using wheelchairs and seeing-eye dogs) of buildings of existing railroad stations, sea and river ports, airports and intercity bus stations must be initiated in 1991 and completed not later than January 1, 1995.

The equipment of trains with at least one car accessible to invalids (including those using wheelchairs and seeing-eye dogs), and the adaptation of individual airplanes and sea and river vessels for access by invalids, must be completed by January 1, 1993.

5. The provisions of Article 12 of the Law establishing the economic liability for nonfulfillment of the requirements for ensuring invalid access to transportation and other social infrastructure facilities go into effect according to the schedules established by articles 3 and 4 of this Decree.

6. It is recommended that the higher agencies of government control and management of the union and autonomous republics resolve the issues of:

- the schedule and procedures for organizing the network of rehabilitation centers stipulated by Article 20 of this Law, their financing, material-technical supply and staffing;
- the creation of supplies of inexpensive consumer goods and the procedure for their distribution to invalids as an important measure of their social protection under conditions of transition to a market;
- the offering of assistance to public organizations of invalids in creating and equipping specialized enterprises;
- improving the material-technical supply of enterprises of republic societies of invalids, and preserving and expanding long-term economic links with enterprises supplying them with products.

7. The USSR Council of Ministers shall by July 1, 1991:

- adopt a decision of the USSR government in accordance with the USSR Law "On the Foundations for Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR";
- ensure the review and repeal of USSR ministry, state committee and bureau directives in conflict with this Law;
- ensure that a Provision on the Individual Rehabilitation Program is worked out;
- ensure that a list is prepared of criteria for certifying a person as an invalid, paying special attention to invalids who, in their childhood were wounded, injured or mutilated during the Great Patriotic War;

- prepare suggestions on organizing the Union Fund for Social Protection of Invalids;
- define the concrete measures for social protection of invalids during the period of transition to a market economy.

8. The Concept for the Basic Directions of Government Policy on Disability Problems in the USSR presented by the USSR Council of Ministers shall be approved.

The USSR Council of Ministers, taking into consideration the provisions of this Law and of suggestions of USSR people's deputies, shall by July 1, 1991 approve measures to implement said concept, ensuring priority resolution of the following tasks within the next five years:

- organization of highly skilled medical and treatment assistance to invalids;
- training of specialists in rehabilitation and social welfare, including training abroad;
- creation of special jobs for invalids at enterprises, development of a network of specialized enterprises using invalid labor;
- development of scientifically sound standards and types of social assistance to persons in connection with disability; and
- provision of additional benefits to invalids in the use of railroad and other types of national transportation.

Journalist Supports Protecting Social Morality of Youth

91US01644 Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 Dec 90 p. 2

[Article by V. Konstantinov: "There Is Sex in Our Country! A Commentary"]

[Text] *The President of the USSR has signed a regulation entitled: "On Working Out Urgent Measures for Safeguarding Social Morality."*

The exclamation: "There is no sex in our country!" which became a classic statement by a female participant in the "television bridge," has been firmly refuted by the process of eroticizing our entire everyday life—a process which has been precipitously developing during recent months. Not only is there sex—it is everywhere in our country: in underground passageways, station waiting rooms, theaters where plays are shown, Sovuzpechat kiosks, movie theaters, and—it goes without saying—in videotheques. It is as if we have undertaken to prove to the entire world that we too have something to show.

Of course, it's a good thing that we have finally stopped puritanically pretending that we devote all our working time to building a brightly shining future and our leisure time to fighting for peace. We are persons, human beings, and nothing human is alien to us.

But the point is that the word "human" cannot be relegated merely to that which the anarchically evolved market offers us in video and other items. I myself was approached on Pushkin Square by someone trying to sell me for five rubles a treatise entitled: "One Hundred and Fifty Erotic Positions," which, for some reason, had been drawn by hand. That amounts to three kopecks per position. It's clear that the principal customers for all this trash are certainly not the fathers of families nor housewives, who, I fear, dream at night not about the secrets of the "Kama Sutra," but instead about the endless lines. Youths and children comprise the principal target of this sexual "attack."

Just a few days ago I dropped in at the "Ulan-Bator" movie theater, which was showing an "erotic motion-picture comedy" (that's the way it was described on the play-bill) entitled: "The Art of Love." I was shocked not so much by the bountifully presented charms of the Polish actresses, nor even by the lack of any sort plot. What was shocking was the reaction of the audience, which consisted of youths ranging in age from 12 to 16. The exclamation "Come on, bitch!" was the mildest and most decorous of all those which resounded during the showing. It all proves the correctness of the saying that degenerate movies form degenerate persons.

It's terrible and frightening. And what is terrible is not just that, by the age of 15, a young girl from Moscow or Sverdlovsk will know 150 erotic positions, but the fact that she will be sure that relations between a man and a woman boil down to the problem of how to begin and how to finish, that love is something like physical education. Therefore, in my opinion, the regulation signed by the President of the USSR will bring about a sigh of relief from many papas and mamas, as well as from cultural figures who have been sounding the alarm with regard to our running wild spiritually. Measures must be taken. The whole point is—what kinds of measures?

If we can expect a trite campaign of banning certain items or kinds of activity, we have already underground such a campaign and quite recently at that. The underground passageways and videtheques simply raise their prices and take their chances. To be sure, great hopes have been placed on the fact that N. N. Gubenko has been made head of the special commission, as well as on the fact that the President in his regulation has recommended that we take into account the experience of other countries in safeguarding social morality and in combating the porno business. As I managed to find out, the USSR Ministry of Culture, along with the commission, will most likely work out and submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet a draft law regulating the operation of videtheques on this country's territory and establishing responsibility for the dissemination of pornography. At the same time it is proposed that the President undertake a whole set of measures aimed at purifying the spiritual atmosphere of society.

And as to the recommended experience of other countries, the following facts are well known. There is no

opposition there to adults, independent persons, who for some reason or other prefer to become aroused in public places, even in movie theaters. But any developed country has set up laws providing a precise framework to safeguard young souls from "little clubs." [?] A magazine containing sexually explicit photographs should never be sold to a child. The idea of openly showing an erotic film through channels accessible to the general public should not even occur to anybody. There is a time and a place for everything.

And another point. I am personally convinced of the following: Only culture can crowd out anti-culture. The period of stagnation was bad; that's certainly correct. But why is it that certain films made at that time, e.g., "Nine Days of One Year," "The Cranes Are Flying," "We Will Live Until Monday," and "A Soldier's Father," entered into my soul and will remain there for the rest of my life? Why is it that nowadays our children do not know such works of art which would help them to distinguish the real thing from a parody, the truth from a lie, and love from filth? Why don't the stores carry books on this very same topic, but written by specialists, physicians, and professional educators? After all, you know, in the final analysis, and whether certain persons like it or not, there really is sex in our country.

Future of Uzbek Komsomol Assessed

91US01464 Tashkent KOMSOMOLISTS
UZBEKISTAN in Russian 7, 8 Nov 90

[Serialized article by Nishan Kakhkharov, instructor at the Institute for Improving the Qualifications of Party Activists and Cadres, attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of Uzbekistan: "Games Being Played With Youth or What Is To Become of the Uzbekistan Komsomol"]

[Text]

[7 Nov 90, p 2]

Two Categories

As the Komsomol—the most powerful youth organization in Uzbekistan—prepares for its 24th Congress, among the fundamental questions to be discussed will be: What kind of an organization is it going to be, and what should be the relations between the Komsomol and the Communist Party?

The second question, it might seem, can be dealt with only after having addressed the first one. In my view, however, the order of response should be reversed for the following reasons.

There is no need to demonstrate that the political situation in Uzbekistan differs from what is occurring in the Russian Federation or the Baltic, for example. The Communist Party of Uzbekistan remains the ruling party. Naturally, the process of democratization affects even it, as may be seen in changes now taking place in the

cadres. Among the cadres it is theoretically possible to distinguish two categories of party members. First, there are those communists in the ranks of the party and soviets who were at one time in the Komsomol but could not fit in with the carefully kept party and Komsomol nomenklatura. They had an opportunity to stand aside and observe the so-called leaders of the Komsomol. It is therefore understandable why even under the best of circumstances they should have a lack of confidence and trust in the present leaders of the Komsomol committees.

My experience of working for 11 years with Komsomol activists and cadres makes it possible for me to understand such an attitude. Unfortunately, until recently cadre policy has been carried out in such a way that the most promising and talented activists—the genuine leaders of youth—have not entered into the system of Komsomol cadres. As a rule they studied for a time at the Tashkent school for republic Komsomol members, and then disappeared from sight. That is, their Komsomol careers (in the good sense of the word) were discontinued. Meanwhile, the career path of other students, who were memorable chiefly for knowing how to adapt themselves, exploit the situation, and get along with certain people, was characterized by a steady rise in the service hierarchy. These are the ones who were subsequently to be seen studying in the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan.

The second category of senior officials working in party and soviet organs followed careers predicated on temporary duty in the Komsomol. These persons harbor no such antipathies to the Komsomol. Occasionally, they may even recall with satisfaction the days of their work in the Komsomol. But having learned in their time to look upon comrades in the party committees "from the bottom up," while expressing constant readiness to carry out their commands, they view with profound suspicion manifestations of ever greater independence on the part of the Komsomol committee leaders.

It would be all right if their attitude was limited to one of simple distrust. But at this point they are beginning to play games with young people. In an effort to come to terms with a new generation of Komsomol leaders—without having made any prior attempts to enter into a dialogue—they are resorting to the time-tested weapon of confrontation. Their only concern evidently is that alternative organizations will be competing with the Komsomol and "turning up their noses" at communism. What sort of organizations?

There are a number of options. The Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan (UFYU) is one such possibility. This organization has recently become somewhat revitalized. One gets the impression that it seeks access to the power structure. But contacts with these people are feasible only under two conditions—that they have fresh, original ideas to propose, and that they are willing to take a stand on the issues.

Other potential options are traceable to efforts allegedly being made by student youth groups to initiate alternatives to the Komsomol.

After the 'Breakup,' What Will Happen?

Generally speaking, in the opinion of some party and soviet leaders of the old stamp, there are quite a number of attempts of various kinds being made to break up the Komsomol just as it begins to become independent and exert a will of its own. Opponents may raise the question of proving its intentions. However, I am not a politician but a scholar whose basic task is to analyze and interpret the information I get from the youth scene in an effort to predict the future. For the benefit of those who are not in agreement with what is said above, I suggest treating this information as merely an attempt to predict the future. Or, better yet, behave like an ostrich who thinks he is safe after having hidden his head in the sand. For the rest of us, however, there is no way to avoid facing the following questions: If the republic Komsomol organization should fall, what will this mean for young people? For the party? And for our society?

Young people have much to lose as a result of the collapse of the Komsomol. They will be deprived, for example, of the relatively strong economic and social infrastructure that the Komsomol possesses. It is, of course, quite impossible to deny the continually increasing contributions of youth enterprises in resolving the problems of labor employment, in improving the material conditions of young men and women, in augmenting the intellectual potential, and in raising the technical level of arts and crafts. Who is to fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of a broad network of associations, clubs, and interest groups, both subsidized and self-supporting, under Komsomol sponsorship? It is impossible not to recognize the increasing role of the Komsomol in developing agencies and services of social and physical rehabilitation and in supporting legal services for young people. It is the Komsomol committees that have pioneered the development of social services for young people.

This is only a preliminary survey of what young people stand to lose. In principle, it may be objected, all these issues must be resolved by state agencies. But are they addressing them? And how can they come to terms with them? I do not know whether any amended version of the USSR Law on Youth Policy has yet been prepared by the republic Supreme Soviet or the government. But one thing I do know is that a draft has been worked out on instructions from, and under the sponsorship of, the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee.

One of the accusations directed at the present time at the Komsomol is that it has been changing from a social organization into a state-sponsored organization with its own committees on youth affairs under the aegis of state agencies. Until recently there has been a certain amount of truth to this accusation (although not through the fault of the Komsomol, but rather owing to an inability of the

power structure to resolve all the problems of youth). The existing system is one with cadres, fund allocations, forms, methods, and agencies interacting administratively. Only the Komsomol, however, is for the present in the position to address the problems of young people in a concerted and goal-directed manner.

[8 Nov 90, p 2]

The Question of Control

As for what the party stands to lose with the breakup of the Komsomol, well, in the first place, it is an organization supported by a single ideological platform. True, in the Komsomol as in the party itself, in my opinion there is no single viewpoint with respect to theoretical issues. There is no complete meeting of minds even on perestroika. But it is one thing for the party to sharpen its views in discussions with an organization that is loyal and close to it in its outlook, and quite another to contend with an alternative organization. Instead of discussion there would inevitably be a battle.

In our circumstances it is scarcely possible to have youth organizations analogous to those in the European part of the country, such as Social Democrat, Anarchist-Syndicalist, and the like. But on the basis of my own personal experience, I believe that there is a social basis for the emergence and broad-based support for Islamic or nationalistically oriented organizations by young men and women of local ethnic origins. Whatever the nature of it, society may be sure it could occur along the lines of events in Fergana and elsewhere in recent times. It is not, of course, inevitable that religious or nationalistic organizations would have extremist sentiments, but the fact that they would pose a political alternative to the party is obvious.

Does the foregoing assertion signify that the Komsomol should or could remain as it was? It is no longer as it was even as recently as a year ago. Admittedly, the changes are occurring too slowly and inconsistently. The trouble is that these changes are taking place only in the superstructure and are generally of little concern to rank-and-file Komsomol members anywhere. An indication of this may be seen in the degree of participation by members of the Komsomol in discussing the Uzbek Komsomol policy documents. Many Komsomol workers have not even read them, and only in certain of the primary organizations have they even been discussed.

Although submitted to the membership infrequently, the policy documents nevertheless give an idea of what the newly renovated Komsomol will be like. Advocates of the Komsomol as a political organization have appeared as well as those who advocate that it be a sociopolitical organization. For my part, I admit, it is more appealing to think of it as a political organization; for we declare in the title of the organization that the word "communist" is not simply pro forma or for looks. It signifies our

ideological and moral orientation. But it is one thing to declare this, and another thing to unblinkingly face reality.

It is no secret that the majority of members of the Uzbek Komsomol did not enter the organization in pursuit of political ideals. According to research data (not only in the USSR but abroad), only four-six percent of youth are interested in politics or inclined to take part in political activities, whereas presently the Komsomol comprises between 30 and 40 percent of the republic's young people. I am by no means optimistic in appraising the political potential of Komsomol workers and activists.

The republic Komsomol encountered tremendous difficulties in working out its policy documents, one of the reasons being the extremely limited number of scholars qualified to deal with matters pertaining to the youth movement. This dearth is indicative of the intellectual potential of the Komsomol. And although there has been a certain amount of progress made in the political activities of the Komsomol committees, such changes as there have been cannot be considered definitive.

Moreover, the question arises: If the Komsomol declares itself to be a political organization, what is to become of the rest of the membership who are nonpolitical? I believe the Komsomol bears a moral as well as a political responsibility for them and has no right to shunt to one side this category of its membership.

While considering it at the present time inexpedient to declare the Komsomol a political organization, I nevertheless remain an advocate of recognizing it as a sociopolitical organization. In this case the possibility remains of maintaining a broad spectrum of interests and activities within the framework of the Uzbek Komsomol. Despite the disinclination, unwillingness, or inability of the majority of the Komsomol membership to engage in political activity, the Komsomol committees from the raykom and gorkom level up are duty bound to express and defend the political interests of youth.

However, this requires an altogether different approach in forming the Komsomol committees, their elective offices, and executive bodies than is being followed at the present time. This problem is particularly pressing at the threshold of the 24th Congress of the Uzbek Communist Youth League. Before the congress convenes, the delegates and their constituents should define precisely their stands on the following issues. What kind of a body should the highest organ of the Komsomol be during the period between congresses? What tasks should it address? What functions or role should it perform? (Is it to be the usual kind of Central Committee consisting of more than a hundred members, or is it perhaps sufficient to choose a council to represent regional Komsomol organizations?) What should be the authority and functions of the executive body? (This might consist of a single secretary with a staff of his own and an apparatus to carry out specific program functions.)

Increasing the political functions and authority of elective and executive bodies necessitates changing the criteria for forming these bodies.

Komsomol Luddites

While speaking of the efforts to dissolve the Komsomol made by external forces, mention must also be made of the so-called Komsomol Luddites. [An organized band of embittered artisans in England during the early 19th century, the Luddites or Ludds tried to counter the industrial revolution by destroying newly introduced textile machinery.] There is a proposal to transform the Komsomol into the Union of Democratic Youth or to give it some other more democratic name. In the position taken by those who endorse this idea may be seen a serious breach of morality. Democracy presupposes pluralism of opinions and ideology. The Komsomol has repudiated the principle of establishing a monopoly over the youth movement, and it has acknowledged a right to independence for all those who are not satisfied with the goals, tasks, or activities of the All-Union Komsomol. It has allotted 5 million rubles to the fund for organizing the establishment of other youth groups. That is, if any Komsomol officials or activists or other members of the Komsomol are not in agreement with the activities of the All-union Komsomol or the Uzbek Komsomol, then no one denies them the right to resign from the Komsomol and create an organization of their own. Why then should the democrats deny the Communist Youth League a right to exist as well? Why should they set out to change the organization's name?

An answer to this question may be found by reviewing the proceedings of the 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress. One can only agree with the viewpoint of delegates who see such tactics as a Trojan Horse, encroaching upon the property of the Komsomol and posing a threat to its material base.

One of the main arguments of the dissidents is that the material base of the Komsomol represents property that belongs to all members of the All-Union Komsomol. Accordingly, if one element should separate itself from the Komsomol, it has the right to its own share of the property. In making this claim, they deliberately make no mention of the fact that this material base has been built not only with the material resources of today's Komsomol members but more importantly with those of all preceding generations.

It is noteworthy to observe one curious fact. The majority of dissidents present at the 24th Congress who advocated altering the name of the republic Komsomol proved to be one-time Komsomol officials. That is, they were people who, as distinct from rank-and-file members, in one way or another were returning what they had invested in the Komsomol. I do not rule out the possibility that having failed to fulfill themselves in the Komsomol, they hope to realize their goals in another organization. In any case, however, it would be more honorable for them to withdraw from the Komsomol

and establish an organization of their own than to lay claim to the property of those who subscribe to ideas they cannot accept.

Armenian Komsomol Changes Name

91US0132A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 45, 10 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by I. Verdiyán, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent in Yerevan: "Such Is Multiparty Life: Are They Fleeing the Komsomol as Fast as They Can Run?"]

[Text] Radical changes have occurred in the Armenian Komsomol. It is now called the Armenian Youth League [Soyuz molodezhi Armenii] following a decision by a recent republic Komsomol congress.

Quite frankly, in recent years the Armenian Komsomol has been morally undermined and has found itself tagging along behind rapidly unfolding events. The pleasant mansion across from the Armenian CP Central Committee building seemed much like a private mansion once again, keeping the Komsomol secluded from tumultuous youth demonstrations. It was clear that this could not go on for very long, now matter how much the youthful yet already quite careerist functionaries might like their office-bound work style.

The new Youth League feels that its principal task is to protect the social and economic rights of its peers, i.e. quite down-to-earth concerns. Komsomol committees at various levels have also been eliminated and replaced by republic Youth League councils with their own commissions. The newspaper KOMSOMOLETS has been renamed EPOKHA—a high-flown name, it is true, but after all this publication is pretty impudent, combining a spirit of rejection with bold affirmation of new things.

The republic Youth League will remain part of the All-Union Komsomol as a subject of federation, yet at the same time will defend the principle of confederative structure.

At a recent meeting of the Youth League Central Committee apparatus's primary party organization it was unanimously resolved to disband the primary party organization. Those wishing to remain CPSU members may stay on the party rolls at their place of residence or through other organizations.

I can hear impatient voices asking: so does that mean that in Armenia they are fleeing the Komsomol as fast as they can run? We will get an answer to that question in December, following reregistration of Komsomol members.

All that remains to add is that Levon Yesayan was elected Youth League chairman; to be sure, he is a former republic Komsomol Central Committee secretary, but he bears no resemblance to the sort of Komsomol leader usually depicted on posters, and he is also an international chess master.

Well, this is an interesting debut for the young people who are striving to bring about renewal in Armenia.

Belorussian Komsomol Goals Published

91US0132B Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
6 Nov 90 p 2

[Report: "Program Goals and Basic Orientations of Belorussian Komsomol Activity"]

[Text] We are the young people of Belorussia who actively support the transformation of all areas of life in our republic which was begun at the initiative of progressive forces in society and who realize our responsibility for the future of our people; we are voluntarily united in an independent social organization, the Leninist Communist Youth League of Belorussia.

While assessing our past critically, we take the best from the experience of previous generations of Komsomol members and strive for a qualitatively new level in the activities of our organization on the basis of:

- self-determination of Komsomol members and young people in the process of organizational formation and emerging youth movements;
- consolidation of young people for whom the highest purpose of their organization's activities is progress for their beloved Belorussia and attainment of the ideals of liberty, democracy and humanism;
- deepening of democracy within our league and elimination of the alienation of Komsomol members from the league by bringing the nature of our organization's activities into accord with the interests and needs of its members;
- expansion and reinforcement of the league's social base through direct and ongoing dialogue with all young people regardless of their adherence to specific sociopolitical or religious ideals, and reliance primarily on those who have established themselves in life through their own labor

I. Program Goals of the Belorussian Komsomol

We are united in the Komsomol by our deep concern for the fate of our country, our republic and its people and our interest in the success of radical transformation of society

As adherents of the socialist choice we define our fundamental goals as follows

- expression and defense of the interests of young people, above all Komsomol members, and assistance in their self-realization and all-round development;
- active influence on the development of and participation in the creation of state youth policy;
- active participation in public life with the goal of encouraging the progress of Belorussia and creating a humane and democratic society in our republic

II. Methods of Achieving Program Goals

The Belorussian Komsomol strives to attain its program goals through:

- participation of its members in organs of people's power and public self-government;
- cooperation with state, public and political organizations and movements and labor collectives; conducting of joint events and actions;
- use of the right to legislative initiative;
- molding of public opinion;
- realization of its own plans in the realms of socioeconomic development, culture and international cooperation for the sake of strengthening peace and friendship among peoples.

III. Basic Orientations of Belorussian Komsomol Activities

The activities of the Belorussian Komsomol are aimed above all at resolving specific problems of young people who are members of the organization. We do not and cannot have any interests which are contrary to the interests of society and young people.

1. In Support of an Effective State Youth Policy and Solutions to Young People's Socioeconomic Problems

The league will strive to achieve:

- passage of a BSSR Law on State Youth Policy and a republic Youth Program to resolve young people's social and economic problems;
- establishment within soviets at all levels of permanent commissions on youth affairs and establishment of a corresponding BSSR state agency and analogous executive organs under soviets of people's deputies;
- establishment of republic, oblast, city and rayon youth funds;
- inclusion of separate youth sections in legislative acts which affect specific youth interests;
- development and improvement of the production and social infrastructure which provides for young people's labor-related, academic, domestic and recreational activities;
- creation of an effective system of social protection for our republic's young people as the transition to a market economy is made.

The league will develop its own economic activities and youth entrepreneurial activity and will establish young people's associations, enterprises and centers; will resolve young people's social problems by means of youth housing collectives and individual construction based on long-term loans

2. In Support of Immediate Solutions to Problems Connected With the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster

The league will

- interact with state, political and social organizations and movements in order to overcome the effects of the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant;

- organize youth participation in the construction of social and consumer facilities for persons resettled from the disaster area;
- take part in treatment of young people, especially children and teenagers; establish and develop for this purpose its own center for restoration of the health of young people affected by the Chernobyl disaster;
- seek out funding and physical resources to help overcome the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, and to this end establish long-term contacts with the international community, youth organizations and our countrymen living abroad, and also carry out charitable actions and events;
- take part in the work of the commission for public monitoring of efforts to eliminate the effects of the nuclear disaster.

3. In Support of a Clean Environment

The league will:

- participate in the development and realization of a statewide ecological program and regional programs to restore a healthy environment;
- strive to establish a system of effective monitoring of the operations of ecologically hazardous production facilities and enterprises and to ensure full glasnost regarding assessments of the ecological situation.

4. In Defense of Children

The league will:

- regard every child as a legally entitled member of society and ensure him or her the right to opinion and judgment and the right to express these freely, as well as the right of association;
- support diversity in the children's movement;
- establish the organizational and programmatic preconditions for realization of the goals of the Belorussian Pioneer Organization imeni V. I. Lenin as a partner of the Belorussian Komsomol;
- strive to see a republic program to protect children enacted.

5. Spiritual Development and National Revival

The league will:

- strive to achieve broad access by each young person to the treasures of our homeland's culture and world culture and to ensure revival and development of the culture and language of the Belorussian people, as well as of the other peoples living in our republic;
- participate in social movements to restore the objective historical truth about the republic and the Belorussian people, to protect and preserve monuments of history and culture, to return to cities and towns, streets and squares their original names, to encourage and develop national culture and art, to revive national holidays, traditions, rituals, crafts,

symbols and everything else which defines the ethnic distinctiveness of the peoples living in Belorussia;

- take part in the development and realization of the "Intellect of Belorussia" republic program, the goal of which is to seek out and create proper conditions for the development of talented youth;
- found art and design workshops, studio theaters, exhibit halls and other forms for realization of creative initiatives by young people, render assistance in their establishment and development, and organize festivals, concerts and shows of young people's creative work;
- strive for democratization and humanization of the educational system and of higher and vocational schools, differentiation in instruction and realization of educators' right to creativity; develop faculty and student self-administration.

6. In Support of Efficient Organization of Leisure Time and a Healthy Lifestyle for Young People

The league will:

- participate in the development of a network of cultural centers, musical, computer, athletic and other clubs and young people's cafes, tourist facilities and athletic facilities;
- develop various forms of youth tourism;
- promote a healthy lifestyle and sponsor youth holidays, festivals, sports competitions and performances by popular youth theatrical and concert collectives.

7. In Support of Democracy and Civil Tranquility

The league will:

- strive to ensure that proclamation of any world view as the sole view, obligatory for all, is not permissible;
- conduct an ongoing dialogue and seek means of cooperation, consolidation and harmony among young people of different nationalities, world views and religious faiths.

8. In Support of Development of International Ties

The Belorussian Komsomol joins international structures as an independent organization.

The league will:

- participate in international programs of cooperation;
- develop various forms of international youth tourism;
- strive to establish contacts with our young countrymen abroad

IV. The Komsomol and You

The life of the Komsomol is based not on privileges at the expense of society, not on orders and regulations, but rather on the initiative, independence and interest of young people; therefore each person can count on the same attitude toward himself that that person demonstrates toward the organization.

Mutual relationships between Belorussian Komsomol members and their organization are based on mutual voluntary obligations and responsibility to each other.

Upon joining the organization one has a right to expect of it:

- respect for one's views, lifestyle and spiritual exploration;
- protection of one's civil and economic rights, honor and dignity;
- help with fulfillment of one's political, economic and cultural needs;
- moral, material and financial support for one's socially beneficial initiatives;
- the rights of priority usage of league property and support with Komsomol organization funds in the event of a difficult situation in one's life;
- aid in acquiring the skills required to manage the affairs of a collective, the state or society and in one's social and political activities;
- nomination and support of one's candidacy in elections to organs of state power and public self-government;
- extension of opportunities to openly express one's position on problems of concern to oneself via the Komsomol mass media;
- help in adjusting to a first or a new labor collective or academic collective, and sensitive attention to one's personal problems;
- assistance in relations with one's relatives in the USSR and abroad and in one's discovery of the world;
- help in assuring unhindered access to the national cultural heritage and in one's search for one's own understanding of historical truth regarding the past;
- support for one's pastimes and provision of the Komsomol's cultural and athletic facilities for this purpose.

Resolution of the 29th Belorussian Komsomol Congress

On the Program Goals and Basic Orientations of Belorussian Komsomol Activity

It is hereby resolved:

1. to consider the "Program Goals and Basic Orientations of Belorussian Komsomol Activity" the fundamental document explaining the nature and tasks of the Belorussian Komsomol until the next Belorussian Komsomol congress;

2. that the Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee Komsomol committees and all Komsomol organizations should be guided by the "Program Goals and Basic Orientations of Belorussian Komsomol Activity" as they develop specific plans for their work, programs and events

3. that the Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee shall render necessary practical and methodological assistance to Belorussian Komsomol committees in

regard to realization of the "Program Goals and Basic Orientations of Belorussian Komsomol Activity."

Moscow Komsomol Leader Interviewed on Future Youth Federation

91US0101A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Nov 90 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Artemyev by A. Podkopalov: "The Komsomol Opens Its Umbrella"]

[Text] There will be a place for both communists and monarchists in Moscow's future Federation of Youth Organizations.

Aleksandr Artemyev was elected to the leadership of the Moscow Komsomol two weeks ago. The name now given to his position is capable of tipping some old-school career communist over the edge—Chairman of the Moscow Conference of the All-Union Komsomol. This is why those who are used to the old ways add a hyphen and "First Secretary."

"This is not a bureaucratic whim," Aleksandr assured me. "We simply created a higher organ, a permanent conference, for the transition period in order to concentrate maximum power. During the transition to the new organization—exactly a year is allocated for this, until February 1991—we need to make so many radical decisions that we simply wouldn't have the time to convene a new conference each time. This is why delegates to the February conference will retain their status for the year."

[Podkopalov] How will this transition period end?

[Artemyev] The Moscow Komsomol will no longer exist in its previous form—that is certain. Instead, most probably it will be a federation of youth organizations having as its subjects both the former rayon organizations—many with new qualities—and other youth associations. Moreover not only sociopolitical, but also professional, creative, athletic—all kinds. There is but one criterion—their activity must not conflict with the USSR Constitution.

As far as our own Komsomol structures are concerned, each unit must decide what it is to be, and with whom it is to align itself. And a process of self-determination is under way. Some rayon organizations of the All-Union Komsomol have ceased to exist. In Zelenograd, a youth federation was formed in its place, an association was formed in Oktyabrskiy Rayon, and in the Sokolnicheskiy Rayon Committee, as an example, it has transformed into a youth club, and its first secretary has become its director. At the same time Proletarskiy and Sovetskiy rayons decided to leave everything as is. Such that the federation, if it should come about, will bring together the entire spectrum of political forces—from communists to democrats, from anarchists to monarchists.

[Podkopalov] All of this recalls the fable about the swan, the crayfish and the pike.

[Artemyev] With the one difference that the cart which they all were forced to pull will not be there. Membership in the federation is a purely voluntary matter, and it does not require participation in every action and program. Such a system of bringing together young people of different political persuasions and interests beneath the same roof—it is in fact referred to as an “umbrella”—has long existed and worked successfully in countries which we now call civilized. Why shouldn't such a system work in our country as well?

[Podkopalov] How will the federation be useful to its members?

[Artemyev] First of all we will be able to provide financial and material assistance. As we know, the All-Union Komsomol has accumulated substantial assets and hammered together a reasonably good material base, and the most recent Central Committee plenum decided to share all of this with local organizations—some of it will come down to Moscow as well.

Moreover there is a need for coordinating the activity of youth organizations at the city level. For example the MZhK [youth lodging] is something useful both to communists and to monarchists, but from a practical standpoint it is difficult to solve all problems of erecting housing for young people within just one rayon. The capital's center has the assets and the material resources, but no vacant lots, while on the periphery the reverse is true. This is a place where cooperation will work. Or consider something else. Around 400 enterprises and cooperatives are operating in Moscow under the auspices of the Komsomol. We are interested in having them work effectively, and in a way benefiting the young, which is why we submitted our own proposals on their taxation to the Moscow City Soviet. Such matters would also naturally be resolved through a federation, rather than trying to break down the walls individually.

[Podkopalov] What progress, by the way, are you making in your relationships with the Moscow City Soviet?

[Artemyev] None yet, though some movement is noticeable. At first the youth commission of the Moscow City Soviet, which was created by the way with our support, rejected outright all proposals for cooperation. The feeling was that the All-Union Komsomol was part of the party apparatus, part of the administrative system, and therefore that it couldn't suggest anything or do anything sensible. However, time has shown that the deputies, who have no experience or an executive machinery in place, are getting nowhere, and they are clearly out of touch with the revolution occurring in the younger generation. This is probably why we finally got Georgiy Pavlov, the commission chairman, to attend our conference, and were able to discuss the prospects of joint activity with him.

I was unable to ask Aleksandr one final question about mutual relations with the CPSU because he was summoned to the city party committee on short notice.

Ukrainian Minister of Education Views Ukrainianization

91UN04824 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
28 Nov 90 p 2

[Interview with Ukrainian Minister of Education at a press conference by Lyudmyla Shevchuk: “Which Language Should First-Graders Study?”]

[Text] This and other issues arose at the press conference devoted to what is perhaps the most important direction in educational work—the realization of the law concerning language. To the point, this was the first meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of People's Education of the Ukrainian SSR with journalists, organized by the recently opened press center here. And, as evident, having become overjoyed at the opportunity to learn what the ministry thinks, the journalists even neglected this theme and hurried to clear up the position of the ministry in regards to its other problems.

We are concentrating on three points, which, to judge from the mail to the editorial office, concern our readers the most. They are the following:

[Shevchuk] **FIRST POINT.** How do you view the introduction of classes conducted in Ukrainian in Russian language schools and the policy of teaching first-graders immediately in two languages?

[Minister of Education] The main idea behind creating such classes lies in the fact that children from primary grades eventually go on to high school and in order to [facilitate] the change of Russian language schools into Ukrainian language schools. We believe that the 1,158 classes to be conducted in Ukrainian, which were initiated this academic year in the republic, will lead to creation of schools that conduct classes in Ukrainian.

And the fate of classes conducted in Ukrainian in Russian schools is varied. There are discouraging signs. And wherever its discouraging—an “operation” needs to be conducted.

In regards to learning the Russian language in the first few years of classes conducted in Ukrainian, obviously, this was once done in an artificial manner, and this mistake must be corrected.

The problem lies in how are classes to be conducted in Ukrainian in Russian language schools? A discussion is going on concerning this point. I think that the conflict, if it emerges, can be resolved, by allowing the parents to have a choice. But in general, it is necessary, that the children in the classes speak their mother language.

[Shevchuk] **SECOND POINT.** How much time will it take in Eastern Ukraine before introducing the Ukrainian language will be regarded as a necessity?

[Minister of Education] The issue only concerns taking the first steps of putting the law into practice, which we in the ministry are to take, beginning on January 1 of this

year, when it acquires effectiveness. And, naturally, it will not be easy to realize this law in the eastern and southern regions, and also in Sumy and Kharkov Oblasts. In those areas there are complications. But there have already been some successes: stopping the process of closing down Ukrainian language schools, the growth in numbers of classes conducted in Ukrainian, the change in the content of education. But to talk today of some great gains is not possible.

We believe that the most complications will be experienced in Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts in realizing the law. Yet some of what are perhaps the most important type of changes are occurring there: a psychological re-orientation of leaders of people's education, of principals of schools, and of the pedagogical collectives. There is a desire to introduce the Ukrainian language into the educational process, to learn it. Today in these oblasts virtually no one is being dismissed from teaching the Ukrainian language.

[Shevchuk] **THIRD POINT.** What position are you taking in regards to de-ideologization of the educational-upbringing process?

[Minister of Education] In the conditions of today and the future, the school should be de-ideologized, depoliticized; in a multi-party system it should be independent of the ideologies of any given party; and in such conditions, the ministry is not to lean to the right or left; it should conduct a distinct policy and concern itself only with the content of education. For now the most essential changes have been introduced into the educational programs. This includes whatever could have been done practically and quickly. But the removal of that political clatter and that totalitarian ideologization, which had its place in textbooks, cannot be done so quickly. Time is needed in order to revise and republish. But we have already removed texts from the textbooks of primary school and recommended that teachers do this independently, using artistic, publicist texts in their place. The difficulties here are enormous. The teacher is left alone to confront the problems. To publish books is not so straightforward a matter, even those, which have already been written. The state press constantly tells us: how can we publish if we have no paper.

In regards to the Pioneer and Komsomol organizations, the position of the ministry is clear. We believe that all children's organizations should be excluded from the educational-upbringing process, which functioned and will function in schools, professional-technical institutes, and other educational institutes during after school hours. The relations are to be established on an equal basis.

[Shevchuk] To this information, it should be added that the organs of people's education beginning with the present academic year have begun work in renewing the content, form, and methods of activity of the pedagogical collectives, the rebirth of national schools. Witness to this fact is the project, the concept of a national, general

education high school for the Ukraine, which V.Yu. Taranenko, the first deputy minister, states will be characterized by three essential features. First. This is the establishment of the kind of national school, which would preserve the national culture, which with its organization, content, and forms of work would fully respond to the national-cultural needs of the Ukraine, the rebirth of its national distinctiveness.

Second. The proposals for this concept are determined by considerations, like the renewal of national distinctiveness in our schools, what is the essence and content of general education, the sovereignty of schools, the autonomy of schools in choosing the forms and methods of teaching and upbringing.

Third. This conception emphasizes that the school is inseparable from the national ground and root of its people. The national component is to be distinctly stressed in the content of education.

Therefore, it seems the ice has been broken in education. There is a possibility to swim. Now the matter is one of desire, daring, and skill.

Depoliticization of Education in Ternopol

91UN0392A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
15 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by Tamara Kutsay, MOLOD UKRAYINY special correspondent, Ternopol: "They Do It Differently..."]

[Text] "One of the obstacles on the path to the rebirth of an independent Ukraine is the centralized politicization of the society. . .": that is how the Ternopol city council justified its recent decision regarding the depoliticization of enterprises, organizations, institutions and educational institutions. The Ternopol oblast council also passed a resolution regarding the political neutrality of educational institutions. Ternopol is like a laboratory, where things are happening which in time will spread to all of the Ukraine.

Why Do We Need... Committees?

We cannot expect that one, even a very necessary and very timely decision can put an end to the bad things of the past (like the fairy tale hero, who with a single wave of his sword cuts off the heads of the evil dragon). Even in as democratic a city as Ternopol.

An institution of higher learning is an institution that is generally static and conservative. There are many reasons for this. Among them is the fact that we are all genetically programmed with the virus of fear of future punishment for our courage. It is like the parable about the Israelites who led the people who were born in slavery through the desert until those people died, never having made any protest.

As recently as one year ago, students at the Ternopol Medical Institute tell us, a lecturer in the department of

Marxist-Leninism publicly assured them in one of his lectures that without the knowledge of Marxist-Leninist philosophy one cannot be a Soviet doctor. Changes have taken place—the department has been renamed the department of socio-political studies, although, it is true, it has kept the same staff. And, as is appropriate in such cases, the staff members have “restructured” themselves.

“Why do we need committees (party committees, Komsomol committees)? This in no way helps one either to make the correct diagnosis, or to perform successful operations”—these were generally the replies of medical students to questions about the meaning for them personally of political structures. And this is yet another confirmation of the truth which is only now becoming obvious to us.

This is not a happy time for the leader of one of the political structures of the Ternopol Medical Institute—the secretary of the Komsomol committee, Volodymyr Voloshyn. The city council's decision about taking the party committee and the Komsomol committee out of the institute has been made. And, as they say, you cannot do anything about it. “I am troubled by one thing: who will now protect the rights of the students?” Volodymyr asks rhetorically. But, most likely, he is no less troubled by another consideration: although he has worked for Komsomol for many years, he still has not managed to earn himself an apartment. The system which tried to make everyone its debtor is now leaving its servants in the lurch.”

The party committees and the Komsomol committees will go from higher educational institutions,” says Yuri Fedorovich Vikalyuk, professor and chairman of the anatomical pathology department. “But one taboo still remains—the organs of the KGB. I raised this issue with the institute's academic council, saying that it was time to reconsider the role of this organization in the institute. The academic council remained silent. It is true, however, that they promised to establish a commission at the institute which would check whether such organs exist here and what they do.”

“Deideologization means the rejection of any ideology. Depoliticization means the rejection of politics. This has never been, is not and cannot be. We are all immersed in politics up to our ears. But we must reject monopolistic ideologization. In conditions of true political pluralism, we must familiarize students with all political movements; however, the emphasis must be on learning the specialty, on one's studies, on professional knowledge. Scientific knowledge must always dominate.” These are the views of Roman Teodorovych Hromiak, professor and chairman of the department of Ukrainian literature at the Ternopol Pedagogical Institute and a people's deputy of the USSR.

Under God's Finger

“Glory to the Ukraine!” That is how Maria Oleksiyivna Marchuk, mathematics teacher at Ternopol High School

No. 9, greets the students as she enters the classroom. “Glory to the Heroes!” comes the loud reply. But the teacher is immediately struck by something else. “Can one glorify the Ukraine in such dirt?” she asks aloud in surprise. The reaction is immediate and soon the classroom is shining.

So, for young Ternopol residents, patriotism is normal. It has even become fashionable here to address instructors as “Mr. Teacher.” But not as fashionable as having something “national” in the classroom—portraits of Shevchenko, blue and yellow flags, which, incidentally, were blessed for the local schools at Spivochke Arena.

All the Ternopol schools' politicized symbols have been relegated into the past, or, more exactly, into the warehouses of supervisors of material resources. So now, if Uncle Mykola or Ivan wants to decorate his attic with them or keep them for his descendants, he can do so.

“If we allow in educational institutions the symbols of one party, we will have to, for the sake of equality, allow those of another, and yet another. And thus we may reach the absurd,” comments Bohdan Petrovych Fenyuk, director of the city department of education.

And one of the recent decrees of the city department of education proclaimed that with the beginning of the school year, the activity of political parties and organizations, as well as of children's and youth political, politicized and politically-oriented organizations, should stop in institutions forming part of the city's system of education.

The school “red-scarf brigade” is a thing of the past. Even those Pioneers who still exist in the city are depoliticizing (and not forgetting to note this fact in their new statute) and instead of neck-ties, they now have blue and yellow ribbons. The Pioneer Palace has been transformed, in the full meaning of the word, into a city centre of children's creativity. The former school pioneer leaders have been transformed into organizers of extra-curricular activities.

At the same time, we also see the rebirth of another children's and youth organization—Plast (in this case, with a Scouting orientation).

As to God, his finger is felt in almost all the changes in the Ternopol schools. And those critics are wrong who sometimes say that people are going from one extreme to another. They are wrong because they do not see the main point—that in Ternopol, people are trying to reach the center: to put an end to the distortion of children's conception of the world. Here, they will no longer tolerate organized, savage, warlike materialism. Thus, the above-mentioned decree of the department of education says that it aims “To put an end to organized atheistic propaganda in institutions of learning.”

Before the start of the school year and at the beginning of it, many Ternopol schools were blessed. Priests sprinkled

the schools with holy water, blessed the children, parents, teachers. And in the classrooms, where for many years the faces of all kinds of party leaders looked down at the students, there now hang ikons of Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary. Beside the national blue and yellow flags. And all these things, incidentally, were brought by the children.

The history of religion (religious art, culture, world religions) has become a compulsory subject in city schools. At the same time, catechism teaching is being introduced—bringing the children to God and to the church. Does this not contradict the “revolutionary achievement”—the separation of church from school? No, because the bringing to God takes place outside of school, privately. If the children are interested and their parents do not object, pupils are registered into groups at churches, and nuns instruct them.

And how do you view the prospect of spending a “social education hour” in a traditional Ukrainian living room, decorated in the folk style? In the city’s School No. 8, students have “tasted” this experience more than once, with singing of Ukrainian songs, national folk crafts and just friendly, warm talks. “Ukrainization of Ukrainian schools” is not nonsense, but our sad reality.

“Being Ukrainian is more than just folk customs. It is something deeper. To give children an opportunity to feel that depth, to manifest their personalities in the most natural environment—this is what concerns teachers at schools,” comments Hryhoriy Burbeza, educational methodologist at the city department of education.

Remember how Father Fedir, Ostap Bender’s first-class competitor, climbed onto a mountain and began to shout in full voice: “Birds, repent publicly.” Perhaps today’s “repentance” of those who were guilty in the past would appear similar to that. Is it not simpler to just reject an ideology, at the basis of which lies the idea of a forced transformation of the world? And to free young souls from it?

That is exactly what they are doing in Ternopol.

Progress in Implementing Ukrainian Law on Languages Outlined

91UN0313A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
6 Nov 90 p 3

[Report by V.Ye. Taranenko, Ukrainian SSR first deputy minister of public education: “The Law on Languages: Steps Toward Implementation”]

[Text] The press center created under the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Public Education devoted its first press conference to the problems of implementing the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR. V.Ye. Taranenko, first deputy minister, talked about this to the journalists.

“The Law on Languages,” he said, “has laid the foundation for the rebirth of national self-awareness among the citizens of our republic. With its adoption we have done away with many obstacles for a genuinely broad-based utilization of the native language by the Ukraine’s indigenous population. We can already count on the plus side of the ledger the fact that nowadays there are virtually no schoolchildren who, for some reason or other, have been deprived of the opportunity to study Ukrainian language and literature.

“During the last two years there has been a noticeable increase in the network of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction: 400 of them have been opened or renovated; 32 schools have been newly built in major industrial centers. Moreover, during academic year 1990-91 some 1158 classrooms are being opened with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. The number of first-graders being taught in the Ukrainian language (whether six-year-olds or seven-year-olds) has increased five-fold and now comprises more than half of the pupils in this age-group. There has also been an expansion in the number of classrooms offering an in-depth study of Ukrainian language and literature.

“Unfortunately,” the speaker stated, “we are troubled by delays in implementing the Law on Languages in the Donetsk, Zaporozhye, Crimean, and certain other oblasts. And the blame for this lies not only in the lack of sufficient flexibility in the work of the local organs of public education, but also in the lack of action along these lines by the local organs of authority.

Inasmuch as the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR protects the rights and interests of citizens of all nationalities living on this republic’s territory, the speaker deemed it necessary to inform those assembled about the progress being made in this part of its implementation as well. In particular, he cited the number of schools with Romanian, Moldavian, Hungarian, or Polish as the language of instruction. It was also noted that in this academic year 18,000 pupils are studying the national languages of peoples with less densely populated concentrations in the Ukraine, such as the Bulgarians and Greeks.

As to further Ukrainizing the process of instruction in vocational-technical schools, the principal obstacle here lies in the lack of the necessary textbooks. As of today only about 20 percent of the textbooks are being published in Ukrainian, but there are more than 4,000 titles of them in vocational-technical education. Nevertheless, whereas two years ago only one out of every four PTU’s [vocational-technical schools] had Ukrainian as the language of instruction, nowadays this figure is one out of every three.

And so the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR is taking its first practical steps. In order to implement it at a more rapid and confident pace, the Ministry of Public Education considers that all ministries should join in solving this problem and, in the first place, the Ministry

of Higher and Secondary Special Education, at the juncture of which the secondary school operates.

As summarized by T. Mayboroda.

Technical-School Curriculum Described

91UN0313B Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
2 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by N. Nesvitenko: "What Is Being Taught in the Technical School"]

[Text] A lyceum or technical school training technicians to machine metals was opened a year ago in Kharkov. Nowadays some 600 young fellows and girls who have graduated from the eighth grade are studying here.

"In-depth teaching of mathematics, physics, chemistry, and other general-educational disciplines is conducted along with the continuous study of metal technology, electrical engineering, computer science, and other subjects of theoretical training," states Ivan Geyko, the lyceum's director.

But in order to become a technician engaged in machining metals, it is necessary to know perfectly the technology of machining metals not only in theory. The lyceum students study it in practice from the very first course onward in educational-production workshops, thus acquiring the vocational skills of lathe-operators, fitters, mechanics, and toolmakers.

"Nowadays our permanent production output consists of parts for assembling tractors used for plowing," states A. Yegoda, the workshop head. "We make them for a neighboring tractor plant on a contract basis."

During the days when they are working on the educational-production line the lyceum students earn 120-130 rubles per month. They usually deposit this money in their savings account in town, or else they send it to their parents.

The school day begins at 0800 hours and continues for seven hours. Then there are classes in music and art studios at the palace of culture. They are a component of the curriculum, and the lyceum students must pass examinations in these subjects.

A special place in the curriculum is occupied by the humanities: courses in ancient and modern history of the Ukraine, the USSR, juridical sciences, and aesthetics. These courses are taught by professors and docents from the local higher educational institutions; they work at the lyceum on a contract basis.

An important place in this lyceum's curriculum is occupied by the study of religion, the history of which is linked with the emergence of a written literature, music, as well as the fine and applied arts. These disciplines are called upon to lay the foundation for the lyceum students' spiritual education. The teaching of religious doctrines and religious preaching, which play an important role in

evoking a lofty morality and a feeling of charity and mercy among the lyceum students, is performed at Kharkov's cathedral.

The lyceum's educational buildings and dormitories were built on the city's eastern outskirts. It is a genuine micro-city with autonomous service facilities. Located on its territory is a sanatorium, where each lyceum student can obtain free medical treatment and preventive medical service.

Defense Account Against Anti-Semitic Views Detailed

91UN0225A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 31 Oct 90
Union Edition p 3

[Article by Nina Katerli: "The 'Honor and Dignity' of the Antisemite: Under the Protection of the Organs of Justice"]

[Text] Leningrad. "...I am an expert in the field of Russian literature and sociopolitical thought. I am also an expert in the field of French, German and Russian anti-semitism.

"After I was asked to express my opinion, I familiarized myself with the book, 'O klassovoy sushchnosti sionizma [On the Classic Essence of Zionism].' Published by Lenizdat in 1986, the author is a certain Aleksandr Romanenko. My opinion of this work is as follows:

"1. This book expresses profound hatred toward Jews as a people, and racial prejudice; it openly proclaims an ideology of Nazi-like totalitarianism, actually corresponding with the theses of Nazi theoreticians.

"2. This work possesses an ominous potential to worsen the attitudes of the various peoples of the USSR toward Jews.

"3. The opinions expressed in this book violate the provisions of a number of international treaties signed by the Soviet Union... particularly documents such as the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN declaration forbidding all forms of racial discrimination..."

The conclusions of the distinguished bachelor of arts and doctor of philosophy of Manchester and London Universities, which were ratified with the signatures of two witnesses, were handed to members of the Soviet delegation in Copenhagen in June of this year at the Conference on Human Dimensions. During the preceding year Soviet scholars and specialists on German Nazism, in a decision written at the direction of the Dzerzhinskii Rayon People's Court of Leningrad, confirmed the apparent similarity of certain provisions of Romanenko's book with the provisions encountered in anti-semitic and Nazi literature. "The experts will not undertake to deliver a judgement on whether A.Z. Romanenko studied the works of Nazi theoreticians. But certain provisions that are similar to such ideals are encountered

in the book under scrutiny," and, "The personal positions of the author showed a marked similarity."

The case, it would seem, is clear. Nevertheless, the process of Romanenko's lawsuit against me and the editors of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, which published my article, lasted nearly two years.

I wrote the article in the Fall of 1988—on the heels of the Pamyat meetings in Rumyantsevskiy Square which shocked the city.

Since that time we have gotten used to a lot of things, including the fact that anti-Semitic propaganda, which was first heard openly in Rumyantsevskiy Square, is today being carried on with the same quiet dignity by certain newspapers and magazines. Today Sumgait, Baku and Osh are behind us, and the hundreds of thousands of refugees, and the crowds of our fellow citizens at OVIR [Visa and Foreign Citizen Registration Department], and the Pamyat parade on Red Square, and the debauch at the TsDL [Central House of Literature]... And now my lawsuit with Romanenko is also behind me.

In that long-ago article I was at a loss over the fact that overt anti-Semitism could spring up in our country. And I arrived at the conclusion that official anti-zionist literature had played a significant role here. For many years it has been published with a huge circulation; it was estimated that by 1985 the number of such books exceeded 9,000,000 copies, that is, twice as many as there are people in Israel. And it was not Pamyat that thought up the method of hiding the ears of anti-Semitism under the cowl of the struggle with zionists—it was employed by the authors of several books and articles, which pounded into the heads of the readers the conviction that there is no greater danger for a Soviet citizen and no more treacherous enemies than the Zionists, who have put together a network for seizing world hegemony.

As our "national patriots" are wont to do, Romanenko immediately went to court. In his statement of claims, he asked to defend his honor and dignity, and asserted that my article "directly supports foreign Zionism in an anti-Soviet campaign against the USSR," that I committed an act of moral terrorism, having slandered him and the Leningrad Oblast CPSU Committee, having prepared a book for publication. The plaintiff solemnly signed the complaint as a participant of the Patriotic War. Romanenko asked that I receive the maximum penalty the law allows, and planned, after winning this civil suit, to bring criminal charges—for slander.

The first stage—in Dzerzhinskiy Rayon People's Court—dragged on for eight months. Everything went according to plan—the tumult, banners, outcries, and aggressively emotional "patriots," who tried to burst into the room first. Coming in earnest to the session, I somehow found my way through the crowd and Romanenko's excited female worshippers, who were making rude sounds and kicking me in the shins with their shoes.

The plaintiff appeared in court—his entire breast covered with medals and badges, and with the order of the Patriotic War on his lapel. At every session he would deliver lengthy tirades condemning world Zionism and me for having slandered the Leningrad Obkom, and angrily protested the appointment of experts, since "there are no grounds for revising the evaluation of the party obkom." He presented a statement to Judge Sapotkina, where he categorically objected to bringing in as expert witnesses scholars from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute on Oriental Studies, since many of the people who work there are allegedly of Jewish origin. Meeting the communist-petitioner halfway, the court appointed as experts two scholars from the Higher Party School and one from the Higher Trade Union School of Culture...

While the experts were working on their decision, my friends and colleagues were sending inquiries to the CPSU Obkom in order to determine whether the obkom considers itself slandered by my article. The obkom maintained a stony silence.

The decision was ready, and the court examined it on 22 June. The plaintiff was indignant, declared that the experts were my collaborators and demanded new expert witnesses. It came as a surprise to everyone when the procurator supported him. However, the court, under the chairmanship of Comrade Sapotkina, delivered its decision: to reject Romanenko's lawsuit against me and the editors of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA. Thus there appeared the document from which it followed that in 1986 a book containing Nazi ideology was published.

After the session, the plaintiff's cronies accompanied the judge to the metro with cries and threats.

Romanenko, of course, entered an appeal, and shortly before its examination brought a denunciation to the city court. There it was reported that I had "already begun to take advantage of the erroneous decision of the Dzerzhinskiy Rayon People's Court to stir up an anti-Soviet slander campaign...against the CPSU." Romanenko accused one of the experts of the fact that he was allegedly married to a Jewess, and therefore submitted a false conclusion, and called those who took part in the lawsuit at the rayon court political dumbbells...

I went calmly to the session of the city court. And so I went into the hall. For some reason the plaintiff's supporters were happily excited. In their hands they bore furled banners. Right away they advise me to submit an apology to Romanenko before it is too late. He himself, smiling, would give an interview to "Tel-Avision"...

And then the judge delivered her report.

And standing before the audience was a person whose interests had been grossly flouted by the rayon court. In the opinion of the procurator, the decision of the rayon court should be overturned because of insufficient investigation of the case, that the "rayon court did not refute a single one of the plaintiff's arguments." After a brief

meeting, they made their determination: to overturn the previous decision, to designate a new hearing, and this time in the city court. Right then and there the victory banners were unfurled.

The new lawsuit was pathetically similar to the first—the hooligan-like escapades of the plaintiff's "support group," his interminable speeches and appeals to the court with demands—to make a separate determination with respect to those who had published my article, to subject me to criminal liability for "attempts to undermine the socialist system," since "the CPSU...Marx, Engels and Lenin had never before been slandered in a more criminal manner, throughout the history of the USSR's struggle against imperialist reaction." In each of his speeches the plaintiff proved that I was right, but the pleading continued. True, the court finally did approve my petition and sent an inquiry to the obkom. And the court received an answer: It turned out that a certain resolution was passed on Romanenko's book as early as January 1987, but the obkom does not have the right to report its content to the court. The decision was...classified Secret(?). And that was all.

So that was it. However, less than a month later Leningradskaya Pravda printed that secret document. It was printed by request of candidate for RSFSR People's Deputy A. Degtyarev, first deputy chief of the Ideological Department at the CPSU Central Committee, and former Leningrad Obkom secretary (It was during his days in Leningrad that Romanenko's book was published, and now in the course of the election campaign, writer V. Voskoboynikov accused A. Degtyarev in print of complicity in the publication of an anti-Semitic work). And here, wringing its hands over a party secret (Why was this secret?!), the apparat disavowed its true defender Romanenko. For, it turns out, as early as 1987 the obkom had condemned the book and pronounced its publication an error, but after that there was...silence.

The court records contain a note from the plaintiff, with which I am in complete sympathy: "...the manuscript of the book was read and re-read by many responsible officials; for example, Barinova, who at that time was head of the obkom Agitation and Propaganda Department." And further: "At first to approve the book, and then after it was published to pour filth upon it—here you have an example of 'adherence to party principle'..."

The party apparat renounced it. And not long before that the plaintiff was deprived of his right to assert that he was—a Defender of the Motherland, who had fought the Fascists: popularity did its own deed; Romanenko had attracted the attention of journalists, and SMENA published an article in which it was shown that our plaintiff had not met with German fascism on the battlefield. He was forced to return the illegally-received medal.

One got the impression that only one organization still supports Romanenko—the procuracy. Attending all the

judicial proceedings, the procurators heard his anti-Semitic speeches, and the provocative pamphlets were distributed in their presence. And—nothing happened... Moreover, as many times as the plaintiff demanded (while trying to discredit the experts by any means) appointing a new commission which directly includes people who think like him, he received the support of the procurators. For a long time all this was a riddle to me, and it is only recently that everything became clear: in 1987 the procuracy rejected the statement of a man who was demanding that Romanenko be brought to liability for the anti-Semitic book, "O klassovoy sushchnosti sionizma [On the Classic Essence of Zionism]." Two years later, this January, city procurator D. Verevkin affirmed his previous opinion about this book, having written: "...The historical facts in the book...have been presented properly... This book does not contain propaganda which aims to stir up national enmity..." Well, after this how could the procurator support the pronouncement of the decision where it would be written that there are Nazi ideas in the book it had placed under its protection?!

In May, 1990, the experts submitted another decision to the court. This time, it seemed, victory was inevitable. But...it would have placed too many people under attack... I am not speaking about Romanenko. But after all, his book was not "samizdat." Its clients, curators and reviewers exist somewhere, and they could be named if necessary. Once again—how would it be with the procuracy?

A way out was found. The plaintiff declared, that...he requests terminating the case: "It is necessary to support the realization of the appeal of the President of the USSR...on the need to consolidate our society." The court, which not so long ago filed the plaintiff's leaflet, where he called for "preparing" for an armed assault on the Zionists and for the patriots to switch to an illegal position, granted the request of that fiery adherent of consolidation. And the case was terminated. The procuracy representative was not present at the session—what was there for him to do there?

The lawsuit has been finished. What were the results? From a retired instructor on scientific communism, the plaintiff has turned into the chairman of the All-Union and Worldwide Anti-Semitic Fronts, which he created. And at the same time, while remaining in the ranks of the CPSU—he is the chairman of a new party, "Renaissance of Russia." Xerox copies of his new work, "Genocide," and also the well-known Nazi aid, "Protokolov sionskikh mudretsov [Protocols of Zionist Sages]," with his foreword, could until recently be bought at "Otechestvo" [Fatherland] meetings. True, he has lost the right to call himself a veteran... On the other hand, over the course of two long years he had the opportunity to freely propagandize his views. Not just anywhere at meetings under the rain and snow—but in the warm and brightly lit, radio-equipped Soviet courtroom...

I and the other participants in the lawsuit lost two years on this story. In addition, I was favored with an anonymous message which promised that a magnificent lampshade would be made out of my hide. But I also achieved this, that having withdrawn the lawsuit, Romanenko has lost the right to appeal to the court in case someone repeats my analysis of his works.

Therefore, I declare that: the book, "On the Classic Essence of Zionism," published by the publishing house of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom, a book which the Leningrad procuracy does not consider criminal, a book on which the Leningrad court took no decision whatsoever, this very book contains the ideas of and all but direct quotations from the works of Nazi theorists.

Footnote

*IZVESTIYA has already spoken out very definitely about the "scholarly" creativity of A. Romanenko (No 58, 1988). No denial was heard on the part of the author at that time.

Moscow Writers Form Splinter Group

91UN0476A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 50, 12 Dec 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Prose Writers Support Poets!"]

[Text] Poets are people with an instant response. This time, they were also the first ones to perceive and correctly articulate the need to set up at the Moscow Organization of Writers an alternative creative association of poets who are tired of politicking, ambitious passions, and endless quarrels.

Alas, the situation of Moscow prose writers is no better. As a matter of fact, just one group is represented in the bureau of their creative association, for whose declarations and resolutions we cannot and do not wish to be responsible. Therefore, in our case it is also becoming necessary to create a second capital-city association of prose writers to which writers of the most diverse creative schools will belong. All they will have in common will be professionalism, human integrity, and the readiness to stand up for the rights of writers and literature.

We believe that such a measure will be much more helpful in rejuvenating our organization than the never-ending talk of consolidating the forces of writers.

We call on all those who hold dear the interests of Russian discursive arts to support us.

Gennadiy Abramov, Anatoliy Ananyev, Artem Anfinogenov, Grigoriy Baklanov, Andrey Bitov, Vardvan Vardzhapetyan, Timur Gaydar, Iosif Gerasimov, Natalya Dmitriyeva, Yuriy Dodolev, Nikolay Yevdokimov, Valentin Yerashov, Viktor Yerofeyev, Sergey Yesin, Fazil Iskander, Sergey Kaledin, Vyacheslav Kondratyev, Anatoliy Kurchatkin, Aleksandr Latsis, Lidiya Libedinskaya, Vladimir Makanin, Yelizar Maltsev, Yevgeniy Popov, Oleg Poptsov, Anatoliy Pristavkin, Vyacheslav Petsukh,

Lev Razgon, Yelena Rzhetskaya, Sergey Ryabchuk, Georgiy Sadovnikov, Vadim Safonov, Mikhail Chernolusskiy, Yekaterina Sheveleva, Vyacheslav Shugayev

Yevtushenko on New Film 'Stalin's Funeral'

91UN0476B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Nov 90 Union Edition p 3

[Report on statement by USSR People's Deputy Yevgeniy Yevtushenko: "Stalin's Funeral": "Yevgeniy Yevtushenko Presents His New Film"]

[Text] This film will be shown for the first time on 25 November in Kharkov to the voters who nominated the poet as USSR people's deputy. On 27 November, it will premiere in Moscow, at the Palace of Sports in Luzhniki. Only after this will there be a traditional premiere for cinematographers in the House of Cinema and a show in "Rossiya..."

Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich said: This is my second work in the cinema. My first film, "Day-Care Center," was an autobiography. This one is also. The name of the main character is Zhenya; he is quite young, and in the movie he reads my poetry. He also ends up, as I once did, in the horrible crush on Trubnaya Square, in a crowd of people going to Stalin's funeral bier. I wrote about it in my autobiography in 1962, and the poem of German Plisteskiy entitled "Trumpet" was also written about it (he was there as well). I intend to revisit this event in prose yet again...

I came up with the concept of this endeavor long ago, well before the concept of "Day-Care Center." Through all of these years, I have kept the memory of being there, in this crowd, this monstrous crush. It was a gigantic and diverse crowd... You know, in the final outcome it had the same face, the face of a monster. We can see it at present too—thousands of people gathered together, who may be nice individually, become an uncontrollable and cruel monster, with the features of people twisted... I remember this. It was an apocalyptic picture...

What happened at the time? The office of the city commandant and the Ministry of State Security gave instructions to block off Trubnaya Square with trucks. Human Niagara Falls poured down there from the slope, from Sretenka. People were forced to crush each other and find their way through houses and apartments. People perished, children died. This resembled a crowd forcing its way to a soccer game or a boxing event. Those who had never seen Stalin alive wanted to see him at least in his death, but they did not succeed. I did not get to see him either... The people did not cry. They cried in the kitchens and on the streets when they heard reports on the death of the leader. Over there, everything turned into a struggle for survival, a struggle for life. People squeezed into this artificial square of trucks were dying. They screamed to those in the cordon: "Get the trucks out of the way!" I remember an officer who was crying. As he was crying and rescuing children, he said only one thing: "I cannot, I have got no instructions..." To my

mind, this "I have got no instructions..." is precisely one more horrible product of the Stalinist system. After all, this is also a metaphor for our life at present: We are still being herded into a structural pattern, a cage; hence, ethnic strife and an economic impasse.

This was a surrealistic, absurd sight... At night, the breath of the people was so dense that it reflected the shadows of trees in March—an absolutely surrealistic picture...

Naturally, no documentary footage was shot at the time. I saw myself how they snatched the camera of a female foreign journalist, and this episode will be present in the movie. The British movie star Vanessa Redgrave played this woman.

There are official newsreels shot in the Hall of Columns. On Trubnaya Square nobody filmed anything—and why did they need to film this? I inquired with the KGB: Nothing is available. The picture of this Apocalypse was relegated to oblivion. I attempted to recreate this picture on screen. However, I also attempted to show something else—a transformation of this monster-crowd: Some people, myself included, tried at this point to cut the crowd apart and form chains, and then the human faces of people became visible again; the people became human. A crowd holding hands was gradually turning into the People. This is what we badly need at present!

I have always liked working with nonprofessional actors. Denis Konstantinov and Marina Kalinichenko starred in this movie of mine too. They are 16; she is a high school student, and he has already been admitted to the imeni Shchukin School. Along with these remarkably talented nonprofessional youngsters, well-known marvelous actors costarred in the movie: Aleksey Batalov who played my father and Maya Bulgakova (playing a woman who fancied herself the secret wife of Stalin—she has a real-life prototype). Svetlana Kharitonova played my aunt, who at the time told me for the first time in my life that Stalin was a murderer....

However, this is not a movie about Stalin. This is a movie about love and happiness, about love born during Stalin's funeral. I would like not only those of the elder generation to see it (see it and cry), but also the younger ones. Perhaps, at present they have difficulty believing that even then, under a tyranny, the people fell in love, experienced joy, and were happy, that these were not robot-like people, and that they had some surprisingly pure, precious moments. The following lines are from my poem "The Bratsk Hydropower Station": "Whatever you say, being 17 is being 17, even in a ghetto..."

This terrifying time, the time of Stalin, was also the time of first love and first kisses for my generation. Love is the main point of this movie.

This is a sad film. However, I would like it to give rise to a pure feeling amid our present-day bitterness, and to remind us that there is nothing superior to the love of people.

Voynovich on Publication of Satire 'Moscow 2042'

91UN0476C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Nov 90 p 6

[V. Malukhin report on statement by writer V. Voynovich at Moscow presentation of his novel; date not given: "Life From a Novel. The Year 2042 Came to Moscow Sooner Than Could Be Expected"]

[Text] First of all, the most direct parallels may be drawn between the content of the satirical novel "Moscow 2042" by Vladimir Voynovich and the present situation in our country. Secondly, this book which has been published more than 10 times in various countries was not expected in our country that soon. NEVA magazine announced it in its plan for this year, but still did not resolve to publish it. This was done by the joint Soviet-German enterprise "Vsya Moskva," which published an unprecedented 500,000 copies of the novel. Yellow and brown sheets of coarse paper on which the book is printed seem to be intentionally selected for this narrative about a profound crisis which the country is going through. Of course, this is not a show of editorial refinement meeting the demands of a sated market. It so happened that time caught up with the social fantasy of the author.

A presentation of the Soviet edition of the novel was held at the "Vsya Moskva" publishing house at which Vladimir Voynovich, who had come to Moscow, spoke.

"The recent years of my life in the West were quite a lonely time. I continued to work, published new books, but there was no response of any kind from Russia, save for the most infrequent exceptions. Is it difficult to live in isolation from one's readers? Of course it is. However, I knew that there were people who managed to get hold of my books and retype and photocopy them. At one time I was such a reader myself. I lived hoping and being aware that an unseen bond between the writer and his readers still existed, that the readers did not leave out of their lives a writer with whom they were made to part. I am grateful to them for remembering me and being loyal. My novel 'Moscow 2042' is in part fantasy and anti-utopia. However, the publication of this book is, fortunately, for real. I am grateful for this to everyone who played a part in bringing this about.

"I have no illusions regarding my own potential, but in 1982 I thought the following when I worked on the book: Perhaps if my fellow countrymen read it they will succeed in changing their future in order not to find themselves in the situation I described. In essence, I wrote a novel that was a warning. At present, reality rivals the imagination of this writer. When I was forced to leave the country 10 years ago I was considered to be virtually the greatest slanderer. They tried to convince me otherwise, but I truly could not see anything good in our life at the time. When I refer now to the rays of hope which I notice they tell me once again that I am mistaken. The readers of the book know that I am capable of

foretelling certain things. I see a reason for hope. We are now close to a critical point beyond which changes for the better should begin. Life is hard, and a difficult journey lies ahead. However, to my mind, there is no justification for despair and pessimism..."

The author of these lines has no doubt that the novel will become a bestseller, and it is very good because being capable of laughing at ourselves means that we are still alive. If we are aware of where dead-end streets end, we will go on living.

END OF

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